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Abstract 
'!his study investigated the financial perfonnance of not-for­
profit hospitals in 10 Southern states acquired by either the for­
profit or not-for-profit multihospital systems between the years 1978 
through 1982 . '!he impact of system affiliation on acquired hospitals 
was investigated by looking at average financial perfonnance from the 
two years before acquisition to 1984/1985 . Differences between the 
perfonnance of hospitals acquired by for-profit and not-for-profit 
multihospital systems were examined as well. With regard to the 
latter, major findings revealed both for-profit and not-for-profit 
multihospital systems increased debt in acquired hospitals and made 
improvements to plant and equipment. For-profit multihospital systems 
additionally increased profitability and appeared to operate their 
acquisitions in a more business-like fashion than the not-for-profit 
multihospital systems did. Comparing acquired hospitals with matched 
independents revealed that both for-profit and not-for-profit 
multihospital facilities used more debt and had newer plant and 
equipment than the not-for-profit independents did. Multihospital 
systems decreased liquidity in acquisitions as compared with 
independent not-for-profit hospitals . Only for-profit multihospital 
system facilities showed increased profitability, and this was largely 
due to higher prices. Little or no improvement in efficiency was 
observed in either for-profit or not-for-profit multihospital system 
hospitals ; however, the financial indicators used to measure 
efficiency proved to be problematic. 
ix 
CliAPl'ER 1: INTROIXJCITON 
Introduction to the Problem 
The past decade was one of relatively steady growth for 
multihospital systems (MHSs) in the United States. Through 1985, 
growth in both for-profit (FP) and not-for-profit (NFP) systems 
changed the structure of the health care industry. Not only did MHSs 
expand horizontally by including more beds and hospitals under their 
direction, many began to diversify into nursing homes, health 
:maintenance organizations, psychiatric hospitals, home health 
agencies, freestanding ambulatory care facilities and preferred 
provider organizations (Johnson, 1986) . 
CUrrently, the industry is witnessing the restructuring of many 
large FP MHSs. In 1987, Hospital Corporation of America (HCA) 
divested 104 hospitals which fo:t:ll'ed Health Trust, Inc. (carlsen, 1988; 
Southwick, 1988) . In a similar move, American Medical International 
(AMI) recently sold 37 domestic acute-care hospitals to an employee 
stock ownership plan (Southwick, 1988) . While a trend toward 
downsizing among large systems is emerging, system membership con­
tinues to be popular. Regional and local systems continue to evolve. 
This is a turbulent period in the history of health care. Rapid 
change characterizes the industry as hospitals adapt to environmental 
pressures for cost containment. system membership represents one 
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adaptation and hope for hospital survival . 
From a research perspective, it is useful to know if this hope is 
realistic. Of particular interest is determining whether or not 
inclusion in an MHS affects a hospital ' s  financial perfonnance 
subsequent to acquisition. As described in Cllapter 2 ,  systems are 
theorized to achieve various production efficiencies as well as 
irrproved access to capital . 
Another interesting question is whether financial perfonnance is 
related to the ownership of the acquiring system. That is, do 
acquired hospitals perform differently depending upon whether they are 
acquired by FP or NFP systems? While m.nnerous theorists suggest FP 
and NFP organizations exhibit different financial perfonnance, others 
believe their perfonnance is similar. The different perspectives are 
reviewed in Cllapter 2 . 
Purpose of the Study 
The specific intent of this research was to examine empirically 
the financial effects of system affiliation on previously independent 
NFP hospitals which became part of either FP or NFP MHSs . Ratio 
analysis,  which provides a means of focusing attention on critical 
relationships between components of income statements and balance 
sheets, was used to measure perfonnance. Liquidity, capital 
structure, financial activity, and profitability were assessed. Each 
represents a primary dimension of financial perfonnance as discussed 
in Cllapter 3. 
Thle to the continuing public policy debate over for-profit health 
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care (Herzlinger, 1987 ) , special attention was given to the impact of 
FP MHS purchase on subsequent hospital financial performance . 
Specifically, this study analyzed the reported financial data of 
hospitals in a 10 state region where the FP MHSs were active in 
acquiring acute care hospitals before 1982 . Although the sample was 
dominated by FP purchases, NFP MHS acquisitions in the region were 
included as well .  
'Ihe focus of research was on the financial performance of acquired 
hospitals relative to a matched set of independent NFP hospitals . The 
central question was whether system affiliated hospitals i.rrproved 
their financial performance relative to the matched set of independent 
hospitals. The financial performance of system hospitals related to 
ownership was also explored. 
'Ihe remainder of this chapter provides background for the 
research . Multihospital system expansion strategies are described, 
key tenns are defined and the focus of the study is narrowed to 
consider only hospitals which were purchased ( i . e .  become owned) . 
Differences between FP and NFP systems and the hospitals within those 
systems are clarified. Research hypotheses are stated. The chapter 
concludes with consideration of the significance of the research and 
its limitations . 
Multihospital Systems 
Expansion Strategies 
Organizations can grcM through either internal or external 
expansion. If internal expansion is pursued, the organization 
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constructs new facilities . In the case of hospitals , this involves 
overcoming certain regulatory hurdles such as obtaining a Certificate 
of Need (<X>N) to build. Internal expansion can be an extremely slaw 
path to growth (Finkler and Horowitz , 1985) . A faster alternative to 
MHS growth is expansion through business combinations . 
In fact, much of the expansion of multihospital systems has 
occurred through the external approach. Hoy and Gray ( 1986) , for 
example, doet.nnent that 80 percent of hospitals newly included in six 
large investor-owned corporations through 1984 involved purchase or 
leasing agreements. 
Definition of Tenns 
A multihospital system, as defined by the American Hospital 
Association (1986) , is "two or more hospitals , awned , leased, 
sponsored, or contract-managed by a central organization" (p. 38) . 
Each type of affiliation represents varying degrees of system 
influence over the affiliated hospital . To clarify, definitions of 
each type are given below. 
'!he American Hospital Association (1986) defines institutional 
contract management as, 
general day-to-day management of an entire organization by 
another organization , under a fonnal contract, in which the 
managing organization reports directly to the board of 
trustees or owners of the managed organization and the managed 
organization retains total legal responsibility and ownership 
of the facility's assets and liabilities . (p. 13) 
With respect to hospital management, it is clear that the servicing 
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organization is fully responsible for the day-to-day operations of the 
managed hospital but exercises limited influence over policy 
decisions . 
Similar to contract management,  a lease arrangement also involves 
full management without ownership. '!he primary distinction between a 
lease and contract management is that both day-to-day management and 
policy decisions are asSI.lll'ed by the leasing organization. "In 
essence, the lease transfers possession of hospital property and 
equipment, for a specified mnnber of years and for a specified rental , 
along with responsibility for the operation and maintenance of the 
hospital" (Zuckerman , 1979 , p. 9 ) . 
With full ownership, an MHS legally owns the affiliated hospital . 
The MHS , consequently, has no restrictions, other than those which are 
self-inposed, upon the day-to-day management and policy decisions of 
the owned facility. 
As defined by the American Hospital Association ( 1986) , 
sponsorship refers to the, 
relationship between a religious or other sponsoring organiza­
tion and a hospital that may set limits on the activities 
undertaken within the hospital or is intended to further the 
objectives of the sponsoring organization but that does not 
involve ownership or other legal relationships . (p . 57) 
With respect to MHSs,  the preceding definition suggests a loosely 
associated group of hospitals with, perl1aps , modest system influence. 
Only owned hospitals are examined in this study, to prevent 
obscuring differences between system and independent hospitals which 
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may result from consideration of too heterogeneous a group of system 
affiliated hospitals . OWned hospitals are those over which systems 
have the most influence. If financial benefits are to be realized 
from system affiliation, it is logical to expect them to be manifest 
first in these facilities. 
For the most part, this research employs Finkler and Horowitz's 
( 1985) definitions to refer to particular fonns of business 
combinations . 'Ihese authors define a combination as "any situation 
where two organizations become one organization" (p. 22) . 
A merger is a special type of combination. In a merger, 
organization A combines with organization B. '!he resulting combined 
entity is organization A or organization B.  '!his contrasts with a 
consolidation in which organization A combines with organization B, 
and the combined entity is organization C. In a merger, one 
organization is absorbed by the other. '!his research is concerned 
only with situations in which a hospital is absorbed by an established 
MHS (i . e .  mergers) . 
In situations where a hospital merges with an FP system, the 
system is considered the acquiring organization or buyer, and the 
hospital is referred to as being acquired or as the seller. 
Acquisition has a technical meaning with respect to taxes . According 
to Finkler and Horowitz , "An acquisition is a merger or consolidation 
that is a taxable transaction. A tax-free merger or consolidation is 
referred to as a reorganization" (p. 23) . A reorganization occurs in 
situations where an NFP hospital combines with an NFP system. '!his 
study does not use the tenn acquisition is its technical sense but 
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refers to all absorptions of hospitals by systems, whether FP or NFP, 
as acquisitions. 
Comparison of Systems by OWnership 
'Ihe preceding definitions do nothing to illuminate the differences 
between FP and NFP MHSs. To the extent that questions rna.y arise 
regarding the impact of structural and environmental differences on 
the financial perforrna.nce of member hospitals, it is useful to review 
the characteristics of each. At least three noteworthy structural 
differences exist. Additional environmental differences are 
d0Clll11ented. 
First, FP MHSs were substantially larger, on average, than the NFP 
MHSs. To illustrate, Table 1 gives the average m.nnber of domestic 
acute care hospitals owned, leased, or contract rna.naged per system 
between the years 1980 and 1985 . FP systems were consistently larger 
than the NFPs .  I n  1985,  FP MHSs contained, on average, roughly three 
to six times as rna.ny hospitals as the NFP systems. 
Second, hospitals in FP systems tended to be srna.ller than those in 
the various NFP systems (Table 2) . Religious systems, both catholic 
and other, tended to have the largest average hospital size with other 
religious hospitals showing a tendency toward larger hospitals over 
the years 1980 to 1985 . 
A third structural difference involves the higher concentration of 
hospitals and beds in a few large FP organizations. Table 3 gives the 
average sizes of the four largest systems in each ownership category 
by beds and hospitals per system. It is readily apparent that the 
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Table 1 :  Average NLnnbers of U.S. Acute care Hospitals OWned, Leased, 
or Managed per System, 1980-1985 
For-Profit 
(n�) 
Not-For-Profit 
catholic 
(number) 
Other Religious 
(number) 
Secular 
(number) 
Average Annual 
Growth 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1980-1985 
20 . 0  26 . 5  22 . 7  29 . 0  34 . 2  32 . 2  
(29) (29) ( 32) (30) (28) ( 33) 
6 . 6  7 . 0  7 . 6  8 . 5  8 . 9  9 . 4  
( 43) ( 43) (26) (27) (29) (40) 
7 . 0  7 . 7  7 . 9  8 . 0  8 . 6  7 . 4  
( 19) ( 19) (23) (23) (21) (28) 
5 . 7  6 . 6  6 . 4  6 . 9  6 . 4  5 . 6  
(56) (56) (82) (85) (84) (92) 
9 . 9% 
7 . 3% 
1 . 1% 
-0 . 4% 
Sources: Johnson in Modern Healthcare, ( 1982b; 1983 ; 1984 ; 1985 ; and 
1986) 
aNumber of hospitals responding to survey 
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Table 2: Average Nlnnbers of Acute care l3eds per System Hospital , 
1980-1985 
For-Profit 
( nt.llll]:)erCl) 
Not-For-Profit 
catholic 
(number) 
Average Arumal 
Growth 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1980-1985 
140 . 7  135 . 6  136 . 2  142 . 5  140 . 5  141 . 3  
(30) (30) (32) (30) (28) (33) 
261. 6 252 . 3  232 . 2 230 . 8  228 . 3  250 . 2  
( 46) ( 46) (26) (27) (29) ( 40) 
0 . 1% 
-0. 9% 
other Religious 149 . 1  146 . 0  174 . 0  187 . 8  190 . 9  204 . 4  6 . 5% 
(number) (21) (21) (23) (23) (21) (28) 
Secular 164 . 6  157. 9 151 . 8  148 . 0  158 . 3  176 . 2  1 . 4% 
(number) (64) (64) (82) (85) (84) (92) 
Sources: Johnson in Modern Heal thcare, ( 1982b; 1983; 1984; 1985; and 
1986) 
aNumber of hospitals responding to survey 
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Table 3: Average Sizes of the Four largest Systems in each OWnership category, 1980-1985* 
Average Annual 
Gro.vth 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1980-1985 
BEnS 
For-Profit 17, 583 22, 196 21, 815 23, 617 26, 251 28, 892 10 . 4% 
Not-For-Profit 
catholic 4, 250 4, 427 4, 507 4, 563 4, 572 5, 953 7 . 0% 
Other Religious 2, 293 2, 566 4, 130 4, 633 4, 710 5, 599 19 . 6% 
Secular 3, 735 4, 108 4, 035 4, 035 3, 929 3, 841 0 . 6% 
HOSPITAlS 
For-Profit 108 . 3  144 . 0  145 . 5  154 . 8  177 . 3  184 . 5  11 . 3% 
Not-For-Profit 
catholic 15 . 0  16 . 3  16. 5  17 . 0  17. 0  25 . 5  11 . 2% 
Other Religious 14 . 5  16 . 5  24 . 5  26 . 5  26. 8  25 . 5  12 . 0% 
Secular 23 . 3  28. 3  36. 3  17 . 0  26. 5  22 . 3  -0 . 8% 
*rargest systems based on number of U.S .  and foreign acute care hospital beds operated. 
Sources : Johnson in Modern Healthcare, (1982b; 1983; 1984; 1985; and 1986) 
...... 
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largest FP MHSs were much larger in corrparison to the NFP systems . In 
addition, the FP sector has been dominated by the same four companies 
over this time span: Hospital Corporation of America, American 
Medical International, Humana, Inc . ,  and National Medical Enterprises, 
Inc . ,  in descending order. With this in mind, Table 3 charts the 
average annual growth rate in hospitals and beds per system for these 
four companies. '!he table does not chart the growth of stable groups 
of NFP systems since the distinction of being among the largest four 
systems within an ownership class has shifted among systems . While 
the largest catholic and other religious systems of 1985 were 
considerably larger in tenns of beds and hospitals than their 
counterparts in 1980, they were considerably smaller than the FP MHSs. 
Environmental differences between FP and NFP systems have also 
been documented (Olanges in the ownership, control, and configuration 
of health care services, 1986). Most FP system hospitals are located 
in the "sunbelt" states, high growth states, areas with favorable 
insurance characteristics, and suburban areas . '!hey are less likely 
to be located in highly regulated states ( i . e . , states where hospital 
rate changes are controlled by government agencies) .  NFP MHSs, to the 
contrary, have hospitals located more in keeping with the national 
distribution of hospitals . 
Finally, the growth of NFP MHSs has occurred largely, although not 
exclusively, through the acquisition of other NFP organizations . 
Until recently, FP MHSs also grew through the acquisition of other 
organizations of similar ownership type . Between 1980 and 1984, 
however, NFP and governmental hospitals began to assume a significant 
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portion of the acquisitions of FP MHSs (Hoy and Gray, 1986) . 
While the ownership differences cited alx::Jve are unmistakable, they 
are not necessarily related to differences in financial performance . 
In fact, the financial performance of the two ownership types, 
particularly in similar envirornnental circumstances, may be similar. 
'Ibis idea is developed further through the literature review in 
Olapter 2 .  For the present, Table 4, which provides the annual 
revenues of hospitals responding to Modern Healthcare's surveys 
between 1982 and 1985 , shows the NFP MHSs increased their revenues at 
a faster rate than FP MHSs . While these figures could reflect a 
particular response bias ( e . g . ,  more aggressive NFP hospitals 
responding to the surveys) , another explanation is a more business-
oriented approach among NFP MHSs . Fox example, Coyne (1985b) found 
similarities in financial ratio trends in a sample of FP and NFP MHSs 
between the years 1978 to 1982 . Findings such as Coyne's have led 
researchers and practitioners to expect increasingly similar behavior 
from FP and NFP MHSs. 
Research Hypotheses 
Two hypotheses flow from the overview presented in this chapter. 
Each is further developed in the chapters which follow. 
Hypothesis 1: There is no difference in the financial 
performance of FP and NFP MHS-acquired hospitals . 
Hypothesis 2: Financial performance in MHS-acquired hospitals 
differs favorably from that of independents . 
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Table 4: Comparative Growth of Revenues for For-Profit and Not-For­
Profit Multihospital Systems, 1982-1985 
Revenues (Millions) 
For-Profit 
1982 1983 1984 
Average Annual 
Growth 
1985 1982-1985 
$8, 866 . 0  $11, 131 . 0  $13, 186 . 7  $15, 538 . 9  20.6% 
Not-For-Profit $15, 475 . 2  $22, 348 . 0  $26, 772 . 2  $32, 660 . 3  28 . 2% 
Sources: Johnson in Modern Healthcare, (1983; 1984; 1985; and 1986) 
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Significance of the Study 
SWeeping changes occurred in the structure of the hospital 
industry prior to 1985. Many of these changes relate to the growth of 
MHSs . 'Ihe increased presence of MHSs and concomitant cost containment 
pressures in the hospital industry make understanding the impact of 
systems on acquired hospitals both interesting and important to 
healthcare researchers, policy makers, and managers. 
First, researchers may find this study of interest since it fills 
a gap in the existing errpirical literature. No study to date has 
examined the impact over time of full system ownership on the 
financial performance of MRS-acquired hospitals in relation to that of 
independent hospitals .  Further, no study has examined post­
acquisition data taken during the years since Medicare began 
reimbursing providers on a prospective basis. 'Ihe latter is important 
since cost-based reimbursement contained few incentives tc:Mard 
financial efficiency and control . 
Second, given the promise of ilTiproved financial performance 
associated with system affiliation (Zuckerman , 1979) , public policy 
makers may be interested to know if MHSs can ilTiprove hospital 
financial performance sufficiently to ensure the survival of these 
institutions in an increasingly cost-conscious environment.  'Ihis is a 
particularly timely issue for threatened rural hospitals (Brice, 
1988) . 
From another perspective, this study may be of interest to the 
Federal Trade Conunission and the Justice Department, both are 
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concerned with the anti-trust illlplications of mergers . As will be 
shown , one of the illlportant findings from previous research is that 
system affiliation is frequently associated with higher charges for 
services . Higher prices in the absence of illlproved operating 
efficiency raise questions about whether combinations in the hospital 
industry are in the public interest . 
Finally, managers of both MHSs and independent NFP hospitals may 
find this study of interest . System managers can gain insight into 
the potential financial benefits of expansion strategies via 
acquisition of freestanding NFP hospitals .  Individual hospital 
managers can find answers to questions about the likely illlpact of 
acquisition upon their hospitals. 
Limitations 
'!he illlpact of acquisition upon the financial perfonnance of 
acquired hospitals was examined. Since the level of analysis is at 
the hospital rather than system level, no conclusions can be drawn 
about the effects of merger on system perfonnance. Another limitation 
is the focus on previously independent NFP hospitals acquired by MHSs. 
'!his research did not consider the consequences of acquisition on 
previously independent FP hospitals. 'Ihree additional limitations 
involve aspects of the research methodology including: (a) the 
research design, (b) the use of Medicare cost report data, and 
(c) financial ratio analysis . 
First, a significant limitation of the research results from the 
use of a self-selected sanple and nonequivalent control group design 
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( campbell and Stanley, 1963) . Clearly, study hospitals were self­
selected in so far as they were facilities which sought system 
membership. In a true experimental design, subjects are randomly 
assigned from a cormnon population to study and control groups 
(campbell and Stanley, 1963) . In the foregoing manner, pre­
experimental sampling equivalence is assured. Unlike the true 
experimental design, the quasi-experimental design used here does not 
assure pre-experimental equivalence between study and control groups . 
A matching procedure was used instead in an effort to assure as much 
similarity as possible between groups . As a result, there were 
various threats to the internal and external validity of the study as 
discussed in Chapter 3 . 
A second limitation of the research design involves the 
measurement of financial performance for study and control hospitals 
in the two years immediately prior to acquisition and in 1984 and 
1985 . CUring the years between these pre- and post-acquisition 
measurements, financial performance is unmeasured. As a result, it is 
only possible to compare pre- to post-acquisition performance. 
Another quasi-experimental design, the multiple time-series, is a 
stronger alternative to the above (campbell and Stanley, 1963) , but 
not feasible due to data unavailability and expense . 'Ihe multiple 
time-series involves a study and control group with multiple 
observations leading up to the treabnent ( i . e . ,  system acquisition) 
and following immediately thereafter. 'Ihe multiple time-series allows 
examination of the slopes of regression lines for performance measures 
before and after treabnent. In this manner, trends in financial 
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pe.rfo:nnance can be examined. statistically significant improvement in 
pe.rfo:nnance measures associated with system membership may be suspect 
if trend analysis suggests these measures were improving prior to 
acquisition ( i . e . , if the slopes before and after were unchanged) . 
A further limitation of the research involves the use of Medicare 
cost report data. Medicare cost reports, while the best source of 
available information, were frequently unaudited. As a result, the 
data could misrepresent a hospital ' s  financial status . 
Financial ratios have limitations, as well . While ratios 
generally minimize the effects of inflation when corrparisons are being 
made across different time periods, they are unable to perf om this 
function when assets, which are recorded at historical cost, are used 
in the construction of the ratio. During periods of inflation, a bias 
results which must be considered in their interpretation. 
SUmmary 
Although system grcMth is slowing, this organizational fonn 
continues to be popular in the hospital industry. Pressured by third 
party payers , both governmental and private, hospitals are adapting to 
cost contairunent . System affiliation represents one such adaptation. 
'!his research sought to ascertain if MHSs were able to bestow upon 
member hospitals the theorized financial benefits of system 
affiliation. Further, inquiry was made into whether FP or NFP MHSs 
were more successful in improving the financial perfo:nnance of member 
hospitals . 
FP and NFP MHSs differ from one another in certain structural and 
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envirornnental respects. '!he average FP system is larger than the 
average NFP system; however, the average FP system hospital contains 
fewer beds. FP MHS hospitals and beds tend to be concentrated in a 
few large organizations, and the FP MHSs tend to select more favorable 
envirornnents in tenns of growth potential, insurance characteristics , 
population and regulations. In spite of these differences , recent 
national sw:veys show revenue growth among NFP systems exceeding that 
of the FP MHSs. Additionally, there is reason to believe FP and NFP 
MHSs are beginning to demonstrate similar financial trends . 
In recent years , FP systems have acquired previously independent 
NFP hospitals . '!he following chapter reveals that these hospitals 
tended to be financially distressed. Some interesting questions 
follow from these observations. First, are systems able to positively 
impact the financial performance of their acquisitions? Secondly, 
does ownership status make a difference in performance? 
Olapter 2 reviews the literature to provide a theoretical and 
empirical base for the proposed research . '!he theorized economic 
benefits of system affiliation are explored as well as theories 
regarding the behavior of FP and NFP organizations. Chapter 3 
describes the research design and methods . Findings are reported in 
Chapter 4 . Discussion and irrplications of the research follow in 
Chapter 5 .  
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rnAPI'ER 2: LITERA'IURE REVIEW 
Conceptual Framework 
Merger is a highly complex and poorly understood phenomenon. 
Numerous and conflicting theories can be found to explain why 
organizations merge. Among these are economies of scale, 
technological advance, market control, pooling of human capital, 
managerial interest in growth , and a variety of lesser considerations 
(Bisbee, 1981). Zuckennan (1979) outlines economic, manpower, and 
organizational benefits to explain MHS growth . Ennann and Gabel 
(1986) believe "increasing financial pressure upon hospitals to remain 
solvent has stimulated the growth of multihospital systems" (p. 477). 
Attention is confined here to the theorized economic and financial 
benefits of system membership on acquired hospitals. '!his section 
discusses the benefits, reviews one theory of the ilnpact of merger on 
hospitals over time, and considers whether type of ownership (i.e., FP 
or NFP) can be expected to influence financial performance. '!he 
chapter concludes with a review of empirical research findings. 
Economic Benefits 
Production Efficiencies 
In an early work, May (1971) outlined four theoretical 
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explanations for hospital mergers. 'Ihese were selected to correspond 
with ideas in the general economics literature. Included were: (1) 
economies of scale, (2) market share, (3) complementarity among items 
in the product line, and (4) the structure of the market. '!he first 
three relate to production efficiencies. 'Ihe latter refers to an 
organization's interest in reducing the competition between itself and 
others and relates to antitrust issues. 
Economies of scale or, as they are alternately referred to, 
increasing returns to scale, are said to arise when, "a particular 
scale of physical plant produces a doubling of output which does not 
necessitate a doubling of every input" (May, 1971, p. 68). According 
to May, economies of scale result from increased utilization of excess 
capacity, quantity discounts available through :mass purchasing, 
increased specialization, lowered cost of capital, and the statistical 
law of large numbers. '!he latter states that 11 if you observe a large 
sample from a given distribution, then variance will be smaller 
relative to the mean than it would be for a small sample" (May, 1971, 
p. 71). For merged hospitals this may mean less variation in 
occupancy, for example. 
A change in market share resulting from merger allows an acquiring 
organization the opportunity to expand its delivery of services. If 
two hospitals which produce complementary services merge, the combined 
hospital may produce the services more efficiently since an increase 
in one service will result in an increase in the other. 
It is apparent that many of the efficiency characteristics 
identified by May relate to mergers of geographically proximate 
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hospitals rather than widely dispersed systems . Another problem in 
the application of May's ideas to the present work is his definition 
of economies of scale. May's usage is rather broad. Further, 
economies of scale, by definition, should result in increased output. 
Mergers of the type discussed here ( i.e. , acquisitions by 
geographically dispersed MHSs) generally do not lead to such an 
outcorre . 
For the preceding reasons, the tem production efficiencies rather 
than economies of scale provides the more appropriate description of 
potential benefits from MHS acquisition. 'lhese benefits may result 
from volmne discounts, more efficient use of capital facilities and 
equipment, more efficient use of highly skilled personnel, utilization 
of more experienced management, better accounting methods as well as 
less costly and easier access to capital . 
Access to capital 
MHS hospitals enjoy advantages over independent hospitals in 
securing capital financing . '!he prbrary benefit of systems with 
regard to capital financing is their decreased riskiness . "Systems 
(both tax-exempt and investor-owned) are perceived as sounder risks 
because of their larger revenue, asset and equity bases , and debt 
capacity" (Ennann and Gabel, 1986, p.  477). Investor-owned MHSs have 
the added advantage of being able to raise capital by issuing stock. 
While not exclusively a system benefit, Medicare's past practice of 
guaranteeing a rate of return on equity to FP hospitals gave FP MHSs 
an opportunity to raise more capital funds through profits (Ennann and 
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Gabel, 1986, p. 478). 'lhese advantages may be partially balanced by 
the NFP sector ' s  access to financing through tax-exempt bonds . 
Economic Impact of Merger OVer Time 
Cooney, Alexander, Beatzoglou, and Doody (1975) hypothesize that 
newly fanned MHSs, after an im:nediate post-merger adjusbnent period, 
will reach a new state of economic equilibrium. At this new 
equilibril..nn position, average costs and prices for services will be 
relatively lower and output will be relatively higher than those of 
similar independent hospitals . Costs and prices may be relatively 
higher during the adjusbnent period. At the foundation of this theory 
are the theoretical benefits of lowered costs and increased output 
attributed to economies of scale. Prices are theorized to decrease as 
MHS hospitals pass savings on to consumers. 
Increased costs during the adjusbnent period may arise from setup 
costs, internal personnel friction, and external adverse reaction. 
Setup costs can include legal and professional fees, any overpayment 
for assets, or the establishment of a corporate headquarters. lDss of 
productivity may result from interpersonal friction and various 
problems inherent in organizational change. Finally, a negative 
comnn.mity reaction to merger may result in a costly decline in the 
conslllTlption of services. 
A similar adjusbnent period has been hypothesized for hospitals 
acquired by existing MHSs. Added costs may occur as a result of 
efforts to upgrade an acquired financially distressed institution. 
While it is fairly clear that system benefits are likely to take 
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time to realize, there is less certainty about the length of the 
adjusbnent period . Cooney, Alexander, Beatzoglou, and IX>ody (1975) 
suggest that the period of adjusbnent may vary depending upon the 
particular circumstances surrounding mergers . While they provide no 
definitive guidelines about length of time, the irrplication is that 
economic benefits may take a "long time" to achieve. Jolmson (1982a) 
reports that Hospital Corporation of America 1 s figures indicate that 
up to five years are required to turn around a distressed institution 
and 18 months to raise a relatively healthy acquisition to a target 
level of profitability, which is an 18 percent pre-tax return on 
assets . Errpirically, researchers have used as few as two years 
(Alexander and Lewis, 1984) and as long as seven (Treat, 1976) to 
examine the economic benefits of merger . 
Theories of For-Profit and Not-For-Profit Behavior 
OWnership structures 
Investor-owned corporations are established for the purpose of 
maximizing stockholders 1 wealth .  The owners elect the organization 1 s 
l:x:>ard of directors who, in turn, employ top management . Both the 
l:x:>ard and top management may hold considerable stock in the company. 
The NFP corporation is organized differently. There are no owners 
or the organization is owned by members who are forbidden from sharing 
in surpluses from operations .  Unlike the FP finn, the purpose of the 
NFP organization is generally not stated in terms of profitability. 
Instead, its mission may be couched in terms such as providing 
particular services or being responsive to community needs . 
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Nevertheless, the NFP organization cannot fulfill its mission without 
remaining economically viable . 
'lheories 
Most theories developed to explain the behavior of FP and NFP 
organizations envision the FP form as more efficient than its NFP 
counterpart. However, as will be shown, there may be ample reasons to 
expect few differences between NFP and FP hospitals . 
Property Rights 'lheory. 'lhis is the dominant theoretical model 
used to predict differences in economic performance between FP and NFP 
firms . Under conditions present in a competitive market, property 
rights theory suggests FP firms will behave in an economically 
efficient fashion . As described by Register, Sharp, and Bivin (1985), 
this result derives from the owner ' s  exclusive residual claim to the 
net revenues of the organization . To ensure that the management 
operates the firm in an economically efficient profit-maximizing 
manner, the for-profit owner may extend a partial residual claim to 
the appointed manager . In the NFP organization, no sudl mechanism is 
present .  No individual can augment personal income through efficient 
operation . Consequently, property rights theory predicts the NFP 
organization will diverge from strict profit maximization. 
Unfortunately, property rights theory gives no guidelines to 
predict the particular form the behavior of NFP organizations will 
take . To fill this gap a number of theories of NFP hospital behavior 
have been advanced. 
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The Not-For-Profit Hospital as a Physicians ' Cooperative. The 
critical assumptions of this model advanced by Pauly and Redisch 
(1973) are that the physician staff members control hospital 
operations and assure that the hospital produces services in a manner 
which max:intizes their joint incomes . This model suggests the 
physician is the "traditional income max:intizing economic agent who is 
' discovered ' in a decision-making role within this not-for-profit 
enterprise" (p. 211) . Under the physicians ' cooperative model, 
quality consciousness can be explained as a synonym for "application 
of nonphysician labor and capital in physician-income-enhancing ways" 
(p. 222). Inefficiencies arise because the physicians have little 
incentive to restrain hospital cost increases . 
Not-For-Profits :Maximize Quality And Quantity. This model 
proposed by Newhouse (1970) is based on considerations of the 
self-interests of the administrators whose perfonnances are asst.nned to 
be judged by the prestige of the institution in which they serve .  
According to the model , administrators attempt to maximize both 
quantity and quality of services subject to a budget constraint . 
Inefficiencies arise because the decision-maker chooses a }:X)int on the 
quantity-quality tradeoff cw:ve which is optimal for him but not 
necessarily socially optimal . That is, the administrator may produce 
higher quality, defined by Newhouse as more expensive, care than would 
be produced in a competitive market where consumers make infonned 
decisions. 
A somewhat similar theory has been advanced by Reder (1965) . He 
suggests NFP conrrnunity hospitals "tend to be run as though their 
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objective was to maximize the weighted number of patients treated (per 
time pericrl), the 'weights ' being the professional prestige of the 
doctors attending them" (p . 480) . 
A Conspicuous Production 'Iheory. Lee (1971) proposed a mcxlel 
which also suggests that administrators attempt to maximize their own 
utility. '!he theory asstnnes "the utility of hospital administrators 
is a function of the status of the hospitals in which they serve" 
( p .  200) . '!he status of the hospital is further assumed "to vary 
directly with the range of services available and the extent to which 
expensive and highly specialized equipment and personnel (including 
M . D . 's) are available" (p . 200) . 
Lee outlines two results, suggesting inefficiencies, which follow 
from the conspicuous prcrluction mcxlel . First, inputs of higher 
quality than those warranted by prcrluction requirements can be 
expected. Secondly, undue duplication of sru:vices, over equipment, 
and over hiring of staff are predicted. 
Not-For-Profits Maximize cash Flow . Karen Davis (1972), in a 
mcxlel more closely resembling the profit-maximizing mcxlel, suggests 
that the NFP hospital maximizes the difference between revenue and 
out-of-pocket expenses . 'Ihese expenses include operating expenses 
other than depreciation expenses. '!he cash-flow maximizing hospital 
is expected to minimize the short-run cost of prcrlucing output . '!he 
primary distinction between this mcxlel and a profit maximizing mcxlel 
is that the quantity of capital services used does not depend "upon a 
minimum cost criteria, but upon the availability of funds in the past 
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( including philanthropy, government grants and retained earn.ings) " 
(p. 4 ) . 
Implications of Envirornnental Influences 
Each of the theories reviewed above attempts to describe the 
behavior of hospitals based upon the internal organizational 
characteristics of the institution ( i . e . , ownership fonn) . While 
these characteristics no doubt influence the organization ' s  behavior, 
there may be problems with the application of theories which fail to 
account for the influence of the external envirornnent or make 
erroneous asSUI'lptions about the envirornnent.  
Property rights theory, for example, predicts organizations will 
behave in an economically efficient fashion in corrpetitive markets . 
Perfectly corrpetitive markets are asst.nned to arise under conditions 
wherein, 
const.nnerS and producers have perfect knowledge ; there are 
large mnnbers of buyers and sellers in the market; each 
seller ' s  goods are perfect substitutes for all other seller ' s  
goods ; and a change in the quantity of goods available 
doesn ' t  create market power for either buyers or sellers . 
(Langwell and Moore, 1982 , p .  2 )  
Asymmetric infonnation and barriers to entry suggest that 
profit-maximizing organizations may not operate efficiently in the 
hospital industry (Profits and health care: an introduction to the 
issues , 1986) . 
An argt.nnent can also be made that the distinctions between 
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organizational ownership types have be:jun to break down (Profits and 
health care: an intrcxluction to the issues , 1986) . At least ten 
factors have been identified which influence the breakdown. Four are 
of importance to this discussion. First, few differences in sources 
of capital exist today. Olaritable donations and goverrrrnent grants to 
NFP hospitals have been severely limited. Both NFP and FP hospitals 
obtain most of their capital from retained earnings and debt. With 
less philanthropy, NFPs have less cushion from competitive pressures . 
Second, the prohibition against distribution of profits by NFP 
hospitals is breaking down as legal ways are found to develop 
incentive plans which differ little from profit-sharing plans . Third, 
strong values affect the behavior of health care organizations and 
"may attenuate ownership-related differences" (Profits and health 
care : an intrcxluction to the issues , 1986 ,  p.  10) . Finally, both 
ownership fonns are subject to economic pressures . 
With regard to the latter, many believe differences between FP and 
NFP systems will decrease due to recent changes in the reimbursement 
envirornnent.  Since 1984 Medicare has been reimbursing hospitals on a 
prospective basis. Other insurance plans have followed Medicare ' s  
lead. Price consciousness on the part of employers has increased, as 
well . As predicted by one NFP CEO, "We are going to see more 
similarities than differences between the investor-owned and the 
not-for-profit systems in many areas, and I think that will be the 
case in both operational and capital financing" (Wegmiller, 1983 , 
p .  49) . 
Researchers who have studied the financial perfonnance of systems 
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using data from the era of cost-based reimbursement suggest the 
changErl reimbursement envirornnent warrants continuing evaluation. 
Renn, Schramm, Watt, and Derzon ( 1985) , for example, state, 
there is the possibility that the economies of scale and 
prcx:luction efficiencies prornisErl by theory from the 
consolidation of hospitals into multi-institutional systems, 
regardless of ownership, may be achievErl in the face of 
stronger incentives . (p. 233)  
All hospitals face an increasingly hostile envirornnent which 
includes greater competition from other hospitals as well as 
substitutes, pressure for cost contairnnent ,  threats of corporate 
take-over, and issues of legitimacy. '!hose pressures are likely to 
overshadow the influence of ownership fonn. As a result, it is 
expected that recent data will reveal few differences between the 
perfonnance of hospitals associatErl with NFP and FP MHSs . 
Review of the Empirical Literature 
Eight studies have explicitly examinErl the financial perfonnance 
of system affiliatErl hospitals through the use of financial ratios . 
'Ihree dealt with the effects of a particular type of system 
affiliation, contract-management .  'IWo examinErl hospitals fully ownErl 
by systems, and the remaining three considerErl a variety of fonns of 
MHS affiliation. 
'!his portion of the chapter examines studies which have made 
contributions to our current understanding of the impact of system 
affiliation on the financial perfonnance of ac:quirErl hospitals .  No 
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effort has been made to be comprehensive in reporting the findings of 
each study. Instead, findings relevant to the present research are 
reported and discussed. 
'!he review of the research literature serves two purposes. First, 
it provides an empirical foundation for the research design and 
methods presented in Chapter 3 .  Second, the literature review 
provides a means of linking the current study with previous research . 
To accomplish these objectives, the research is grouped by method 
( i . e. univariate or multivariate analysis) and explored. A sununary 
and discussion of the adequacy of the research methods are presented 
at the conclusion of each section. Appendix A contains infonnation 
about the sample, data sources , methods, and findings of each study. 
With the exception of one, all of the studies reviewed use data from 
1982 or before. 
Univariate Research 
Cross-sectional Studies 
Levitz and Brooke (1985), in a study of all short-term, acute 
care, nongovernment hospitals in the state of Iowa, studied the 
financial perfonnance of system hospitals in comparison with 
independent hospitals . A sample of 94 hospitals, 1981 data, and 
t-tests were employed. 
After testing for differences between contract-managed and syster 
owned hospitals, Levitz and Brooke concluded the two were sufficient] 
similar to warrant combination for purposes of analysis . 
Statistically significant results revealed several differences between 
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system arrl irrlepen::ient hospitals, however . System affiliated 
hospitals used greater debt leverage arrl enj eyed higher measures of 
operating profitability than in:iependent hospitals . On measures of 
overall profitability, no statistically significant differences were 
foun:l. 'Ihe superior operating profitability of systems appeared to 
result from the aggressive pricing policies of the MHS hospitals . 
'!hey marked up prices over expenses significantly higher than the 
in:iependent hospitals but also had significantly higher deductibles . 
No differences were observed in liquidity or the efficient use of 
assets . 
In another study using the population of all AHA member hospitals 
arrl 1981 AHA data, Coyne (1985a} examined the relative capital 
structure arrl profitability of system arrl in:iependent hospitals. 
Differences in median measures were examined by ownership (i . e . ,  
for-profit, church operated, arrl other not-for-profit) arrl system 
affiliation . While no tests of statistical significance were 
conducted, Coyne ' s  firrlings support other research in:iicating that MHS 
hospitals, particularly the investor-owned, used greater debt leverage 
arrl were more profitable than in:iependent hospitals. 
In a study using more recent data, McCue arrl Lynch (1987) examined 
parent, or lead, hospitals of 56 small systems arrl a matched set of 56 
in:iependent hospitals . Differences in the average financial 
performance of MHS arrl in:iependent hospitals were examined by 
ownership category. Few statistically significant differences were 
foun:l. For exarrple, only secular NFP MHS hospitals were foun:l to use 
more debt than their in:iependent counterparts . '!hey were also 
31 
significantly less profitable. In results not published, MHS 
hospitals were found to differ little by ownership. While this may 
have resulted partially from the small sample sizes, the finding lends 
support to the argument that FP and NFP MHS hospitals , in a more price 
conscious reimbursement envirornnent ,  are likely to be similar rather 
than different. 
Longitudinal Studies 
Wheeler, Zuckerman, and Aderholdt ( 1982 ) used a time-series 
quasi -experimental design to examine the financial perfonnance of FP 
and NFP hospitals under contract with a single NFP MHS . Data for 
three pre-contract years and three years during contract-management 
were taken on each hospital . Differences in average perfonnance 
before and during contract-management were tested using t-tests . A 
similar procedure was used to examine the rates of change of 
profitability indicators before and after contract-management .  
Contract-managed hospitals demonstrated a statistically 
significant i.nprovement in profitability which the researchers 
believed resulted from increasing revenues and controlling the rate of 
increase in expenses .  Expenses per discharge increased but 
proportionately less so than revenues per discharge. While 
statistically significant increases in price and the efficiency with 
which fixed assets were enployed ( i . e .  fixed asset turnover ratio) 
were observed , the researchers were reluctant to attribute these 
effects to contract-management since upward trends were apparent in 
the variables prior to the introduction of external management . Debt 
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financing expanded under contract-management,  but the difference was 
not statistically significant . No statistically significant changes 
in liquidity were observed, but contract-managed hospitals tended to 
decrease their liquid assets to a level more closely resembling 
industry standards. 
Kralewski , Dc::lv.U, Pitt, and Biggs ( 1984 ) also used a ti.Joo-series 
design to measure the financial effects of contract-management on 
participating hospitals .  Observations for this study were taken in 
each of the three years prior to the initiation of contract-management 
and in each of the three years after the contract was in effect. 
Differences in the average perfonnance for the first and second three 
year periods were calculated for each hospital and then averaged by 
group ( i . e. contract-managed and non-contract-managed hospitals) . 
Average differences were compared through the use of t-tests . Rates 
of change were calculated using ordinary least squares regression and 
average differences between the two groups were tested in an analogous 
fashion. 
'!he primary finding of this research was that contract-managed 
hospitals tended to price services higher after the initiation of 
external management .  'Ihe result was a significant irrprovement in 
profitability .  Profitability increased in spite of the fact that not 
all of the increased billings were collected. '!his was reflected in a 
decline among contract-managed hospitals in the percent of gross 
patient revenues collected while non-contract-managed hospitals 
remained relatively stable on this measure . Each of the reported 
results was statistically significant. 
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'Ihe most consistent findings from the univariate studies suggest 
system affiliation is associated with higher prices, improved 
profitability, and greater use of debt. While these results support 
the theory that system hospitals benefit from improved access to debt 
capital , no support is found for the position that systems benefit 
their members through production efficiencies. Instead, the studies 
suggest that systems improve their operating profitability by charging 
higher prices . 
Several problems are apparent in the research methods used to gain 
the above results. First, the Wheeler, Zuckerman, and 
Aderholdt ( 1982) study examined only one group, contract-managed 
hospitals . Since no control group was used, restraint must be 
exercised in attributing the observed effects to contract management . 
Findings may reflect little more than national trends in hospital 
performance. Second, cross-sectional research designs were used in 
three of the studies . Such designs are limited in at least two major 
respects . Cross-sectional sarrples may include hospitals affiliated 
with systems for varying lengths of time. To the extent that length 
of MHS association affects financial performance, inclusion of newly 
or recently acquired hospitals may result in confounded or 
insignificant results . Further, a cross-sectional sarrple of hospitals 
gives little information about the effects of system affiliation on 
member hospitals . Observed differences may be due to selection bias 
rather than system influence. longitudinal designs overcome these 
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problems ;  however, the use of univariate statistics is a limiting 
factor in both types of studies . 
One problem of univariate statistics occurs when a large mnnber of 
measures are tested individually for statistical significance and only 
a few differences are fow'rl. 'lhese differences may be "nothing ltK)re 
than statistical artifacts attributable to sinple random variation" 
(Johnson and Meinster, 1973 , p.  59) -that is , the probability of 
having tests "indicate a significant difference due to nothing but 
chance increases rapidly as the mnnber of tests increases" (p. 59) . 
'!his phenomenon may account for the statistically significant 
differences fow'rl in the McCue and Lynch (1987) study in which 60 
t-tests were conducted with only four significant findings . 
Another problem with relying on univariate analysis is that 
performance measures may not be independent of one another. As 
Johnson and Meinster ( 1973 ) point out, 
Significance testing is corrplicated by two related problems : 
(1)  Some of the perfonnance measures might be highly 
correlated with one another and ( 2 )  some measures might act 
differently in combination than they would if tested 
separately .  '!he fact that some o f  the measures interact upon 
each other, altering the total effect upon overall performance 
cannot be detected or accounted for in a univariate analysis. 
(p. 60) 
Multivariate analysis is useful for the preceding reasons . 
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Multivariate Research 
Studies 
TWo studies (Alexander and lewis, 1984 ; Renn et. al . ,  1985) used 
multiple regression analysis to measure the effects of ownership and 
system affiliation on hospital financial performance while controlling 
for other relevant hospital and envirornnental variables . A third 
(McCue and Furst, 1986)  profiled the financial characteristics of 
independent NFP hospitals acquired by the FP MHSs. 
Using a large sample and a randomly selected comparison group, 
Alexander and lewis ( 1984) sought to identify the financial 
characteristics that different MHS ownership types emphasize as part 
of their general operating and acquisition strategies . To compensate 
for a lack of longitudinal data, these researchers identified and 
studied cohorts of hospitals under contract in 1980 for less than two 
years and greater than two years . 
Their statistically significant findings revealed that only FP 
contract-managed hospitals demonstrated an improvement over non­
contract-managed hospitals on measures of efficiency in the use of 
assets ( i . e .  fixed asset and total asset turnover ratios) . Contract­
managed hospitals, particularly those managed by FP companies , used 
greater debt financing than their traditionally managed counterparts. 
Regardless of their tenure with management companies , contract-managed 
hospitals had lower liquidity measures than the comparison group . 
There were few differences in profitability between contract-managed 
and non-contract-managed hospitals ; however, newly NFP managed 
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hospitals demonstrated significantly lOW'er profitability and old FP 
managed hospitals shOW'ed significantly higher markups of prices over 
expenses than non-contract-managed hospitals. 
Collectively, these findings suggest that the primary differences 
between contract-managed and traditionally managed hospitals were in 
the areas of debt financing and liquidity. HOW'ever, the latter may 
reflect rrore of a predisposition of hospitals with lOW' liquidity 
tOW'ard contract-management than an effect of contract-management .  
Findings in the areas of efficiency and profitability suggest slight 
differences between the perfonnance of contract-managed and 
traditionally managed hospitals. 
Renn, Schramn, Watt, and Derzon ( 1985) also used a large sample 
and multiple regression analysis to examine the effects of system 
affiliation and OW"nership on measures of hospital economic 
performance. Using 1980 data, their statistically significant 
findings support other research and identify some OW"nership related 
differences observable during the years of cost-based reimbursement. 
Investor-OW"ned MHS hospitals were found to earn significantly rrore 
revenue from patient seJ:Vices than either independent NFP or MHS NFP 
hospitals .  '!his was due largely to aggressive pricing. In spite of 
proportionately lower nonoperating revenues than either of the two 
reference groups and higher deductibles on revenues from patient care , 
FP MHS hospitals still managed to be rrore profitable . Revenues to 
total assets were higher for roth FP and NFP MHS hospitals relevant to 
independent NFP hospitals, and this measure was higher for FP MHS 
hospitals relevant to NFP MHS hospitals. With regard to capital 
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structure, FP MHS hospitals were foillld to rely more heavily on debt 
financing than either NFP group. 
In a study which differed from previous work, McCue and Furst 
(1986) profiled the financial characteristics of hospitals acquired by 
the investor-owned chains from 1978 to 1983 . 'lhese researchers used 
factor analysis and logistic regression to measure the relative 
importance of liquidity, capital structure, age of physical plant, 
profitability, patient mix, and bed size in predicting FP MHS­
acquisition . Statistically significant findings revealed hospitals 
purchased by the FP chains during the specified time period tended to 
be smaller and to have lower profitability, relatively older and more 
depreciated assets, and proportionately greater amounts of debt than 
non-acquired hospitals . 
SUmmary 
Findings from the multi variate studies confinn the univariate 
conclusion that system affiliation is primarily associated with 
greater profitability, higher prices, and greater use of debt . 
Multiple regression analysis offers benefits over univariate methods 
by allowing researchers to examine performance measures while 
statistically controlling for relevant hospital and environmental 
variables known to affect financial performance . '!he result is more 
confidence in the findings . 
Summary 
'lhrough a review of both the theoretical and errpirical literature, 
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this chapter establishes a conceptual framework for investigation into 
the effects of system membership on hospital financial performance. 
'Ihe theoretical literature suggests that, although costs may increase 
immediately after acquisition, production efficiencies and improved 
access to capital are benefits which should accrue to MHS members in 
the longrun. A number of theories suggest performance may vary by 
ownership; however, the argt.nnent has been made that recent 
envirornnental pressures toward cost contairnnent are likely to 
overshadow the importance of ownership in detemining financial 
performance . F\lrthenrore, property rights theory, which suggests FP 
organizations are more efficient, may not be directly applicable to 
the hospital industry. 
Although the empirical studies provide little evidence to confinn 
the realization of production efficiencies, firrlings suggest system 
hospitals tend to rely more heavily on debt than independent 
hospitals . 'Ihe most consistent firrling, however, suggests that MHS 
hospitals tend to be more profitable in the production of patient 
services due largely to aggressive pricing. 
McCue and Furst ( 1986) established that NFP hospitals acquired by 
the FP chains during the period from 1978 to 1983 tended to be 
financially distressed. Although similar financial characteristics 
are suspected in the cases of independent NFP hospitals acquired by 
the NFP MHSs (Ennann and Gabel , 1984) , no similar empirical findings 
exist. 
With the exception of one, all of the studies of MHS hospital 
financial performance used data from 1982 or before. To date, no 
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study has looked longitudinally at the performance of acquired 
hospitals including the IrOre cost-conscious period since 1984 . At 
least two interesting questions present themselves . Are MHSs able to 
bestOIN upon financially distressed acquisitions the benefits promised 
by theory? Further, are either FP or NFP MHSs IrOre successful in 
realizing the theorized benefits of system membership? 
On the basis of the literature review, it was hypothesized that 
MHS-acquired hospitals would realize production efficiencies and 
improved access to capital . 'Ihese benefits would be reflected in 
their balance sheet and income statement accounts follOINing a minimal 
adjustment period of at least two years . 
While the theoretical literature suggests otherwise, no 
differences were expected in the performance of FP MHS-acquired and 
NFP MHS-acquired hospitals . 'Ibis hypothesis follOINed largely from the 
obsel:vations of industry observers who believe the perfonnances of FP 
and NFP hospitals are becoming similar in the increasingly competitive 
and cost-conscious period of the mid-1980s. 
Chapter three outlines the analytical procedures used to test the 
preceding hypotheses . In accordance with previous research, 
investigation was made into the financial perfonnance of MHS hospitals 
relative to independent hospitals in the areas of liquidity (i . e . , the 
ability to meet short-term maturing obligations) ,  financial activity 
(i . e . , the efficiency with which assets are employed) , capital 
structure (i . e . , relative levels of debt and equity financing) ,  and 
profitability. Higher liquidity, financial activity and profitability 
were expected in MHS hospitals, as well as increased levels of debt. 
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CHAPI'ER 3 : RESEAROi DESIGN 
OVerview 
'Ihis chapter describes the analytical methcx::ls used to examine the 
effects of MHS rrernbership on hospital financial performance. It 
presents the research design, sarrple selection, and construction of 
perfonnance measures . Statistical methcx::ls for testing the research 
hypotheses are outlined. 
Research Design 
A quasi -experimental design was used to study the effects of MHS 
rrernbership on hospital financial perfonnance. Although true 
experimental control ( i . e .  , random selection and exposure to 
"treatments" ) was not possible, some measure of control was gained by 
assessing the perfonnance of study hospitals in comparison to that of 
matched controls . '!he quasi -experimental design used is a variation 
of canpbell and Stanley ' s  (1963) "nonequivalent control group design . "  
'!his is frequently represented by: 
0 X 0 
0 0 
where "0" represents measurement and "X" represents the exposure of a 
group to an experimental variable or event. '!he dashed line is 
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intended to corrvey the information that groups are not equated by 
randomization. 
'Ihe variation used in the present study was :  
X 
Financial performance was measured in each of two years ilrnte:liately 
prior to acquisition; these are "01" and "02" .  "X" indicates MHS 
acquisition. '!here was a gap of at least two years between system 
acquisition and the post-test financial performance measurements, 110311 
and 1104" .  Post-test data carne from 1984 and 1985 ; data for matched 
control hospitals carne from corrparable points in time. 'Ihe gap 
between pre- and post-testing was necessary to allow hospitals time to 
realize the hypothesized benefits of system membership. Comparisons 
were made between average pre- and post-acquisition financial 
performance. 1 
'Ihe control group is considered "nonequivalent" because 
randomization is the procedure used to ensure "pretreatment equality 
of groups, within known statistical limits" (campbell and Stanley, 
1Although another quasi-experimental design, the multiple time­
series , is a stronger alternative to the design utilized here, the 
expense and inaccessibility of data rendered that option inpractical . 
'Ihe multiple time-series design involves an experimental and control 
group with multiple observations leading up to the treatment and 
following ilrnte:liately thereafter. 'Ihis design allows examination of 
the slopes of regression lines for performance measures before and 
after treatment. In this manner , trends in financial performance can 
be examined. statistically significant inprovement in performance 
measures associated with system membership may be suspect if trend 
analysis suggests these measures were inproving prior to acquisition 
( i . e . , if the slopes before and after are unchanged) . 
42 
1963 , p .  6) . It is readily apparent that random selection and 
assi�t to treabnent groups ( i . e . , acquired or nonacquired) was not 
possible in this natural experiment. Matching, with its inevitable 
limitations , had to suffice . 
One potential problem with a matched study design is that the pre­
test means of the two groups may differ substantially . When this 
occurs, it represents the failure of matching to provide the intended 
equality. F\lrthennore , as discussed by campbell and Stanley ( 1963 ) , 
unwanted regression effects are virtually assured under those 
circumstances . That is , the two groups tend to differ on their post­
test scores independently of any effects of 11X11 ( in  this case, 
acquisition) . 'Ihe result is a threat to internal validity, as 
discussed below. For the preceding reasons, it was important to test 
the equality of pre-test financial measures for study and control 
groups . 
More broadly, weaknesses of the nonequivalent control group design 
threatened both internal and external validity. Internal validity 
makes it possible to answer the basic question, "Did the experimental 
treabnent make a difference in the specific instance under study?" 
External validity deals with the generalizability of findings . 
A significant threat to the internal validity of the matched study 
design resulted from the self-selection of hospitals into the acquired 
group . Because acquired hospitals were not randomly assigned to 
system membership and because they probably deliberately sought 
membership, the asSlllllption of unifonn regression between study and 
control groups was questionable .  Selection biases and maturation 
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could interact to produce differences which were independent of system 
membership. '!hat is, acquired hospitals could differ from matched 
hospitals in such a manner that they could be expected to change in 
different ways over time regardless of system effects. 
Furthenrore, external validity was threatened by the interaction 
of selection biases and acquisition. Thus the observed effects of 
acquisition may be specific to this particular group of hospitals and 
matches. As a result, findings are not readily generalizable beyond 
the immediate study sample. 
In spite of these limitations, the nonequivalent control group 
design provided useful infonnation. Most importantly, it controlled 
for the effects of history or specific events occurring between the 
first and second sets of measurements in addition to acquisition. 
Data Base and Sources 
The data base was derived from financial, hospital and market 
infonnation collected for selected NFP, short-tenn general 
medical/surgical hospitals acquired by either FP or NFP MHSs, and for 
matched independent NFP hospitals. Financial data for two years 
before purchase and for the system affiliation years of 1984 and 1985 
were obtained for each acquisition. Similar data were obtained for 
independent hospitals in the same years as their matches. 
Hospital and market data were used to match acquired and 
independent hospitals. Balance sheet and income statement infonnation 
was used to construct twenty-one financial ratios measuring liquidity, 
capital structure, financial activity, profitability, and age of the 
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physical plant. 
'Ihe pri.nru:y sources of data were the 2552 Medicare Cost Reports 
which were collected from the Medicare fiscal intennediaries for each 
hospital included in the study. Financial data from the Medicare Cost 
Reports were augmented with descriptive data from the American 
Hospital Association Guide issues ( 1979 ; 1980 ; 1981 ;  1982 ; 1983 ; 1985 ; 
and 1986) . 
Sarrpling 
General Procedure 
The geographic region from which hospitals were selected includes 
Alabama, Florida, Georgia , Kentucky, Louisiana , Mississippi , North 
carolina, South carolina, Tennessee, and Texas . 'Ihe study was limited 
to the southern region of the United states due to the large mnnber of 
acquisitions which occurred there, particularly among the FP MHSs, 
between 1978 and 1982 . Confining the study to the Southern region 
also made it possible to follow-up the McCue and Furst ( 1986) research 
which identified hospitals acquired by FP MHSs as financially 
distressed. 
Although the McCue and Furst study (1986) included seven hospitals 
acquired in 1983 , only hospitals acquired before or during 1982 were 
examined here. '!his restriction was necessary in order to provide 
minimal time for hospitals to realize the benefits of system 
affiliation ( i . e . , at least two years) . 
To prevent empirical test bias as a result of regulatory 
envirorunent, size, ownership, and market characteristics , hospitals 
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were matched in each of these areas . Matching variables were selected 
on the basis of their acknowledged or theorized brportance in 
affecting the financial perfonnance of hospitals , and their extensive 
use in other matched sample studies (Biggs , Kralewski , and Brown ,  
1980 ; Kralewski et al. , 1984 ; Lewin, Derzon , and Rhea, 1981;  Treat, 
1976 ; McCue and Lynch, 1987). Matching permitted the control of 
variables thought to influence financial perfonnance. It also 
minimized the effects of variables extraneous to the purposes of the 
study. 
For example, states vary in the degree of regulation brposed upon 
hospitals , as well as in general economic envirornnent. Matching 
acquired hospitals with nonacquired hospitals from the same state 
prevented any variation in financial perfonnance due to state 
characteristics rather than system effects. Similar variations occur 
with respect to population base; rural and metropolitan areas may 
differ in demand for hospital services and in the amount of 
competition present. 'Ihus it was brportant to match hospitals with 
similar community population characteristics. 
'!he theorized differences between ownership forl!lS have been 
discussed at length. In the absence of any definitive findings about 
ownership differences in the current competitive market, acquired 
hospitals were matched with control hospitals on the basis of pre­
acquisition ownership. 
Although the argument has been made that size is unbrportant when 
financial ratios are used because ratios "adjust for size through 
measuring one account relative to another" (Coyne, 1985b , p. 52) , 
46 
organizations of varying bed sizes may have different characteristics . 
Larger organizations may realize same economies of scale which could 
affect eamings and margin ratios . '!his phenomenon has been observed 
in banking studies (Johnson and Meinster, 1973 ; Fischer, 1961) . For 
that reason, hospitals were matched on the basis of bed size . 
Because financial ratios are measures of accounts relative to one 
another, they tend to adjust for the effects of inflation. The 
exception occurs when assets, valued at historical costs , are used to 
construct the ratio (Finkler, 1982 ) . Using data for study and control 
hospitals from the same years also helped control for the effects of 
inflation between groups . Although the years for which data were 
gathered varied between pairs, within pairs they were the same . 
Selection of Hogpitals 
Independent t-l""FP hospitals acquired by FP and NFP MHSs between the 
years 1978 and 1982 in the ten Southern states specified earlier were 
identified in two ways . First, the McCue and FUrst (1986) research 
provided a ready means of identifying NFP hospitals acquired by FP 
MHSs . The primary strategy used by these researchers to compile their 
list of acquired hospitals was a review of the "Under New Management" 
section of Modern Heal thcare . '!his coltmll1 has been a regular feature 
since 1979 and contains information about FP MHS-acquired hospitals. 
Since acquisitions by NFP MHSs are not included in Modern 
Healthcare ' s  coltmll1, a second procedure had to be found to identify 
hospitals which became part of NFP systems before 1982 . '!he Directory 
of Multihospital Systems (First through Fourth Editions) was used. 
47 
Unfortunately, the first year of publication for the Directory of 
Multihospital Systems was 1980 , so its earliest data is from 1979 . As 
a result, it was possible to identify only the hospitals which were 
added to NFP MHSs from 1980 fo:rnard. Each edition of the directory 
was consulted to identify hospitals newly added to the NFP MHSs in the 
ten state region urrler consideration. 
From the list of acquired hospitals and a<XJUiring systems corrpiled 
in those two ways, only previously independent NFP hospitals were 
retained for study. Hospitals which were purchased by one system from 
another were not included. Further, only short-tenn general 
medical/surgical hospitals were included. 
To avoid any bias which could have occurred as a result of using 
different sources to identify the acquisition years for hospitals 
incorporated into the two different types of MHSs (i . e .  FP and NFP) , 
those dates were established in the same way for both groups . In each 
case, the year of acquisition was established by noting when the 
hospital was first listed as a system member in the Directory of 
Multihospital Systems. For example, if a hospital was listed as a 
system member in the 1981 edition ( i . e .  1980 data) but not the 1980 
edition ( i . e. 1979 data) , the year of acquisition was taken to be 
1980 .  For hospitals from the McCue and Furst (1986) study which were 
acquired prior to 1980 , the date of acquisition was identified as the 
year in which ownership changed from NFP to FP as reported in the AHA 
Guide to the Health care Field. McCue and Furst used that selection 
method for identifying acquisitions occurring before the "Under New 
Management" colmnn appeared in Modern Healthcare . 
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Once the date of aa:Jllisition and the acquiring institution were 
identified for each potential study hospital , one further step was 
taken to define the study group. To assure that the experience of 
acquired hospitals could be traced over the study period and to be 
certain that the study hospitals were in a position to reap system 
benefits, only hospitals which remained in the original acquiring 
system through 1985 were retained for study. Divested hospitals were 
not retained. Because a certain amount of turbulence is likely when 
systems are acquired by other systems, potential study hospitals 
involved in such changes were excluded. '!his was considered necessary 
since the turbulence surrounding corporate absorptions of this nature 
might delay the realization of system benefits . 
Of the 43 hospitals identified by McCue and Furst ( 1986) as 
acquired by FP MHSs between the years 1978 and 1982 , 31 were suitable 
for analysis by the above criteria. An additional 15 NFP MHS­
acquired hospitals were identified for study. The final sample 
consisted of 29 hospitals acquired by the FP MHSs, 13 acquired by the 
NFP MHSs, and their respective matches . Four hospitals, two acquired 
by the FP MHSs and two acquired by the NFP MHSs, were dropped due to 
the unavailability of minimal data: one Georgia and one Louisiana 
hospital from the FP MHS group, two Texas hospitals from the NFP MHS 
group. 
Acquired hospitals were paired with indeperrlent short term general 
medical/surgical hospitals on the matching variables of state, 
ownership, bed size, population, and time. Indeperrlent facilities had 
to have been indeperrlent throughout the study period. Hospitals were 
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matched on the basis of data taken from the year of acquisition. An 
effort was made to match an acquired hospital with an independent 
hospital whose bed size was within an interval of plus or minus 50 
beds of the acquired hospital ' s  size. According to the procedure used 
by the AHA on their 1982 SUrvey data tape, standard metropolitan 
statistical area (SMSA) size was categorized into 7 groupings: (1)  
nonrnetropolitan areas , (2 )  50, 000 to 100 , 000 population, (3)  100 , 000 
to 250, 000 , (4 )  250 , 000 to 500 , 000 , (5)  500 , 000 to 1 , 000 , 000, (6)  
1 , 000 , 000 to 2 , 500, 000 , and (7)  over 2 , 500 , 000 . A hospital 
categorized in a particular SMSA group was matched, whenever possible, 
with an independent hospital in the same category or one category 
larger or smaller. Matching variables were prioritized as follows : 
(1 )  state, ( 2 )  ownership, ( 3 )  bed size, and (4)  population base . 
In all cases, matches for acquired hospitals were found in the 
same state and ownership categories: acquired government hospitals 
were matched with government hospitals which remained NFP; acquired 
church and other NFP hospitals were matched with independent hospitals 
in similar ownership categories. Table 5 identifies the initial 
ownership of acquired facilities . 
Tables 6 and 7 show the success encountered in matching 
acquired hospitals on the basis of bed size . '!he average bed sizes of 
the FP and NFP MHS groups were similar to those of the matched groups 
and similar to one another (Table 6) . On average, FP and NFP MHS­
acquired hospitals had four fewer beds than their matches, with a 
standard deviation of 26 and 21,  respectively (Table 7) . '!his 
suggests good success in matching on the basis of bed size. In no 
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TABlE 5 :  Pre-acquisition CMnership of Hospitals 
Acquiring System 
CMnership Type FP MHS NFP MHS 
Goverrrrnent 19 10 
Church 1 1 
Secular 9 2 
TABlE 6 :  Average Bed Size of Sanple Hospitals in the Year of 
Acquisition 
Average 
(number) 
FP 
Acquired 
112 
(29) 
Matched 
Independent 
116 
(29) 
NFP 
Acquired 
120 
(13)  
Matched 
Independent 
123 
(13 )  
TABLE 7 :  Difference in Bed Size between Acquired Hospitals and their 
Matches (Acquired minus Nonacquired) 
FP NFP 
Average -4 -4 
Standard Deviation 26 21 
Minimum -72 -33 
63 52 
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case did a FP MHS hospital exceed its match by more than 63 beds , or 
have fewer than 72 beds . NFP MHS hospitals never exceeded their 
matches by more than 52 beds or had less than 33 beds . 
Hospitals were matched on the basis of population base as 
previously specified, with only three deviations from the rule. In 
one case, the best match fourrl for an acquired hospital was two SMSA 
groupings away from that of the acquired hospital . In two other 
cases, the best match was three SMSA groupings away. Table 8 gives 
information about the population characteristics of camrmmities where 
acquired and nonacquired hospitals are located. 
One further step was taken, to assure as much as possible, that 
independent hospitals were not associated with MHSs through contract 
management .  Although the Am:rrican Hospital Association ' s  computer 
tapes of the Annual SUrvey of Hospitals were not available for all 
years of the study period, the results of the 1982 and 1984 sw:veys 
were available. 'Ihese tapes were consulted, and no hospital was used 
as a match if the data on the tapes indicated the hospital was under 
contract management in those years . 
Performance Measures 
Financial performance was measured through the use of financial 
ratios . Ratio analysis focuses attention on critical relationships 
between conp:ments of income statements and balance sheets . '!here is 
no universally accepted single measure of financial performance , nor 
an agreed upon relative ranking of performance measures . Instead, 
there are four generally recognized cllinensions of financial 
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Table 8 :  Nlnnbers of Hospitals in each Standard Metropolitan 
statistical Area (SMSA) Size Group 
1 
FP MHS-Acquired 19 
Matched Independents 2 1  
NFP MHS-Acquired 8 
Matched Independents 8 
2 
* 1 
= 
Nonmetropolitan or rural areas 
2 = 50 , 000 - 100 , 000 population 
3 = 100 , 000 - 250, 000 
4 = 250 , 000 - 500 , 000 
5 
= 
500 , 000 - 1 , 000 , 000 
6 = 1 , 000 , 000 - 2 , 500 , 000 
7 = over 2 , 500 , 000 
3 
3 
3 
SMSA Size * 
4 5 6 
3 2 2 
3 1 1 
1 1 
1 1 1 
7 Total 
29 
29 
3 13 
2 13 
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perfonnance: liquidity, capital structure, financial activity, and 
profitability. An additional dimension of interest is the average age 
of the physical plant. Measures from each dimension provide different 
critical information. 
Indicators used in this research were adapted from the Heal thcare 
Financial Management Association (Cleverley, 1985) . Its measures are 
standards in the field. Fonnulas for financial irrlicators are given 
in Table 9 .  
Liquidity refers to an organization 1 s ability to meet its short-
term maturing obligations . Payrolls, suppliers 1 bills, and payments 
to creditors are examples of day-to-day obligations that a financially 
healthy organization should be able to pay through cash or assets that 
can be quickly converted to cash . Measures of liquidity used here 
included the current (CURRENT) ,  quick (QUICK) , and acid (ACID) ratios , 
as well as measures of the number of days accounts were outstanding 
(DAYSAR) , the length of time hospitals took to pay their bills 
(AVPAY) , and the amount of cash available daily (DAYCASH) . 2 Favorable 
inprovement in liquidity is measured through increased CURRENT, QUICK, 
ACID, and DAYCASH ratios and decreased DAYSAR and AVPAY ratios . 
capital structure ratios describe the relative levels of debt and 
equity financing employed by the institution. These irrlicators are 
reviewed by long-tenn creditors before they extend credit. Measures 
used were cash flow to service debt (CASHDEBI') , as well as irrlicators 
2Fonnulas for DAYSAR, AVPAY, and DAYCASH are given for hospitals 
with fiscal years of 365 days . In the few cases in which hospitals 
reported data for fiscal years with fewer days, the actual number of 
days is substituted for 365 . No fiscal years were less than nine 
months . 
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Table 9 :  Measures of Hospital Financial Performance 
Measure of Financial 
Performance 
LIQUIDITY 
CUrrent Ratio 
Quick Ratio 
Acid Test Ratio 
Days in Accounts 
Receivable 
Average Payment 
Period 
Days cash on Hand 
CAPITAL SIRUCIURE 
cash Flow to 
Total Debt 
Definition 
CUrrent Assets 
CUrrent Liabilities 
Marketable Accounts 
cash + Securities + Receivable 
CUrrent Liabilities 
cash + Marketable Securities 
CUrrent Liabilities 
Net Patient Accounts Receivable 
Net Patient Service Revenue 
365 
CUrrent Liabilities 
Ooeratincr ExPenses - DeQreciation 
365 
cash + Marketable Securities 
Ooeratincr ExPenses - DeQreciation 
365 
Excess of Revenues 
OVer Expenses + DeQreciation 
CUrrent Liabilities + I..ongtenn Debt 
Equity Financing Ratio Fund Balance 
Total Assets 
Total Debt to 
Equity 
I..ongtenn Debt to 
Equity 
I..ongtenn Debt to 
Net Fixed Assets 
Total Liabilities 
Fund Balance 
I..ongterm Liabilities 
Fund Balance 
I..ongterm Liabilities 
Fixed Assets 
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Variable 
Name 
QUICK 
ACID 
DAYSAR 
AVPAY 
DAY CASH 
CASHDEBI' 
FBI' A 
TDFB 
LTDFB 
LTD FA 
Table 9 :  Measures of Hospital Financial Perfonnance (cont. ) 
Measure of Financial 
Perfonnance 
Financial Activity 
CUrrent Asset 
Turnover 
Fixed Asset 
Turnover 
Total Asset 
Turnover 
PROFITABILITY 
Markup 
Nonoperating 
Revenue 
Return on 
Equity 
Return on 
Assets 
Operating Margin 
Deductible 
Average Age 
of Plant 
Definition 
Total Operating Revenue 
CUrrent Assets 
Total Operating Revenue 
Net Fixed Assets 
Total Operating Revenue 
Total Assets 
Net Patient Other 
Service Revenue + Operating Revenue 
Operating Expenses 
Nonoperating Revenue 
Operating Revenue 
Excess of Revenues over Expenses 
Fund Balance 
Excess of Revenues over Expenses 
Total Assets 
Total Operating Operating 
Revenue ExPenses 
Total Operating Revenue 
Deductions 
Gross Patient Service Revenue 
Accumulated Depreciation 
Depreciation Expense 
Variable 
Name 
CA'IURN 
FA'IURN 
TA'IURN 
NONOPREV 
ROE 
ROA 
OrnARG 
m:rucr 
AGE 
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of equity financing (FBI'A) and debt financing (TDFB, LTDFB, and 
LTDFA) 3 . Greater debt utilization is measured through increased TDFB 
and LTDFB ratios and a lower LTDFA ratio. Inproved cash flow to 
sexvice debt is measured through higher CASHDEBI' ratios. 
Activity ratios measure the relationship between assets or inputs 
and revenues or outputs. They are considered measures of how 
efficiently organizations are able to generate revenues from limited 
resource bases . Measures used included indicators of the efficiency 
with which current (CA'IURN) and total (TA'IURN) assets were employed 
and the generation of revenues from property, plant, and equipment 
(FA'IURN) . Inproved efficiency in the use of assets is measured 
through increased CA'IURN, TA'IURN, and FA'IURN. 
Profitability ratios reveal an organization ' s  ability to control 
expenses and earn a return on its resources . If an organization 
cannot earn revenue greater than its expenses, its survival is 
threatened. Several elements of profitability were measured here. 
The narkup of prices over expenses was indicated by MARKUP. DEOOcr 
provided a measure of the proportion of gross patient revenue that was 
unlikely to be realized in cash due to contractual allowances, bad 
debts , or charity care . High narkups and low deductibles generally 
result in high operating nargins (OFMARG) . OFMARG measured the 
proportion of operating revenue, net of deductions , retained as 
income . Nonoperating revenue as a proportion of operating revenue was 
3rn cases where hospitals had a negative fund balance resulting 
in a negative TDFB and LTDFB, the negative ratio values were converted 
to positive values . This conversion did not change the results of the 
statistical tests but provided more easily interpretable ratios . 
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given by NONOPREV. High NONOPREV suggests an ability to subsidize 
poor operating margins . '!he amount of net income earned per dollar of 
invesbnent (ROA) and per dollar of unrestricted equity (ROE) 4 were the 
final measures of profitability. Improved profitability is measured 
through increased ROE, ROA, and OFMARG ratios . Higher prices 
(MARKUP) , a greater percentage of revenues from nonoperating sources 
(NONOPREV) , and lower deductibles (DEIUcr) are ways of increasing 
profitability. 
'!he age of the physical plant (AGE) ratio provided a means of 
assessing the newness of plant and equipment. Older, more depreciated 
facilities yield larger AGE ratios, which indicate the need for near-
tenn replacement of fixed assets. '!he favorable direction for 
movement of the AGE ratio is dCMnWard. 
Statistical Methods 
Comparison of FP and NFP MHS-Acquired Hospitals 
'!he hypothesis that FP and NFP MHS-acquired hospitals perfonn 
similarly was addressed first. Hypothesis testing was accomplished 
through a univariate analysis and proceed  in two steps . First, the 
average pre-acquisition financial performance of hospitals acquired by 
the FP, and those acquired by the NFP MHSs were compared on each of 
the twenty-one ratios to detennine if the two types of MHSs selected 
4 ROE ratios that became positive when both the numerator and 
denominator were negative were adjusted to reflect the negative 
i.rrplications of having both a negative net income and negative fund 
balance. '!hat was done by assigning a negative number to the 
resulting ratio. 
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hospitals with different financial profiles . Next, changes in the 
average financial performance of each acquired hospital were conputed 
by subtracting the average value of each ratio in the two years before 
acquisition from the average value for 1984/1985 . Changes in average 
perfonnance over time were corrpared for the FP and NFP MHS hospitals 
to discover if the benefits of MHS toornbership varied by CM"lership. 
Univariate t tests and trimmed t tests were used to conpare the 
maans of FP and NFP MHS hospitals. A key assumption underlying the 
use of Student 1 s t test is that samples are selected from populations 
with nomal distributions. As Tukey and Mclaughlin ( 1963 ) point out, 
rrost practicing statisticians rarely encounter distributions which are 
"nomal" in behavior. '!he typical distribution has a shape with tails 
longer than those of a nomal distribution. '!hat proved to be the 
case with ma.ny of the ratio distributions here. 
All distributions of financial ratios and changes in ratios were 
examined for nonnality. In cases where the assumption of nonnality 
seemed justified, Student t tests were used in hypothesis testing. 
Trimmed t tests were used to test long-tailed distributions. 
'!he trimmed t test is one of two general alternatives to the use 
of Student 1 s t in the presence of long-tailed distributions . '!he 
trimmed t was developed specifically to deal with problems associated 
with long-tailed distributions . '!he Wilcoxon rank stnn or signed rank 
tests are the nonparametric alternatives. 
Nonparametric statistics make few assumptions about the properties 
of the parent distribution of a sample . In this sense, they are often 
spoken of as "distribution-free. "  In the Wilcoxon procedures, values 
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are transformed to rank scores and tested. 
Tri.rrured t tests involve no transfonnation of data . Instead, 
Student ' s  t test is nodified in what has been called "intuitively 
reasonable ways" (Koopmans, 1981 ,  p .  284) --a tri.rrured mean, which is 
simply an ordinary mean with sare observations ren¥JVed, is subjected 
to a t test. Alrong the deleted observations are the outliers . 
Appendix B provides the formulas for calculation of the one- and two­
sample tri.rrured t tests . 
In the absence of nonnality, TUkey and McLaughlin ( 1963) reconunend 
using the tri.rrured t .  Like the nonparametric procedures , the tri.rrured t 
test has the desirable properties of being robust of validity and 
sensitivity in the presence of long-tailed distributions . The 
assumption of nonnality is replaced by the assumption that the 
probability distribution of the population is synunetric. Under this 
condition, the mean of the sampling distribution of the tri.rrured mean 
equals the population mean. 
On the basis of Tllkey and McLaughlin ' s  recormnen:iation and because 
the nonparametric methods have gained limited acceptance outside the 
statistical community, the tri.rrured t was used as the primary 
univariate statistic for tests of long-tailed distributions . However, 
for each tri.rrured t test, the appropriate Wilcoxon nonparametric 
procedure was also performed. The latter provided a verification of 
tri.rrured t test findings. In cases where the nonparametric and trimmed 
t tests differed, the tri.rrured t findings were accepted as the more 
conservative . Conservative findings resulted from the manner in which 
the trimmed t was constructed-that is, trims were performed to remove 
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only extreme outlier observations, as described in Appendix B. 
For those accustomed to Student ' s  t statistic, the trinuned t has 
the advantages of familiarity and a measure of central tendency, the 
trinuned mean . On the other hand ,  the Wilcoxon procedures involve a 
transformation of the data to rank scores , so no meaningful measure of 
location is available. 
Comparison of Acquired and Independent Hospitals 
'Ihe financial performance of MHS-acquired hospitals was 
hypothesized to differ favorably from that of the independents . 
Improvement in financial performance between the years inunediately 
before acquisition and the system-affiliation years of 1984 and 1985 
was expected .  A sununary o f  expectations is presented in Table 10 . 
Specifically, higher liquidity in the fo:rm of increased CURRENT, 
QUICK, ACID, and DA.YCASH ratios and lower DA.YSAR and AVPAY ratios was 
expected .  Greater general liquidity, improved collection o f  accounts 
receivable, and decreases in the time taken to pay bills were expected 
to follow from the implementation of improved business practices under 
MHS ownership. 
Greater debt utilization was expected in the fo:rm of increased 
TDFB, L'IDFB, and LTDFA and lower FBI'A resulting from improved access 
to capital . Increased cash flow to service the added debt was 
expected to be reflected in a higher average CASHDEBI' ratio in later 
years . 
In keeping with hypothesized efficiency benefits of system 
affiliation, increased efficiency in the use of assets (CA'IURN, 
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Table 10 : Direction of Hypothesized Movement of Financial Ratios 
Following System Acquisition 
Measure of Financial Variable 
Perfonnance Name Direction 
LIQUIDITY 
CUrrent Ratio CURRENT Up 
Quick Ratio QUICK Up 
Acid Test Ratio ACID Up 
Days in Accounts Receivable DAYSAR Down 
Average Payment Period AVPAY Down 
Days cash on Hand DAY CASH Up 
CAPITAL S'IRUCIURE 
cash Flow to Total Debt CASHDEBI' Up 
Equity Financing Ratio FBI' A Down 
Total Debt to Equity TDFB Up 
I..ongtenn Debt to Equity LTDFB Up 
I..ongtenn Debt to Net Fixed Assets LTD FA Up 
ACTIVITY 
CUrrent Asset '1\rrnover CA'IURN Up 
Fixed Asset '1\rrnover FA '!URN Up 
Total Asset '1\rrnover TA'IURN Up 
PROFITABILITY 
Markup MARKUP Up 
Nonoperating Revenue NONOPREV Down 
RetillTl on Equity ROE Up 
RetillTl on Assets ROA Up 
Operating Margin OEMARG Up 
Deductible DEIXJCT Down 
AVERAGE AGE OF PlANT 
Average Age of Plant AGE Down 
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FA'IURN, and TA'IURN) was expected. However, it was realized that these 
gross efficiency measures could be affected by i.nprovements in the 
physical plant and equipment. Large capital i.nprovements have the 
effect of increasing the denominator of FA'IURN and TA'IURN ratios and , 
hence, reducing their size. 
Improved profitability in the fonn of increased ROE, ROA, and 
OR1ARG was expected under MHS ownership. The higher profits were 
expected to result partial! y from increased prices (MARKUP) , as 
demonstrated in past research. Lower deductibles (DEOOCI') were 
expected to result from decreased charity care, although financial 
gains in this area could be offset by increased contractual 
allowances. Nonoperating revenue was expected to decrease under MHS 
membership; however, that was one area in which FP and NFP MHSs could 
differ. FP MHS hospitals probably receive fewer gifts than NFP MHS 
facilities . 
Finally, MHS hospitals were expected to make i.nprovenEnts in plant 
and equipment. The result would be a lower average AGE ratio 
following acquisition. 
Both univariate and multivariate methods were used to investigate 
the data . A description of the methods follows . 
Univariate analysis 
The first method of exploring MHS effects used t and trinrrned t 
tests to explore changes in financial perfonnance over time. As 
described earlier, the distributions of all financial ratios and 
changes in financial ratios were examined for nonnality. Student ' s  t 
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test was used to test variables with distributions which appeared to 
confonn to the assumption of normality. Trinuned t tests were used to 
examine long-tailed distributions . '!he Wilcoxon nonparametric 
procedures were used as a verification of trinuned t results . The 
analysis proceed  in three steps. 
First, the effectiveness of the matching procedure was tested by 
comparing the pre-acquisition financial perfonnance of acquired 
hospitals to that of their inde:pen:ient matches . Next, differences in 
the average perfonnance of acquired hospitals from time one (the two 
years inunediately before acquisition) to time two ( 1984 and 1985) were 
examined to detennine if changes occur follCMing system membership. 
Because changes in financial perfonnance can result from industry 
trerrls rather than system effects, the perfonnances of acquired 
hospitals were subsequently examined relative to those of matched 
inde:pen:ient hospitals. 
The perfonnance variables in the analysis are denoted by Yijt 
where: 
i = the "i th" matched pair of hospitals, i = 1 , 2 ,  . . .  42 . 
j = the acquired (j = 1) or inde:pen:ient (j = 2 )  hospital . 
t = the year of observation, t = 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 ;  t = 1 
represents 2 years preceding the acquisition of the 
system hospital ;  t = 2 represents 1 year preceding 
the acquisition of the system hospital ; t = 3 or 4 
represents 1984 and 1985 respectively. 
Therefore, 
Y ijt = the observation of the perfonnance variable Y in the "t 
th" year in the acquired (j = 1) or independent (j = 2 )  
hospital of the "i th" pair of hospitals ; t = 1 or 2 
represents 2 years before acquisition, and t = 3 or 4 
represents 1984 and 1985 . 
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While t 
= 
1 or 2 represents the same years for both hospitals 
within a matched pair, t represents different years across pairs in 
cases where the system hospitals in the various pairs were acquired in 
different years . '!he use of financial ratios is particularly suited 
to such a situation, since absolute dollar arrounts from different 
years cannot be corrpared without adjusting for inflation. Because the 
financial ratios were measures of income and balance sheet data 
relative to other measures, financial performance for hospitals which 
j oined systems in different years could be corrpared. 
Even so, caution was exercised in the use of ratios which included 
assets . As discussed by Finkler ( 1982 ) , financial statements prepared 
in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) are 
oriented toward historical cost infonnation. Assets are valued at 
their cost (less accumulated depreciation) until they are sold or 
discarded. 'Ihus inflation distorts the ratio values. 
'Ihe difference in averages for the "i th" hospital in the acquired 
sanple is defined as : 
b.Y. · 1 l • 1/2 
Where, 
Y i1t = the observation of the perfonnance variable Y in "i th" 
acquired hospital in the "t th" year. 
To test for significant differences in averages before and during 
system membership, 6 Y i1 . was assumed to be a random variable from a 
nonnal distribution. A t test with n-1, or 3 ,  degrees of freedom was 
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used. 
'!he same procedure was used to test for significant differences in 
averages in the matched independent hospitals . As before, .6Yi2 . was 
asstnned to be a random variable from a normal distribution. '!he 
change in averages from the first 2 years to the last 2 years is 
defined as :  
f:::.y . 2 1. • 
Where, 
4 
1/2 Iyi2t -
t=3 
2 
L:Yi2t 
t=l 
Yi2t = the observation of the performance variable Y in "i th" 
independent hospital in the "t th" year. 
T tests were used to detennine if the above differences in aver-
ages varied significantly between system and independent hospitals. 
'!hat is , 
6.Y . . .  = 6'i. 1 . - 6'Y. 2 .  
was asstnned to be a random variable from a normal distribution and was 
tested to detennine if the differences in averages were significantly 
different from zero. 
Multivariate Analysis 
Another method of testing the hypothesis that MHS-acquired 
hospitals differ from NFP independent hospitals was through pooling 
cross-sectional and time-series data. '!he result was a data base 
which included observations for all hospitals in all years . Using 
this data base , the relationship between system membership and 
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hospital financial perfonnance was investigated. Regression analysis 
provided the primacy tool . '!he question of interest was :  " Do  NFP MHS 
or FP MHS hospitals perfonn differently from in::lepen:ient NFP hospitals 
on each of the financial ratios after controlling for the effects of 
variables extraneous to the investigation?" 
To answer that question, three steps were taken . First, 
observations were identified with one of three groups :  NFP 
in::lependent hospitals , FP MHS hospitals,  or NFP MHS hospitals .  
'lhrough analysis of  variance (ANOVA) , the average perfonnance of 
hospitals in each group was compared on each of the twenty-one 
financial ratios . '!he ANOVAs tested the null hypothesis 
Ho= fJ-1 = fJ-2 = f1- 3 
against the alternative that some of the population means were not the 
same . 
'!he second step identified specific groups which differed from one 
another. Several statistical tests are available for such a purpose ; 
however, Scheffe 1 s method is preferred in cases where sarrple sizes 
differ arrong groups (canavos, 1984 } . In this case, the pooled sarrple 
included 252 in::lependent NFP hospitals , 58 FP MHS hospitals,  and 26 
NFP MHS hospitals . '!he in::lependent group was large because it 
included all hospitals in the sarrple from the pre-acquisition years 
plus 1984 and 1985 observations for those hospitals which were not 
purchased. Scheffe 1 s method is additionally useful because it 
produces at least one statistically discernible contrast when the 
ANOVA F test rejects the null hypothesis . 
Finally, when the ANOVAs suggested differences between an MHS 
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group and the NFP independent group, regression analysis provided a 
means of investigating that relationship while controlling for those 
variables identified earlier as extraneous to the investigation. The 
justification for a pooled cross-sectional regression analysis was 
taken from 'l\Ima and Hannan (1984) : "if there are three or more waves 
of observations, and the underlying parameters are constant over the 
observation pericxl, and the interval between waves is a constant, one 
can pool all temporal observations and estimate a single set of 
parameters" (p. 433) . Certainly, the first criterion was met. Data 
were collected for hospitals in the years 1978 through 1982 and 1984 
and 1985 . Fulfillment of the last two criteria was more questionable;  
however, it can be argued that since the time frame of this study was 
fairly short, parameter estimates were unlikely to change from year to 
year. The lack of equal intervals between waves must be acknowledged 
as a limitation ; however, again, the short time frame may render the 
failure to meet this criterion less troubling than it otherwise would 
be .  
The control variables included state (re-defined as region) , SMSA 
location (re-defined as metropolitan or rural) , and hospital bed size. 
Time was not included as a control variable since the data base 
included only observations for MHS hospitals in 1984 and 1985 . In 
trial regressions , time appeared to act as a distorter variable if 
included. 
'!Wenty-one regression equations were estimated, one for each 
financial ratio. The general regression model is : 
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where 
Y = bo + b1 (OORDER) + b2 (SOUIH) + b3 {MEI'RO) + b4 (BEJ:B) + 
b5 {NFPMHS) + b6 (FPMHS) + e 
Y = the financial ratio 
bi = the ord.inal:y least squares parameter estimated as a 
result of the regression analysis, i = 0 , 1 , 2 ,  . . .  , 6  
OORDER = location in the states of Kentucky or Tennessee 
SOUIH = location in the states of North carolina, South carolina, 
Georgia, or Florida 
MEI'RO = location in a standard metropolitan statistical area as 
defined by the Bureau of the Census 
BEI:B = hospital bed size 
NFPMHS 
= 
membership in a not-for-profit MHS 
FPMHS = membership in a for-profit MHS 
e = the error term 
'Ihe variables OORDER and SOUIH are dt.nl1!!1Y variables with the deep 
southern states of Texas, I.Duisiana, Mississippi and Alabama serving 
as the reference group. MEI'RO is a dt.nl1l11Y variable with rural location 
as the reference group. 'Ihe reference group for both NFPMHS and FPMHS 
is NFP independent . 
SUrrnnary 
'Ibis chapter outlined the research design, sarrple selection, 
construction of perfonnance measures , and statistical methods used to 
investigate the effects of MHS membership on hospital financial 
perfonnance. It described the nonequivalent control group design 
which was used to investigate the hypothesis that MHS-acquired 
hospitals differ from similar hospitals which remain NFP independents . 
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In addition, FP and. NFP MHS-acquired hospitals were hypothesized to 
perf om similarly. Methcx:ls for testing each hypothesis were 
described. 
All acquired hospitals for which financial data were available in 
ten Southern states fanned the study group . Controls were selected 
through a matching procedure based on state, ownership, be:l size, and. 
comrmmity population characteristics. 'IWenty-one financial ratios 
measuring liquidity, capital structure, financial activity, 
profitability, and. age of the physical plant comprised the dependent 
variables. 
Univariate student t, trirraned t, and. nonparametric tests were the 
analytical methcx:ls used to test whether the average financial 
performance of FP and. NFP MHS-acquired hospitals were equal . Pre­
acquisition financial performance and. changes in performance over time 
were compared, to discover if FP and. NFP MHSs choose hospitals with 
different financial characteristics for acquisition, and. if they 
manage those hospitals in ways which have different financial 
implications . 
Univariate and. multivariate methcx:ls to investigate the effects of 
MHS membership on hospital financial performance were described. The 
univariate procedure consisted of three steps and. made use of paired 
student t, trirraned t, and. nonparametric tests . First, the pre­
acquisition financial performance of acquired hospitals and. matched 
independents were compared to detennine the success of the matching 
procedure. It was important that study and. control hospitals had a 
conunon starting point from which to assess changes. Next, differences 
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in the average perfomance of acquired hospitals from before 
acquisition to 1984/1985 were examined to see if changes followed 
after system membership. Finally, comparisons of changes in financial 
perfomance of acquired hospitals with changes in matched independents 
provided a means of distinguishing MHS effects from industry trends . 
A pooled cross-sectional multiple regression analysis was described as 
a second method for testing the effects of MHS membership on hospital 
financial perfomance while controlling for variables extraneous to 
the purposes of the investigation. 
71 
OIAPrER 4 :  RESULTS 
overview 
Olapter 4 presents the results of hypotheses testing. FP and NFP 
MHS-acquire:l hospitals were compared with one another to detennine if 
financial perfonnance varied with ownership. Next, the performance of 
acquired hospitals was compared with that of independent hospitals .  
Matched univariate analysis and pooled cross-sectional analysis were 
used to analyze the data. The matched univariate analysis utilized t 
tests and trimmed t tests . Trimmed t tests were supported with the 
results of nonparametric Wilcoxon rank st.nn and signed rank tests, as 
appropriate . The results of the latter are contained in Appendix c .  
Discrepancies between the findings from the trimmed t and from 
nonpararnetric tests are discussed in the text. 
Comparison of FP and NFP MHS-Acquired Hospitals 
No difference in MHS hospital financial performance by ownership 
was expected. Fonnally stated, the hypothesis was 
Hypothesis 1 :  There is no statistically significant 
difference in the financial performance of FP and NFP MHS 
hospitals . 
In order to test that hypothesis , two steps were taken. First, the 
pre-acquisition financial performance of hospitals acquired by the FP 
and by the NFP MHSs were compared with one another to see if the two 
72 
MHS ownership forms targeted hospitals with different financial 
performance (Table 11) . Cllanges in the average financial performance 
of each acquired hospital were then computed by subtracting the 
average value of each ratio in the two years prior to acquisition from 
the average value for 1984/1985 . The changes in average performance 
over time were compared for FP and NFP MHS hospitals to detennine if 
the benefits of MHS membership varied by ownership (Table 12 ) . 
Results from the nonpararnetric Wilcoxon rank sum tests, which 
correspond to the findings in Tables 11 and 12 , are provided in 
Appendix C, Tables 1-c and 2-c respectively. 
Average Pre-Acquisition Financial Performance 
Table 11 shows no statistically significant differences in pre­
acquisition financial performance between hospitals acquired by FP and 
NFP MHSs. Trimmed t tests are presented for seven ratios (ACID, 
DAYCASH, CASHDEBI', TDFB, LTDFB, IJI'DFA, and ROA) ; however, the t, 
trimmed t, and nonpararnetric tests all failed to produce statistically 
significant results . The implication is that FP and NFP MHSs acquired 
hospitals with similar financial traits . 
Changes in Financial Performance 
Contrary to expectations, however, the financial performance of 
hospitals acquired by FP and by NFP MHSs did not remain the same over 
time. Examining the changes in financial performance from just before 
acquisition to 1984/1985 revealed statistically significant 
differences in liquidity, financial activity, and profitability. 
73 
74 
TABlE 11 : Corrparison of Average Pre-acquisition Financial Indicators 
For Hospitals Acquired by FP and NFP MHSs 
FP NFP 
No. No. 
Variable cases Mean cases Mean t-value 
LIQUIDITY 
CURRENT 29 2 . 91 13 2 . 50 . 73 
QUICK 29 2 . 47 13 2 . 16 . 59 
ACID 25 . 42 11 . 25 . 89 
�YSAR 29 74 . 47 13 79 . 66 - . 68 
AVPAY 29 47 . 63 13 64 . 30 -1 . 4 3  
�YCASH 25 16 . 26 11 13 . 32 . 38 
CAPITAL S'IRUCIURE 
CASHDEBI' 23 . 29 9 . 22 . 39 
FBI'A 29 . 60 13 . 54 . 59 
TDFB 23 . 70 9 . 68 . 05 
Ili'DFB 23  . 26 9 . 40 - . 48 
Ili'DFA 23  . 28 11 . 50 -1. 05 
ACI'IVITY 
CA'IURN 29 3 . 54 13 3 . 64 - . 33 
FA'IURN 27 2 . 54 13 2 . 47 . 19 
TA'IURN 29 1 . 52 13 1 . 19 1 . 36 
PROFITABILITY 
MARKUP 29 1 . 17 13 1 . 19 - . 4 1  
NONOPREV 29 . 024 13 . 018 . 58 
ROE 25 . 03 11 . 04 - . 20 
ROA 29 . 03 13 . 02 . 56 
OfMARG 29 - . 007 13 - . 02 . 67 
DEIXJCT 29 . 15 13 . 17 -1 . 02 
AVERAGE AGE OF PI.ANI' 
AGE 28 9 . 70 13 10 . 27 - . 30 
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TABlE 12 : Corrparison of Differences in Average Perfonnance for 
Hospitals Acquired by FP and NFP MHSs (Thlring Membership 
minus Before Membership) 
FP NFP 
No. Mean No. Mean 
Variable cases Difference cases Difference t-value 
LIQUIDITY 
ClJRRENI' 25 . 87 11 - . 95 2 . 00* 
QUICK 25 . 44 11 - . 78 2 . 03** 
ACID 29 - . 46 13 . 23 -2 . 78*** 
DAYSAR 25 2 . 34 11 -6 . 65 . 87 
AVPAY 25 -6 . 20 11 39 . 03 -2 . 16** 
DAY CASH 25 -14 . 84 11 4 . 40 -2 . 24** 
CAPITAL STRUCIURE 
CASHDEBI' 25  . 04 11 - . 4 3  1 . 42 
FBI' A 25  - .43  11 - . 54 . 85 
'IDFB 25 11. 36 11 4 . 34 1 . 12 
I.liDFB 25 10 . 53 11 3 . 25 1 . 21 
I.liDFA 23  . 57 11 . 60 - . 11 
AcriVITY 
CA'IURN 23 . 49 9 . 72 - . 46 
FA '!URN 23  - . 91 11 1 . 87 -1 . 81* 
TA'IURN 23 - . 10 9 . 37 - . 90 
PROFITABILITY 
MARKUP 25 . 17 11 . 06 2 . 20** 
NONOPREV 25 - . 02 11 - . 01 -1 . 4 3  
ROE 25 . 28 11 - . 4 3  1 .  78* 
ROA 25 . 06 11 - . 16 2 . 20** 
0� 29 . 10 13 - . 02 2 . 48** 
DEWcr 25 . 04 11 . 05 - . 33 
AVERAGE AGE OF PLANT 
AGE 24 -7 . 49 10 -5 . 75 - . 68 
* significant at the . 10 level 
* *  Significant at the . 05 level 
*** Significant at the . 01 level or better 
Table 12 contains trimmed t tests for all ratios except ACID and 
OFMARG. In general ,  the trimmed t and nonparametric tests produced 
similar results . In two cases ,  statistically significant differences 
were observed in the nonparametric analysis but not in the trimmed t 
tests . Specifically, the Wilcoxon rank stnn test shows FP MHS 
hospitals had a significantly greater increase in cash flow to total 
debt (CASHDEBI') than NFP MHS hospitals , and NFP MHS hospitals had a 
greater increase in total asset turnover (TA'IURN) than FP MHS 
hospitals . The implication is that the trimmed t tests , as 
constructed here, tended to produce more conservative results than the 
nonparametric alternative. 
In the area of liquidity, hospitals acquired by the FP MHSs , on 
average, increased their aJRRENT and QUICK ratios but reduced their 
relative amounts of cash , as indicated by decreases in the average 
ACID and I::lAYCASH ratios. This relationship was the reverse of that 
observed in the NFP MHS-acquired hospitals . FP MHS hospitals also 
reduced the time they took to pay their short-tenn obligations 
(AVPAY) . Again, the reverse was true for NFP MHS hospitals . 
FP MHS hospitals displayed decreased fixed asset turnover 
(FA'IURN) , indicating either a decrease in the efficiency with which 
fixed assets were employed or the use of newer and less depreciated 
assets . The negative mean differences in AGE indicate that both FP 
and NFP MHSs revitalized and upgraded plant assets . The slight 
negative fixed asset turnover change for FP MHS hospitals implies that 
in 1984 and 1985 newer assets had yet to generate higher revenues . In 
contrast, NFP MHS hospitals exhibited positive improvement in FA'IURN, 
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i.nplying relatively greater generation of revenues from fixe:i assets . 
On average, FP MHS hospitals raise:i their mark up of prices over 
expenses (MARKUP) to a greater extent than NFP MHS hospitals did. 
Concomitantly, profitability, as measure:i by return on equity (ROE) , 
return on assets (ROA) , and operating margin (OFMARG) , increase:i in FP 
facilities but decrease:i in NFP MHS hospitals . 
Comments 
The above findings fail to support the hypothesis that hospitals 
acquire:i by the FP and NFP MHSs perfonn similarly. Although their 
financial perfonnance at acquisition was not significantly different, 
they differed significantly from one another on a m.nnber of measures 
in the years following acquisition. The i.nplication is that FP and 
NFP MHS hospitals were not a homogeneous group. From a financial 
perspective, the results of operations were quite different .  
Comparison of Acquire:i and Independent Hospitals 
The second hypothesis teste:i was that the financial perfonnance of 
MHS hospitals differs from that of the NFP independents . State:i in 
null fonn, the hypothesis was 
Hypothesis 2 :  There is no difference in the financial 
perfonnance of acquire:i and NFP independent hospitals. 
Because the analysis of financial perfonnance by ownership found 
differences between FP and NFP MHS hospitals, separate tests of the 
second hypothesis were conducte:i within each ownership category. The 
univariate analysis teste:i Hypothesis 2 by comparing changes in the 
financial performance of matche:i pairs over time. The poole:i cross-
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sectional analysis compared the financial perfonnance of acquired 
hospitals with that in the group of all NFP independents . 
Univariate Analysis 
'!he univariate test of Hypothesis 2 involved three steps . First, 
the effectiveness of the matching procedure was tested by comparing 
the pre-acquisition financial perfonnance of acquired hospitals 
relative to that of their independent matches. Since few 
statistically significant differences were found in the pre­
acquisition years, the implication was that acquired hospitals and 
their matches were initially similar. Corrparable pre-acquisition 
perfonnance provided a conunon starting point from which to evaluate 
changes occurring thereafter. Next, differences in the perfonnance of 
acquired hospitals from time one to time two were examined to 
detennine if any changes occurred following system membership. 
Because changes in financial perfonnance can result from industry 
trends rather than the benefits of system membership, the changes for 
acquired hospitals were next examined relative to those for matched 
independent hospitals . At each step, separate analyses were conducted 
for FP and NFP MHS-acquired hospitals . 
Average Pre-Acquisition Financial Performance 
Tables 13 and 14 provide the results of statistical tests 
analyzing differences in average perfonnance prior to acquisition 
between MHS hospitals and the paired independent facilities . Mean 
differences between acquired and matched hospitals are reported. The 
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results of the nonpararretric alternative to the paired t test, the 
Wilcoxon signed rank test ,  are contained in Appen:lix c ,  Tables 3-c and 
4-c. 
FP MHS-Acguired Hospitals. '!he selected independent hospitals are 
fairly comparable matches for the FP MHS-acquired facilities 
(Table 13) ; out of twenty-one ratios, only three show statistically 
significant differences between FP MHS-acquired hospitals and their 
independent matches . A statistically significant mean difference on 
the ACID ratio reveals that acquired hospitals had less available cash 
than their matches did in the years before acquisition. statistically 
significant differences in fixed asset turnover (FA'IURN) and total 
asset turnover (TA'IURN) suggest that acquired FP MHS hospitals 
generated more operating revenue per dollar invested in fixed assets 
and in total assets, respectively. 
Trinuned t tests are presented for TDFB, LTDFB, FA'IURN, NONOPREV, 
and ROE . '!hose results were in general agreement with the results of 
the nonparametric tests-that is, for tests of mean differences on the 
five ratios , both the trinuned t and the nonparametric tests produced 
statistically significant results only for FA'IURN. 
NFP MHS-Acguired Hospitals . Table 14 shows that the only 
statistically significant difference between NFP MHS-acquired 
hospitals and their matches was on the deductible (DEOOcr) ratio. On 
average, acquired hospitals lost a smaller proportion of their gross 
patient revenue to contractual allowances, bad debt, or charity care . 
Trinuned t tests are presented for LTDFB, LTDFA, NONOPREV, and 
OFMARG. On each of these four ratios, no statistically significant 
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TABlE 13 : Differences in Perfonnance Variable Averages Between FP MHS 
Acquired Hospitals arrl Independent Matches in the Years 
before Acquisition (FP MHS Value minus Independent Value) 
Variable No. of cases 
LIOOIDITY 
ClJRRENT 
QUICK 
ACID 
DA.YSAR 
AVPAY 
DA.YCASH 
CAPITAL STRUCIURE 
CASHDEBI' 
FBI'A 
TDFB 
LTDFB 
LTD FA 
ACI'IVITY 
CA'IURN 
FA '!URN 
TA'IURN 
PROFITABILITY 
MARKUP 
NONOPREV 
ROE 
ROA 
OfMARG 
DEIXJcr 
AVERAGE AGE OF PIAN!' 
AGE 
29 
29 
29 
29 
29 
29 
29 
29 
25 
25 
27 
29 
23 
29 
29 
25 
25 
29 
29 
29 
28 
* Significant at the . 10 
** Significant at the . 05 
*** Significant at the . 01 
level 
level 
level 
Mean Difference t-value 
- . 72 -1 . 52 
- . 54 -1. 32 
- . 35 -1 . 74* 
2 . 63 . 53 
3 . 81 . 74 
-12 . 67 -1 . 45 
. 14 . 94 
- . 03 - . 53 
. 08 . 38 
- . 10 - . 57 
- . 05 - . 39 
. 34 1 . 46 
. 77 3 . 21*** 
. 48 2 . 78*** 
- . 02 - . 74 
- . 001 - . 20 
- . 04 -1. 13 
- . 001 - . 07 
- . 01 - . 91 
- . 004 - . 29 
. 47 . 47 
or better 
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TABlE 14 : Differences in Perfonnance Variable Averages Between NFP 
MHS Acquired Hospitals and Independent Matches in the Years 
before Acquisition (NFP MHS Value minus Independent Value) 
Variable No. of cases Mean Difference t-value 
LIQUIDITY 
CURRENT 13 - . 67 -1 . 20 
QUICK 13 - . 60 -1 . 17 
ACID 13 - . 32 -1 . 33 
DAYSAR 13 . 4 0  . 05 
AVPAY 13 2 1 . 63 1 . 23 
DAY CASH 13 -7 . 35 -1 . 04 
CAPITAL STRUCIURE 
CASHDEBI' 13 . 11 . 50 
FBI'A 13 - . 12 -1 . 02 
TDFB 13 1 . 65 1 . 54 
L'IDFB 11 . 72 1 . 06 
L'IDFA 11 . 16 . 89 
AcriVITY 
CA'IURN 13 . 19 . 52 
FA'IURN 13 . 52 1 . 11 
TA'IURN 13 . 03 . 13 
PROFITABILITY 
MARKUP 13 - . 06 -1 . 18 
NONOPREV 9 -. 007 -1 . 06 
ROE 13 -. 06 -1 . 02 
ROA 13 - . 01 - . 48 
OFMARG 11 . 03 . 60 
DEIXJCT 13 - . 07 -1 . 82* 
AVERAGE AGE OF PI.ANI' 
AGE 13 - . 10 - . 06 
* Significant at the . 10 level 
differences between NFP MHS-acquired hospitals and their matches were 
found, regardless of whether the trimmed t or nonparametric tests were 
employed. 
Changes in Average Financial Performance 
Average changes in the financial performance of FP and NFP MHS 
hospitals from time one (two years prior to acquisition) to time two 
( 1984 and 1985) are reported in Tables 15 and 16 , respectively. 
Corresponding Wilcoxon signed rank tests are contained in Appendix c, 
Tables 5--c and 6--c. 
FP MHS-Acguired Hospitals . Statistically significant differences 
in the performance of FP MHS-acquired hospitals were apparent on a 
m.nnber of measures . Each of the five dimensions of financial 
performance revealed changes . 
Table 15 shows that, on average, the amount of available cash 
(ACID and DA.YCASH) declined significantly under FP MHS membership. 
Since overall liquidity did not change significantly, that may 
indicate more productive use of current assets--that is, FP MHSs may 
have invested cash . 
Most of the capital structure ratios showed statistically 
significant changes , suggesting greater use of debt under FP MHS 
ownership. 'Ihe proportion of equity used to finance assets (FBI'A) was 
significantly lower in later years , while the proportion of debt 
utilized (TDFB, LTDFB, and LTDFA) was greater. 
Only one financial activity or efficiency ratio was changed 
significantly over time. '!he number of operating income dollars 
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TABlE 15 : Differences in Perfonnance Variables for FP MHS Hospitals 
Before and During Membership {During Membership minus 
Before Membership) 
Variable No. of cases 
LIQUIDITY 
aJRRENT 29 
QUICK 29 
ACID 29 
DAYSAR 29 
AVPAY 25 
DAY CASH 25 
CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
CASHDEBI' 27 
FBI'A 27 
TDFB 25 
ill'DFB 27 
ill'DFA 23 
ACI'IVITY 
CA'IURN 29 
FA'IURN 23 
TA'IURN 27 
PROFITABILITY 
MARKUP 27 
NONOPREV 29 
ROE 25 
ROA 27 
OFMARG 29 
DEOOcr 27 
AVERAGE AGE OF PLANT 
AGE 28 
* significant at the . 10 level 
** Significant at the . 05 level 
Mean Difference 
(during minus before) 
. 73 
. 31 
- . 46 
2 . 59 
-6 . 20 
-14 . 84 
. 04 
- . 43 
11 . 36 
12 . 21 
. 57 
. 63 
- . 91 
. 14 
. 17 
- . 02 
. 28 
. 06 
. 10 
. 09 
-7 . 61 
*** Significant at the . 01 level or better 
t-value 
1 . 18 
. 63 
-3 . 45*** 
. 45 
-1. 10 
-3 . 58*** 
. 22 
-6 . 14*** 
2 . 83*** 
2 . 94*** 
3 . 80*** 
2 . 19** 
-1 . 44 
. 4 0  
5 . 67*** 
-4 . 12*** 
1 . 56 
1. 17* 
3 . 76*** 
1. 77* 
-6 . 08*** 
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TABlE 16 : Differences in Perfonnance Variables for NFP MHS Hospitals 
Before an::l Thlring Membership (Thlring Membership minus 
Before Membership) 
Variable No. of cases 
LIQUIDITY 
CURRENT 
(.2UICK 
ACID 
DAYSAR 
AVPAY 
DAY CASH 
CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
CASHDEBI' 
FBI'A 
TDFB 
L'IDFB 
L'IDFA 
AcriVITY 
CA'IURN 
FA'IURN 
TA'IURN 
PROFITABILITY 
MARKUP 
NONOPREV 
ROE 
ROA 
OfMARG 
m:rucr 
AVERAGE AGE OF PIAN!' 
AGE 
11 
11 
13 
11 
11 
13 
11 
13 
13 
13 
11 
9 
11 
9 
13 
11 
11 
11 
13 
13 
10 
* Significant at the . 10 
** Significant at the . 05 
*** Significant at the . 01 
level 
level 
level 
Mean Difference 
(during minus before) 
- . 95 
- . 78 
. 23 
-6 . 65 
39 . 03 
8 . 34 
- . 4 3  
- . 54 
3 . 86 
2 . 85 
. 60 
. 72 
1 . 87 
. 37 
. 08 
- . 01 
- . 43 
- . 16 
- . 02 
. 05 
-5 . 75 
t-value 
-5 . 94*** 
-6 . 50*** 
1 . 03 
- . 85 
1 . 37 
. 91 
-1 . 79 
-5 . 23*** 
2 . 74** 
2 . 28** 
2 . 73** 
1 . 71 
1 . 00 
. 77 
1 . 27 
-1 . 67 
- . 98 
-1 . 23 
- . 46 
1 . 95* 
-3 . 14** 
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generated per dollar of invesnrent in current assets ( CA'IURN) showed a 
statistically significant increase from time one to time two. 
Several changes are apparent in profitability. Prices (MARKUP) 
rose significantly leading to greater profitability. Higher 
profitability is reflected by statistically significant positive mean 
differences in the proportion of operating revenue retained as income 
(OFMARG) and net income returned on assets (ROA) . The inpact of price 
increases is all the more meaningful if changes in NONOPREV and DEOOcr 
are considered. Nonoperating income as a proportion of operating 
income (NONOPREV) declined significantly after FP MRS-acquisition, 
while the proportion of gross patient revenue lost to contractual 
allowances , bad debts, or charity care (DEOOcr) increased 
significantly. Ordinarily, without greater markups, those two factors 
would reduce profitability. 
Finally, a statistically significant decrease in the average age 
of plant (AGE) indicates the up::Jrading of plant and equipment by FP 
MHSs . Facilities were less depreciated in post-acquisition years than 
before purchase . 
In the preceding analysis of average differences, the 
distributions of twelve ratios were trimmed: AVPAY, DAYCASH, 
CASHDEBI', TDFB, L'IDFB, L'IDFA, FA'IURN, TA'IURN, MARKUP, ROE, ROA, and 
DEOOcr .  In three cases (FA'IURN, ROE, and ROA) , nonparametric tests of 
those ratios produced results different from the ones reported here . 
The Wilcoxon sign rank tests suggested FP MHS hospitals decreased 
their return on fixed assets (FA'IURN) and irrproved their return on 
equity (ROE) following acquisition. The significant irrproverrent in 
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ROA found with the trinuned t was not corrol:x:>rated by the Wilcoxon sign 
rank test. 
NFP MHS-Acguired Hospitals. In the data for NFP MHS hospitals, 
several changes appear in financial perfonnance following acquisition, 
as shown in Table 16 . Liquidity declined from time one to time two, 
as revealed by the statistically significant decrease in aJRRENT and 
QUICK. Like the FP MHS-acquired hospitals , NFP MHS hospitals reduced 
their equity financing (FBI'A) and increased their use of debt (TDFB, 
LTDFB, and LTDFA) following system membership. No statistically 
significant differences occurred in financial activity and 
profitability except for the deductible ratio (DEOOcr) ; NFP MHS 
hospitals lost a significantly greater proportion of gross patient 
revenue to contractual allowances, bad debts , or charity care (DEOOcr) 
following acquisition. Finally, NFP MHS-acquired hospitals, like 
their FP counterparts , invested in new plant and equipment as 
demonstrated by the statistically significant decrease in AGE. 
Trinuned t tests are presented for thirteen ratios : aJRRENT, 
QUICK, DAYSAR, AVPAY, CASHDEBI', LTDFA, CA'IURN, FA'IURN, TA'IURN, 
NONOPREV, ROE, ROA, and AGE. In all but two cases (CASHDEBI' and 
NONOPREV) , results similar to those reported in Table 16 were found 
when the Wilcoxon sign rank test was performed. The nonparametric 
tests found that NFP MHS-acquired hospitals significantly reduced cash 
flow to total debt (CASHDEBI') , and nonoperating revenue as a 
proportion of operating revenue (NONOPREV) . 
Comments. Increased liquidity, debt, and financial efficiency, as 
well as illlproved profitability and invesbnent in plant and equipment, 
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were expected over time . While roth FP an::l NFP MHSs increased 
hospital acx::ess to debt an::l revitalized the physical plant, liquidity 
measures tended to remain unchanged or declined under MHS ownership. 
Only in FP MHS hospitals did profitability increase significantly. 
Findings on improvements in financial activity or efficiency are weak. 
While the observed significant changes were interesting, they did 
not in themselves confinn system effects . '!he remaining question was 
whether the changes observed in the performance of acquired hospitals 
differed from changes observed in matched hospitals. If the 
significant changes observed in acquired hospitals differed from those 
of their matches, system influence, rather than industry trends , could 
explain the difference over time. 
Changes in MHS Hospital Financial Performance Relative to Independents 
Changes in the financial performance of FP an::l NFP MHS-acquired 
hospitals relative to that of matched independents are presented in 
Tables 17 an::l 18 , respectively. Nonparametric Wilcoxon sign rank 
tests are contained in Appendix c ,  Tables 7-c an::l a-c. 
FP MHS-Acquired Hospitals . FP MHS-acquired hospitals differed 
from their matches in all areas of financial performance . Table 17 
reveals statistically significant mean differences in each of the five 
dimensions of financial performance. 
Although no statistically significant change in the CURRENT ratio 
is shown in Table 15, a significant difference was apparent when FP 
MHS-acquired hospitals were corrpared with their matches (Table 17 ) . 
'!he implication is that the matched independent hospitals suffered a 
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TABlE 17 : Changes in Perfo:rmance of FP MHS Hospitals Relative to 
Matched Indeperrlent Hospitals (FP MHS Value minus 
Indeperrlent Value) 
Variable No. of cases 
LIQUIDITY 
aJRRENl' 29 
QUICK 29 
ACID 29 
Di\YSAR 29 
AVPAY 27 
DAY CASH 29 
CAPITAL STRUCIURE 
CASHDEBI' 29 
FBI'A 27 
TDFB 27 
LTDFB 27 
LTD FA 23 
AcriVITY 
CA'IURN 29 
FA'IURN 23 
TA'IURN 27 
PROFITABILITY 
MARKUP 27 
NONOPREV 27 
ROE 25 
ROA 27 
OfMARG 29 
DEIXJcr 29 
AVERAGE AGE OF PI.ANI' 
AGE 28 
* Significant at the . 10 level 
** Significant at the . 05 level 
*** Significant at the . 01 level 
Mean Difference 
(during minus before) 
1 . 22 
. 58 
- . 45 
-7 . 47 
-10 . 04 
-24 . 51 
- . 06 
- . 43 
13 . 45 
12 . 58 
. 54 
. 78 
-1 . 61 
. 11 
. 06 
- . 02 
. 22 
. 02 
. 05 
- . 02 
-5 . 15 
t-value 
1 .  70* 
. 90 
-2 . 05** 
- . 95 
- . 97 
-2 . 77*** 
- . 23 
-6 . 14*** 
3 . 05*** 
2 . 99*** 
3 . 00*** 
2 . 17** 
-5 . 37*** 
. 33 
2 . 00** 
-2 . 50** 
1 . 29 
. 50 
1 . 79* 
- . 67 
-4 . 30*** 
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TABlE 18 : Changes in Performance of NFP MHS Hospitals Relative to 
Matched Independent Hospitals (NFP MHS Value minus 
Independent Value) 
Mean Difference 
Variable No. of cases (during minus before) t-value 
LIOOIDITY 
ClJRRENT 13 - . 58 - . 67 
QUICK 11 -1 . 02 -2 . 37** 
ACID 13 . 21 . 75 
DAYSAR 11 -32 . 35 -2 . 21* 
AVPAY 11 22 . 28 1 . 13 
DAY CASH 13 7 . 49 . 69 
CAPITAL SI'RUCIURE 
CASHDEBI' 11 - . 29 -1 . 04 
FBI'A 13 - . 42 -3 . 84*** 
TDFB 13 2 . 96 1 . 91* 
LTDFB 13 2 . 51 1 . 99* 
LTD FA 11 . 45 2 . 25** 
ACITVITY 
CA'IURN 9 1 . 19 2 . 70** 
FAWRN 11 1 . 61 . 92 
TA'IURN 11 1 . 03 1 . 04 
PROFITABILITY 
MARKUP 13 - . 04 - . 34 
NONOPREV 11 - . 01 -1 . 00 
ROE 11 - . 4 0  - . 95 
ROA 11 - . 12 - . 92 
OFMARG 13 . 0009 . 01 
DEOOCT 13 . 01 . 32 
AVERAGE AGE OF PIANT 
AGE 10 -5. 04 -3 . 02** 
* Significant at the . 10 level 
** Significant at the . 05 level 
*** Significant at the . 01 level or better 
89 
large decline in liquidity as measured by ClJRRENI'. Although FP MRS­
acquired hospitals were able to hold their pre-acquisition levels of 
current assets to current liabilities (ClJRRENI') ,  their cash holdings 
declined (ACID and DAYCASH) . '!his is apparent in Table 15 . 
Table 17 shows that the decline in perfomance on ACID and DAYCASH was 
more severe than that experienced by the independent hospitals. 
With regard to capital structure, the increased debt utilization 
presented in Table 15 was significantly greater than that of the 
independent hospitals. '!his finding is apparent in the statistically 
significant mean differences in FBI'A, TDFB, L'IDFB, and L'IDFA found in 
Table 17 . 
CUrrent asset turnover ( CA'IURN) which increased over time (Table 
15) , changed significantly more than did that of matched independent 
hospitals (Table 17) . While Table 15 shows no statistically 
significant difference in the m.nnber of operating revenue dollars 
generated per dollar of fixed asset investment (FA'IURN) , Table 17 
shows the average change in FA'IURN for FP MHS-acquired hospitals was 
significantly lower than that of matched independent hospitals . The 
implication is that independent hospitals increased their measures of 
FA'IURN considerably. '!he statistically significant mean difference 
between FP MHS hospitals and independents on FA'IURN (Table 17) is 
probably related to the FP MHS hospitals '  use of newer, less 
depreciated assets. '!he latter is evident in the negative and 
statistically significant mean difference on AGE (Table 17) . 
Although Table 15 shows FP MHS-acquired hospitals increased their 
return on assets (ROA) and deductions from gross revenues (DEIXJCT) , 
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the changes were not significantly different from those in the matched 
independent hospitals. As a result, it is inpossible to distinguish 
changes in RDA and m:r::ucr from industry trends . 
For other profitability ratios , however, FP MHS-acquired hospitals 
were significantly different from their matched independent 
counterparts . FP MHS hospitals increased their markup of prices over 
expenses (MARKUP) significantly more than the independents did. 
Nonoperating revenue as a proportion of net patient revenue fell 
significantly more than for independents, and the proportion of 
operating revenue retained as income (OFMARG) rose significantly more. 
Trinuned t tests are presented for AVPAY, FBI'A, TDFB, UIDFB, 
FA'IURN, TA'IURN, MARKUP, NONOPREV, ROE, and ROA. Nonparametric tests 
produced similar findings for each of these ratios with the exception 
of ROE . When tested using the Wilcoxon sign rank test, FP MRS­
acquired hospitals had significantly higher changes in return on 
equity (ROE) than did their matched counterparts. 
NFP MHS-Acguired Hospitals . '!he area of liquidity offers a mnnber 
of interesting insights into the ilnpact of NFP MHS rnernbership on 
hospitals . Although Table 16 shows NFP MHS-acquired hospitals had 
lower liquidity in 1984/1985 as measured by aJRRENT, this change was 
not significantly different from that of the independents ,  as seen in 
Table 18 . NFP MHS-acquired hospitals reduced their liquidity signifi­
cantly more than matched independents did as measured by the QUICK 
ratio (Table 18) . Although NFP MHS-acquired hospitals had no 
statistically significant decrease in their Di\YSAR ratio (Table 16) , a 
significant mean difference between system and independent hospitals 
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is apparent in Table 18 . The implication is that for matched 
independent hospitals the average tilne that receivables were 
outstanding increased. 
In the area of capital structure, NFP MHS hospitals used debt 
significantly m::>re than the matched independents did; they showed 
significant increases over tilne in TDFB, LTDFB, and LTDFA (Table 16) . 
Those measures also increased significantly m::>re in NFP MHS hospitals 
than in their independent counterparts (Table 18) . 
The change in current asset turnover ( CA'IURN) for NFP MHS-acquired 
hospitals from tilne one to tilne two was not statistically significant 
(Table 16) ; however, it did differ significantly from the change in 
CA'IURN for matched independent hospitals (Table 18) . The implication 
is that the m.nnber of operating revenue dollars generated per dollar 
of investment in current assets dropped over tilne in the matched 
independent hospitals.  
The change in DEIX.Jcr for NFP MHS hospitals, which was 
statistically significant (Table 16) , failed to be significantly 
different from the change in the deductibles for matched independent 
hospitals . This finding implies an industry trend toward increasing 
deductibles . 
over tilne, the NFP MHSs replaced the older, depreciated assets of 
the acquired facilities (Table 16) . They improved plant and equipment 
to a greater extent than the matched NFP independents did. That is 
apparent in the negative and statistically significant change in the 
AGE ratio of NFP MHS hospitals relative to their matches (Table 18) . 
Trinuned t tests are presented for QUICK, Di\YSAR, AVPAY, CASHDEBI', 
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LTDFA, CA'IURN, FA'IURN, TA'IURN, NONOPREV, ROE, ROA, and AGE .  
Nonpararretric tests prcx:luced results similar to those presented here, 
except in the case of NONOPREV. While the tr:innned t test found no 
statistically significant difference in NONOPREV changes between MHS 
and independent hospitals ,  the nonpararrw=tric test found NFP MHS­
acquired hospitals experienced greater declines in nonoperating 
revenue (NONOPREV) than did the independents. 
Comments. System membership appears to have had a favorable 
financial impact on hospitals purchased by the FP MHSs. As expected , 
these systems i.nproved facilities, increased access to long-term debt, 
and raised profitability. Improved profitability was accomplished 
primarily through higher markups. However, there is some indication 
of i.nproved efficiency as measured by C'A'IURN. Finally, the FP MHS 
hospitals reduced their cash holdings; that may be an indication of 
more productive use of current assets . 
'!here were fewer statistically significant findings with respect 
to NFP MHS hospitals . As expected, NFP MHSs increased access to debt 
and made capital i.nprovements to the physical plant. Contrary to 
expectations, they lowered liquidity levels. 
Pooled Cross-Sectional Analysis 
Discarding the matching design and pooling all the observations 
from all years resulted in a data base of 336 observations which could 
be analyzed in a pooled cross-sectional analysis . There were 252 
hospitals which could be classified as independent NFP, 58 FP MHS 
hospitals, and 26 NFP MHS facilities. '!he independent NFP group was 
93 
large because it included all hospitals in the sample from the pre­
acquisition years, plus 1984 and 1985 observations for hospitals which 
were not purchased. 
To further examine differences between MHS and independent 
hospitals, both analysis of variance (ANOVA) and regression analysis 
of the pooled observations were perfonned for each financial ratio. 
Each ANOVA tested the hypothesis that the average financial 
performance was the same across the three groups. Results are 
presented in Table 19 . Scheffe ' s  method for multiple comparisons 
allowed pairwise examinations of group means for the purpose of 
identifying specific group differences . The results are presented in 
Table 2 0 .  Multiple regression analysis pennitted examination of the 
effects of system membership on financial performance while 
controlling for extraneous variables. '!he results are presented in 
Table 2 1 .  
'!he hypothesis that the financial performance of MHS hospitals 
does not differ from that of the independents was addressed in two 
ways : (a) through the Scheffe comparisons of financial performance in 
MHS and independent NFP hospitals and (b) through the twenty-one 
regressions of hospital financial perfonnance on system membership and 
control variables. '!he Scheffe comparisons of financial performance 
in FP and NFP MHS hospitals relate to the earlier hypothesis that FP 
and NFP MHS-acquired hospitals perfom similarly. Although that was 
not the focal point of interest at this stage of the analysis, the 
findings are presented ; they support the earlier results . 
'!he ANOVAs and regressions presented here were done with outlier 
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observations removed . OUtliers were identified by performing the 
multiple regression analysis, plotting the standardized residuals, and 
noting any observations with standardized residuals beyond positive or 
negative 3 (canavos , 1984) . '!he results of the original regression 
analysis ( i . e. , with outlier observations included) are presented in 
Appendix c ,  Table 9-c. 
'!he results found in Table 19 suggested the hypothesis of equal 
means across the three groups of independent NFP, FP MHS ,  and NFP MHS 
hospitals could be rejected at the . 05 level of statistical 
significance for all but one of the ratios . '!he lill.OVA for the days in 
accounts receivable {DAYSAR) ratio produced an F statistic which 
failed to reach the . 05 level of significance. 
More infornation can be obtained from Table 2 0 ,  which reports the 
pairwise differences between group means for each ratio. Scheffe 's  
method for multiple comparisons was used to detect differences between 
group means at the . 05 level of statistical significance. When the 
hypothesis of equal means was rejected through the lill.OVA F statistic, 
Scheffe ' s  method produced at least one statistically discernible 
contrast at the corresponding level of significance . 
Liquidity. FP MHS hospitals held less cash {ACID and DAYCASH) 
than the group of all NFP independent hospitals . NFP MHS facilities 
had lower general liquidity (CURRENI' and QUICK) than did NFP 
independent hospitals . '!hey also took longer to pay their bills 
(AVPAY) . 'Ihese findings , while not totally parallel to those found in 
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TABlE 19 : Average Financial Performance by Group 
Irrlependent FP NFP 
NFP MHS MHS 
Variable Number Mean Number Mean Number Mean F 
LICUIDITY 
aJRRENT 234 3 . 08 54 3 . 29 25 1 . 71 7 . 82* 
QUICK 228 2 . 67 55 2 . 58 25 1 . 51 6 . 70* 
ACID 225 . 61 56 . 07 25 . 4 1  20 . 50* 
DAYSAR 233 8 0 . 7 1  56 76 . 68 25 67 . 12 2 . 60 
AVPAY 226 51 .80 55 55. 80 25 85 . 78 5 . 91* 
DAY CASH 217 25 . 20 55 1 . 50 25 18 . 28 23 . 58* 
CAPITAL SI'RUCIURE 
CASHDEBI' 223 . 3 1  55 . 39 24 -. 005 6 . 73* 
FBI' A 235 . 60 55 . 19 26 -. 006 110 . 19* 
TDFB 235 1 . 17 52 11 . 30 26 6 . 22 47 . 43* 
LTDFB 235 . 79 52 10 . 07 26 4 . 66 44 . 82* 
LTD FA 231 . 43 53 . 78 26  1 . 13 3 1 . 28* 
ACITVITY 
CA'IURN 234 3 . 27 56 4 . 18 23 3 . 63 13 . 84* 
FAWRN 228 2 . 12 54 1 . 41 23 2 . 60 6 . 85* 
TA'ltJRN 233 1 . 14 55 1 . 45 25 2 . 22 9 . 30* 
PROFITABILITY 
MARKUP 237 1 . 24 56 1 . 33 26 1 . 26 5 . 79* 
NONOPREV 233 . 03 57 . 002 26 . 005 13 . 93* 
ROE 233 . 05 53 . 30 22 - . 15 8 . 99* 
ROA 232 . 04 54 . 10 23 - . 01 8 . 93* 
OIMARG 231 . 007 56 . 07 26 - . 04 14 . 28* 
oEIXJcr 232 . 18 55 . 19 25 . 24 4 . 43*  
AVERAGE AGE OF PIAN!' 
AGE 226 8 . 89 54 2 . 21 22 3 . 05 84 . 84* 
* Significant at the . 05 level or better 
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TABlE 2 0 :  Pairwise Differences between Group Mean Financial 
Performance 
FP MHS NFP MHS FP MHS 
Minus Minus Minus 
Variable NFP Indep NFP Indep NFP MHS 
LIQUIDITY 
CURRENT . 21 -1 . 37* 1 . 59* 
QUICK - . 10 -1 . 16* 1 . 06* 
ACID - . 54*  - . 20 - . 34* 
D.Z\YSAR -4 . 03 -13 . 59 9 . 56 
AVPAY 4 . 00 33 . 98* -29 . 98* 
DAY CASH -23 . 70* -6 . 92 -16 . 78* 
CAPITAL S'IRUCIURE 
CASHDEBI' . 08 - . 32* . 40* 
FBTA - . 41* -. 61* . 20* 
TDFB 10 . 13*  5 . 05* 5 . 08* 
LTDFB 9 . 28* 3 . 87* 5 . 41* 
LTD FA . 35* . 70* - . 35* 
ACTIVITY 
CA'IURN . 91* . 36 . 55 
FA'IURN - . 71* . 48 -1 . 19* 
TA'IURN . 3 1  1 . 08* - . 77* 
PROFITABILITY 
MARKUP . 09* . 03 . 07 
NONOPREV - . 02* - . 02* - . 003 
ROE . 25* - . 19 . 44* 
ROA . 06* -. 05 . 11* 
OFMARG . 06* . 05 . 11* 
DEIXJCT . 01 . 06* - . 05 
AVERAGE AGE OF PI.ANI' 
AGE -6 . 69* -5 . 85* - . 84 
* Significant at the . 05 level or better 
Tables 17 and 18 , terrl to support the earlier analysis. 
FP MHS hospitals differed from NFP MHS hospitals on almost every 
liquidity ratio .  FP MHS hospitals were more liquid (CURREN!' and 
QUICK) , in general , but held less cash (ACID and DAYCASH) than NFP MHS 
hospitals did. '!hey also took less time to pay their creditors than 
NFP MHS hospitals did. 'Ihese findings support the earlier analysis 
reported in Table 12 . 
capital Structure. FP MHS hospitals were more highly leveraged 
(TDFB, LTDFB, and LTDFA) than the NFP independents .  Consequently, 
they displayed less equity financing (FBI'A) than NFP independents did. 
'!he cash flow to service this debt (CASHDEBI') was not significantly 
different between the two groups . Considering the greater burden of 
debt assumed by the FP MHS hospitals, this may mean future solvency 
problems . Similar patterns were apparent in comparisons between NFP 
MHS hospitals and NFP independents . '!he NFP MHS hospitals used more 
debt (TDFB, LTDFB, and LTDFA) and less equity (FBI'A) than independents 
did. However, they had significantly lower cash flow to service their 
debt ( CASHDEBr) than did the NFP independents. '!hat appears to be an 
even stronger indication of potential future financial problems than 
emerged from comparisons between FP MHS hospitals and independents . 
'!he preceding findings are similar to those reported in Tables 17 and 
18 . 
From comparison of the two MHS categories, it is clear that FP MHS 
hospitals used more debt (TDFB and LTDFB) than did NFP MHS hospitals . 
'!hey also had more cash to service that higher debt (CASHDEBI') .  
SUrprisingly, the NFP MHS hospitals had less equity (FBI'A) than the FP 
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MHS facilities had. '!his financial anomaly seems to be due to the 
negative average fund balance fourrl in the NFP MHS sector. 
Interestingly, FP MHS hospitals showed less long-tenn debt as a 
proportion of fixed assets (L'IDFA) than did the NFP MHS facilities . 
'!hat may be due to a slightly larger denominator ( i . e . , more, and 
perhaps , slightly less depreciated, assets) for this ratio in FP MHS 
hospitals. While these findings are similar to those fourrl in Table 
12 , none of the earlier analyses of changes in capital structure 
ratios reached statistical significance. 
Financial Activity. FP MHS hospitals were not as efficient in the 
use of fixed assets (FA'IURN) as the NFP independents were. '!hat was, 
no doubt, due to the newer less depreciated assets (AGE) fourrl among 
the FP MHS hospitals and the consequently larger denominator that FP 
MHS facilities had for FA'IURN. FP MHS hospitals showed a greater 
return on current assets (CA'IURN) than did NFP independents . '!he NFP 
MHS hospitals were able to generate more revenue on total assets 
(TA'IURN) than the NFP independents were . Findings with respect to FP 
MHS hospitals coincided closely with the findings of Table 17 . 
Findings with respect to NFP MHS hospitals were slightly different, 
although not contradictory. 
In a comparison of MHS hospitals in the two ownership categories 
with one another, NFP MHS facilities were fourrl to be more efficient 
in the use of both fixed and total assets (FA'IURN and TA'IURN, 
respectively) than were their FP counterparts . '!he indication is that 
NFP MHS hospitals generated more operating revenue per dollar of fixed 
and total assets . '!his analysis generally supports the early findings 
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of Table 12 . 
Profitability. As expected , FP MHSs received less nonoperating 
revenue as a proportion of patient and other revenues (NONOPREV) than 
did the NFP independents. They were also generally more profitable 
(ROE, ROA, and OfMARG) than the NFP independents and marked up prices 
over expenses (MARKUP) to a greater extent than the NFP independents 
did. These findings support and are stronger than those reported in 
Table 17 . 
NFP MHSs received less nonoperating revenue as a proportion of 
patient and other revenues (NONOPREV) than the NFP independents did, 
and they lost a greater proportion of their patient revenues to 
charity, bad debts, or contractual allc:Wcmces (DEIXJcr) than did the 
NFP independents . The NFP MHS hospitals, however, were no more 
profitable than the NFP independents . Again, the direction of results 
was the same as presented in Table 18 ; however, none of the results of 
the earlier analysis reached statistical significance. 
When FP and NFP MHS facilities were compared, three statistically 
discernible differences appeared. The return on equity (ROE) , return 
on assets (ROA) , and operating margin (OfMARG) ratios revealed FP MHS 
hospitals were more profitable than NFP MHS hospitals . These findings 
are similar to those of Table 12 . 
Average Age of Plant . The one ratio which examined the age of the 
physical plant (AGE) , confinned that systems revitalized plant and 
equipment. Both FP MHS and NFP MHS hospitals had newer, less 
depreciated assets than the NFP independents . These results are 
similar to those presented in Tables 17 and 18 . 
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'Ihe MHS facilities did not differ by ownership on the AGE ratio. 
'!hat is consistent with matched univariate finding (Table 12) . 
Comments . Differences between the liliOVA and matched univariate 
tests may be attributed to subtle differences between the two types of 
analyses . '!he matched univariate t tests examined changes in 
performance over time and compared each acquired hospital with its 
match. 'Ihe t tests addressed the question of whether MHS-acquired 
hospitals improved financial perfonnance following acquisition. 'Ihe 
pooled �OVA and regression analyses did not examine changes, but 
rather asked if MHS-acquired hospitals differed in performance from 
NFP independents . Statistical controls rather than matched 
comparisons were used . 
Regression 
Table 21 contains the results of twenty-one regressions of 
financial ratios on variables representing region, metropolitan or 
rural location, bed size, and membership in a FP or NFP MHS .  'Ihe 
intent of the analysis was to examine the performance of FP MHS 
hospitals and NFP MHS hospitals in relation to all NFP independents 
while controlling statistically for those variables thought to be 
related to financial performance. Results may differ somewhat from 
those of the liliOVAs , which used no statistical controls . 
The dependent variable in each regression is presented 
horizontally across the top of Table 2 1 .  Independent variables are 
listed vertically down the left-hand side of the chart . 'Ihe first 
page of the table contains liquidity regressions . Page two completes 
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TABlE 21:  Multiple Regression Analysis of the Effects of System Membership on Financial Indicators 
Irrleperrlent 
Variables 
OORDER+ 
scum+ 
MEI'RO@ 
BEDS 
NFFMHS# 
FFMHS# 
Intercept 
F 
R2 
�pendent Variables 
aJRRENT QUICK ACID DA.YSAR AVPAY 
B t B t B t B t B t 
(SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) (SE) 
- . 11 - . 43 
( .  27) 
- . 34 -1 . 4 1  
( . 24) 
- . 37 -1 . 70* 
( .  22) 
- . 00003 - . 02 
( .  002) 
-1 . 44 -3 . 88*** 
( .  37) 
. 24 . 92 
( .  26) 
3 . 37 12 . 04*** 
( . 28) 
3 . 60*** 
. 07 
- . 20 - . 89 
( . 23 )  
- . 41 -1 . 98** 
( . 20) 
- . 37 -1 . 96** 
( . 19) 
. 0008 . 58 
( . 001) 
-1 . 24 -3 . 91*** 
( .  32) 
- . 06 - . 25 
( .  22) 
2 . 92 12 . 13*** 
( . 24 )  
3 . 74*** 
. 07 
. 02 . 17 
( .  09) 
. 06 . 78 
( . 08) 
- . 03 - . 38 
( . 07)  
- . 0001 - . 28 
( . 0005) 
-1 . 56 - . 35 
( 4 .  40) 
-4 . 96 -1 . 26 
( 3 . 95) 
4 . 89 1 . 37 
( 3 .  57) 
. 07 2 . 71*** 
( .  03) 
- . 18 
( . 12) 
-1 . 48 -15 . 43 -2 . 50*** 
- . 55 
( . 09) 
. 60 
( .  09) 
(6 . 18) 
-6 . 36*** -3 . 4 6  
( 4 .  33)  
6 . 47*** 73 . 25 
(4 . 67)  
6 . 91*** 
. 12 
-0. 80 
15 . 69*** 
3 . 03*** 
. 06 
-5. 28 - . 74 
(7 . 13 )  
-2 . 06 - . 32 
(6 . 46) 
14 . 10 2 . 42** 
(5 . 83 )  
- . 006 -. 14 
( .  04) 
32 . 67 
(9 . 96) 
3 . 49 
(7 . 04 )  
50. 23 
(7 . 63) 
3 . 28*** 
. 50 
6 . 59*** 
3 . 21*** 
. 06 
* significant at the . 10 level 
** significant at the . 05 level 
+ Reference group includes TX, IA, MS, and AlA 
@ Reference group is rural 
*** significant at the . 01 level or better # Reference group is NFP Irrleperrlent ...... 0 N 
Table 21 :  Multiple Regression Analysis of  the Effects of System Membership on Financial Indicators 
DAY CASH CASHDEBI' 
In:ieperrlent B t B t 
Variables (SE) (SE) 
OORDER+ 3 . 63 1 . 02 . 18 2 . 58*** 
{3 . 56) ( . 07)  
scx.nW 4 . 33 1 . 35 . 19 2 . 99*** 
{ 3 .  22)  ( . 06) 
MEI'RO@ - . 86 - . 30 - . 03 - . 49 
( 2 . 90) ( . 06) 
BEffi . 02 . 76 . 0008 1 . 92*  
( .  02) ( . 0004 ) 
NFFMHS# -5 . 87 -1 . 20 - . 28 -2 . 92*** 
( 4 .  91) ( . 10) 
FFMHS# -23 . 85 -6. 86*** . 08 1 . 14 
(3 . 48) ( . 07)  
Intercept 20. 78 5 . 47*** . 10 1 . 37 
{3 .  80) ( . 07)  
F 8 . 21*** 4 . 43*** 
R2 . 15 . 08 
* significant at the . 10 level 
** significant at the . 05 level 
*** significant at the . 01 level or better 
Dependent Variables 
FBI'A 
B t 
(SE) 
. 06 1 . 68* 
( .  04) 
. 005 . 14 
( .  03) 
- . 09 -2 . 80*** 
( .  03) 
. 0003 1 . 13 
( . 0002) 
- . 61 -11. 56*** 
( . 05) 
- . 41 -10. 81*** 
( .  04) 
. 58 14 . 57*** 
( . 04) 
40 . 18*** 
. 44 
TDFB 
B t 
(SE) 
. 09 . 08 
{ 1 . 06) 
- . 08 - . 08 
( .  95) 
1 . 29 1 . 50 
( . 86) 
- . 01 -1. 70* 
( . 006) 
4 . 99 3 . 42*** 
(1 . 46) 
10 . 05 9 . 38*** 
( 1 . 07)  
1 . 99 1. 77* 
(1 . 12 )  
16 . 59*** 
. 25 
IJIDFB 
B t 
(SE) 
. 36 . 37 
( .  99) 
. 16 . 19 
( . 89) 
. 95 1 . 19 
( . 80) 
-. 009 -1 . 51 
( .  006) 
3 . 87 2 . 85*** 
{1 . 36) 
9 . 20 9 . 21*** 
{1 . 00) 
1 . 34 1 . 28 
{1 .  05) 
15 . 50*** 
. 23 
+ Reference group includes TX, IA, MS,  and AlA 
@ Reference group is rural 
# Reference group is NFP Independent ...... 0 w 
Table 21:  Multiple Regression Analysis of the Effects of System Membership on Financial Indicators 
L'IDFA CA'IURN 
Independent B t B t 
Variables {SE) {SE) 
OORDER+ - . 20 -2 . 67*** . 19 1 . 07 
( . 07)  ( . 18) 
scx.mr+- -. 02 - . 33 . 04 . 23 
( . 07)  ( . 16) 
MEI'RO@ - . 06 -1 . 04 - . 07 - . 46 
( . 06) ( . 14) 
BEI:S . 0009 2 . 01** - . 001 -1 . 26 
( .  0004 ) ( . 001) 
NFIMJS# . 70 6 . 98*** . 37 1 . 42 
( . 10) ( . 26) 
TIMHS# . 35 4 . 70*** . 91 5 . 19*** 
( . 07)  ( . 18) 
Intercept . 4 1  5 . 30*** 3 . 38 17 . 70*** 
( . 08) ( . 19) 
F 13 . 20*** 5 . 34*** 
R2 . 21 . 09 
* significant at the . 10 level 
** significant at the . 05 level 
*** significant at the . 01 level or better 
Dependent Variables 
FA '!URN 
B t 
{SE) 
- . 17 - . 77 
( . 22 )  
- . 35 -1 . 76* 
( .  20) 
. 45 2 . 43** 
( . 18) 
- . 005 -3 . 64*** 
( . 001) 
. 41 1 . 28 
( .  32) 
- . 71 -3 . 22*** 
( .  22) 
2 . 73 11 . 62*** 
( . 24 )  
5 . 45*** 
. 10 
TA'IURN 
B t 
{SE) 
- . 21 -1 . 12 
( . 19) 
- . 22 -1 . 30 
( . 17) 
- . 06 - . 38 
( . 15) 
- . 003 -2 . 70*** 
( .  001) 
1 . 05 4 . 06*** 
( .  26) 
. 31 1. 70* 
( . 18) 
1 . 65 8 . 45*** 
( . 20) 
4 . 65*** 
. 08 
MARKUP 
B t 
{SE) 
. 006 . 24 
( . 03 )  
- . 009 - . 38 
( . 02 )  
. 0008 . 04 
( .  02) 
. 001 6 . 10*** 
( . 0002) 
. 02 . 55 
( . 04 )  
. 10 3 . 72*** 
( .  03) 
1 . 13 40. 41*** 
( .  03 ) 
8 . 70*** 
. 14 
+ Reference group includes TX, IA, MS,  and AIA 
@ Reference group is rural 
# Reference group is NFP Independent 
,_. 0 � 
�le 21:  Multiple Regression Analysis of the Effects of System Membership on Financial Indicators 
!Irleperrl- NONOPREV ROE 
ent Var- B t B t 
iables (SE) (SE) 
OORDER+ -. 0005 - . 10 - . 004 - . 06 
( . 005) ( . 07 ) 
samr+- . 02 3 . 53*** . 05 . 82 
( . 004 ) ( . 06) 
MEI'RO@ . 01 2 . 78*** . 008 . 15 
( . 004 ) ( . 06) 
BELS -. 000 -2 . 29** . 0007 1. 70* 
( . 000) ( . 0004 ) 
NFIMHS# - . 02 -2 . 50*** -. 19 -1. 84* 
( . 007 ) ( . 10) 
FFMHS# - . 03 -5. 35*** . 25 3 . 52*** 
( . 005) ( . 07 ) 
Intercept . 02 4 . 64*** - . 06 - . 80 
( . 005) ( . 08 ) 
F 10 . 38*** 3 . 73*** 
R2 . 17 . 07 
* significant at the . 10 level 
** significant at the . 05 level 
*** significant at the . 01 level or better 
B 
(SE) 
. 02 
( . 02 ) 
. 04 
( . 02 ) 
-. 01 
( . 01) 
Dependent Variables 
ROA OFMARG 
t B t 
(SE) 
1 . 35 . 01 . 74 
( . 01) 
2 . 91*** . 006 . 50 
( . 01) 
- . 86 - . 02 -1 . 31 
( . 01) 
oiDJcr AGE 
B t B t 
(SE) (SE) 
. 003 . 19 - . 10 - . 17 
( . 01) ( . 57 ) 
. 01 . 79 - . 95 -1 . 84* 
( . 01) ( . 52 ) 
- . 007 - . 64 - . 51 -1 . 10 
( . 01) ( . 46) 
. 0002 1 . 62 . 0003 3 . 58*** . 0002 2 . 91*** - . 008 -2 . 36** 
( . 0001) ( . 0000) ( . 0000) ( . 003 ) 
-. 04 -1 . 77* - . 05 -2 . 39** . 06 2 . 97*** -5 . 89 -7 . 08*** 
( . 02 ) ( . 02 ) ( . 02 ) ( . 83 ) 
. 05 3 . 22*** . 06 4 . 47*** . 01 . 78 -6 . 63 -11. 84*** 
( . 02 ) ( . 01) ( . 01) ( . 56) 
-. 002 - . 09 - . 03 -2 . 00** . 15 10 . 12*** 10 . 41 16 . 87*** 
( . 02 ) ( . 02 ) ( . 01) ( . 62 ) 
4 . 79*** 7 . 21*** 3 . 05*** 31. 32*** 
. 09 . 12 . 06 . 39 
+ Reference group includes TX, IA, MS, and AlA 
@ Reference group is rural 
# Reference group is NFP !Irleperrlent ...... 0 (J1 
the liquidity regressions arrl begins the capital structure 
regressions . 'Ihe third page reports the last capital structure 
regression, the financial efficiency regressions, arrl begins the 
profitability regressions. 'Ihe last page completes the profitability 
regressions and reports the regression for age of the physical plant. 
Control variables used in each regression include two durmny 
variables for region (OORDER arrl SOUIH) , one durmny for metropolitan or 
rural location (MEI'RO) , and a continuous variable representing bed 
size (BELS) . 'Ihe independent variables of interest are two dt.nmnies 
representing membership in an NFP or FP MHS (NTIMIS am FFMHS) . 
OORDER refers the states of Tennessee and Kentucky, which may be 
thought of as bordering on the northern region of the country. Border 
takes on a value of one if a hospital is located in one of the border 
states , and zero otherwise. In a similar fashion, SOUIH refers to the 
states of North carolina , South carolina, Georgia, and Florida. 'Ihe 
reference for both regional dt.nmnies is the group of deep southern 
states : Texas ,  Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama . MEI'RO refers to 
hospital location in a standard metropolitan statistical area (SMSA) . 
'Ihe reference for this durmny is rural location. 'Ihe reference for 
both NFFMHS and FFMHS is the group of all NFP independent hospitals . 
In general , the regressions tended to support the findings from 
the liliOVAs reported above. 'lb prevent unnecessary repetition, the 
account given below briefly presents findings and focuses on any 
discrepancies between the liliOVAs arrl regressions . 
'Ihe Durbin-Watson statistic was used to test each regression for 
autocorrelation. Autocorrelation may occur in time series data when 
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successive residuals are positively correlated. When autcx:::orrelation 
is present, tests of hypotheses involving either the Student ' s  t or 
the F distribution are not valid (canavos, 1984) . Because the 
standard errors of the parameters terrl to be under-estimated, "there 
will be a terrlency to reject the null hypothesis when, in fact, it 
should not be rejected" (Pindyck an:l Rubinfeld, 1981,  p .  153 ) . What 
this means is that a beta coefficient may appear to be significantly 
different from zero when it is not. 
'!he D.Jrbin-Watson test statistic produces a value which must be 
corrpared with upper an:l lower bounds for testing the hypothesis of no 
autocorrelation. 'Ihese bounds are contained in tables found in many 
statistical textbooks (for exanple, canavos, 1984 ; Pindyck an:l 
Rubinfeld, 1981) . '!here is reason for concern about autcx:::orrelation 
in each of the regressions ; however, the D.Jrbin-Watson statistic 
confinned the existence of autocorrelation in the regressions for 
a.JRRENI', (,2UICK, DAYSAR, AVPAY, FBI'A, I.ll'DFA, CA'IURN, FA'IURN, TA'IURN, 
MARKUP, NONOPREV, an:l DEIXJcr. In these cases errors are 
autocorrelated. A transfonnation of the data to eliminate the problem 
is the preferred response . Because transfonnation would have entailed 
losing too many observations, the decision was made to present the 
regressions with acknowledgements of their limitations . 
Liquidity. Six regressions allowed inferences to be drawn about 
the behavior of MHS hospitals in relation to NFP independents . 
Holding constant for regional an:l metropolitan location an:l bed 
size, NFP MHS hospitals had significantly lower liquidity than 
independent NFP hospitals (a.JRRENI' an:l (,2UICK) . '!he collection period 
107 
on accounts receivable (DhYSAR) was significantly lCMer in NFP MHS 
hospitals , but those facilities took lol1g'er to pay their bills (AVPAY) 
than did the NFP independents . All these findil1g's are similar to 
those from the lillOVAs with the exception of that on DhYSAR. No 
difference at the . 05 level of significance was found in average 
collection period (DhYSAR) across groups in the lillOVA. '!he 
discrepancy is probably related to the presence of autocorrelation in 
the regression analysis . For that reason the DhYSAR regression 
findil1g's should be discounted. 
Like the ANOVAs, regression analysis found FP MHS hospitals held 
less cash (ACID and DhYCASH) than did independent NFP hospitals . No 
other liquidity regressions yielded statistically significant 
findil1g's. 
capital Structure . '!he regressions corroborated findil1g's from the 
lillOVAs . NFP MHS hospitals financed their assets with significantly 
greater proportions of debt (TDFB, ill'DFB, and ill'DFA) and had lower 
equity financil1g' (FBI'A) and less cash flCM to support debt (CASHDEBI') 
than did NFP independents . FP MHS hospitals also used relatively 
greater levels of debt and lCMer levels of equity financil1g' (TDFB, 
ill'DFB, ill'DFA, and FBI'A) than the NFP independents did. 
Financial Activity. Like the lillOVAs , the regressions revealed NFP 
MHS hospitals earned a significantly higher return on total assets 
(TA'IURN) than the NFP independents did. FP MHS hospitals made 
significantly more efficient use of current (CATURN) and less 
efficient use of fixed assets (FATURN) than the NFP independents did. 
'!he only regression result which differed from the ANOVAs is the 
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finding that FP MHS hospitals ean1€d a greater retw:n on total assets 
(TA'IURN) than indeperrlent NFP facilities did. No difference in TA'IURN 
was found between FP MHS and NFP indeperrlent hospitals in the Scheffe 
c:orrparison. '!he presence of autocorrelation in the regression 
analysis is the likely explanation. In this case the univariate 
findings are the more reliable. 
Profitability. Similarly to the ANOVA findings , the regressions 
showed that NFP MHS hospitals realized significantly less revenue from 
nonoperational sources (NONOPREV) and higher deductibles (DEIXJcr) than 
the indeperrlent NFPs did. Contrary to the NJOVA findings, NFP MHS 
hospitals were shown to be significantly less profitable (ROE, ROA, 
and OR1ARG) than the NFP indeperrlents were. Again, autocorrelation is 
the likely explanation for the differences in findings . 
Regression results for the profitability of FP MHS hospitals were 
the same as the NJOVAs . FP MHS hospitals marked up prices over 
expenses (MARKUP) more than NFP indeperrlents did. They also generated 
less nonoperating revenue as a percentage of operating revenue 
(NONOPREV) . Finally, they were more profitable than the NFP 
indeperrlents as demonstrated by the retw:n on equity (ROE) , retw:n on 
assets (ROA) , and operating margin (OR1ARG) ratios . 
Average Age of Plant . Both NFP and FP MHS hospitals had newer, 
less depreciated assets than did the NFP indeperrlents. Regression 
results supported the NJOVAs . 
Corrnnents 
In general , the pooled ANOVAs and cross-sectional regression 
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analyses supported the matched univariate findings for the effects of 
system membership on hospital financial performance . As expected , 
both FP and NFP MHS hospitals had newer facilities than the NFP 
independents did. Both types of systems financed plant and equipment 
with higher levels of debt. Although not observed in the matched 
univariate analysis, the pooled cross-sectional regression analysis 
found NFP MHS hospitals had lower cash flow to support debt than NFP 
independents did. 
'lhe FP MHS hospitals, compared to NFP independents ,  were more 
profitable--largely because of higher markups . The NFP MHS hospitals, 
on the other hand , were not significantly different from the indepen­
dent NFPs on measures of profitability. Although no significant 
differences were found in the matched univariate analysis , the pooled 
cross-sectional regression analysis found NFP MHS hospitals to have 
lower nonoperating revenue and higher deductibles than NFP 
independents did. 
Measures of liquidity showed FP MHS hospitals held less cash than 
the NFP independents did. NFP MHS hospitals tended to be less liquid 
than were NFP independents . The pooled cross-sectional regression 
analysis additionally showed NFP MHS hospitals took longer to pay 
their bills than the independent NFPs did. 
Matched univariate and pooled cross-sectional multiple regression 
findings showed that FP MHS hospitals generated more revenue from 
investments in current assets ( CA'IURN) but less revenue from 
investments in fixed assets (FA'IURN) than the NFP independents did. 
What is perplexing are the financial activity findings with regard 
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to NFP MHS hospitals .  Whereas the univariate analysis of changes in 
financial perfonnance found NFP MHS hospitals significantly 1rore 
irrproved than the NFP independents in the efficiency with which 
current assets (CA'IURN) were used , the multivariate analysis found the 
NFP MHS hospitals had significantly greater efficiency in the use of 
total assets (TA'IURN) than did NFP independents . Perhaps the 
discrepancies relate to differences in the handling of outlier 
observations in the two analyses and the presence of autocorrelation 
in the TA'IURN regression analysis. 
'llie statistical analysis presented here fails to support the 
hypothesis that hospitals acquired by the FP and NFP MHSs perform 
similarly. While their financial performance at acquisition was not 
significantly different, they differed significantly from one another 
on a nt.nnber of measures in the years following acquisition. The 
irrplication is that, over time, these FP and NFP MHS hospitals did not 
compose a homogeneous group. From a financial perspective, the 
results of operations were quite different. These findings were 
confirmed by the Scheffe corrparisons of FP and NFP MHS hospitals . 
Since FP and NFP MHS hospitals were found to perform differently, 
the hypothesis that MHS hospital financial performance does not differ 
from that of NFP independents was tested separately within each 
ownership category. Findings from both the paired univariate t tests 
of changes in performance and the multi variate pooled cross-sectional 
analysis suggest that FP MHS hospitals irrproved their access to debt 
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and increased their profitability, as predicted. Improved 
profitability was related more to higher markups than increased 
efficiency in the use of assets . NFP MHS hospitals also increased 
their access to debt ; h01Never, contrary to expectations, they did not 
increase profitability. 
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aiAPI'ER 5 :  CDNCIDSIONS 
Foundations of the Research 
The obj ective of this research was to answer the following 
questions : (1)  Are FP and NFP MHS-acquired hospitals similar in their 
financial perfonnance? and ( 2 )  Are MHSs able to financially benefit 
their acquisitions? The first question asked whether ownership I!Bkes 
a difference in financial perfonnance. The second question went 
beyond ownership to inquire into the financial benefits of membership 
in either a FP or NFP MHS . 
A review of the theoretical literature suggested production 
efficiencies and irrproved access to capital as benefits of MHS 
membership. It was not clear, however, whether these benefits could 
be expected to accrue equally to FP and NFP MHSs . A number of 
theories suggest NFP organizations are less efficient and less 
profitable than their FP cormterparts . On the other hand, many 
industry analysts believe the behavior of FP and NFP hospitals is 
becoming increasingly similar in today ' s  cost-conscious reimbursement 
envirornnent .  
Previous research into the effects of MHS affiliation on hospital 
financial perfonnance provided little evidence to support the 
realization of production efficiencies ; however, increased debt 
utilization was well dOCLlll'lented . Perhaps the most consistent finding 
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from studies conducted prior to Medicare prospective payment is that 
MHS hospitals tend to be more profitable in the production of patient 
services . Higher profitability has been attributed primarily to 
aggressive pricing. 
'!he current study went beyond past research into MHS effects by 
examining the financial performnce of a group of fully owned 
hospitals over time. Indicators of post-acquisition financial 
perfonnance were taken from 1984 and 1985 . In keeping with the 
theoretical literature on MHS effects, systems were hypothesized to 
improve the financial perfonnance of acquisitions . OWnership was 
expected to have little impact. 
Discussion of Findings 
For-Profit/Not-For-Profit OWnership 
'!he hypothesis that ownership makes no difference in the financial 
perfonnance of MHS-acquired hospitals was not supported by the 
research findings . FP and NFP MHS-acquired hospitals were compared on 
the basis of average pre-acquisition financial performnce and changes 
in average performnce between the years just prior to acquisition and 
1984/1985 . 
While there was no evidence to suggest FP and NFP MHSs target 
hospitals with different financial performnce, they appear to operate 
the acquired facilities differently. On the basis of statistically 
significant findings, it appears FP MHS hospitals increased their 
overall liquidity but decreased cash holdings . In contrast, NFP MHS 
hospitals decreased overall liquidity while increasing relative levels 
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of cash. FP MHS hospitals shortened the time it took them to pay 
their bills while NFP MHS hospitals increased their average payment 
J:.lErr iod. 
'!he efficiency with which fixed assets were used decreased in FP 
MHS facilities but increased in NFP MHS hospitals. Since both FP and 
NFP MHS-acquired hospitals made capital ilTiprovements in plant and 
equipment, the ilTiplication is that FP MHS hospitals had yet to realize 
higher revenues from their investments. 
FP MHS hospitals were able to ilTiprove their profitability, while 
NFP MHS hospitals exhibited decreases in profitability. Both FP and 
NFP MHS hospitals increased their prices , but FP MHS hospitals did so 
to a significantly greater extent than NFP MHS hospitals did. 
'lhese findings ilTiply FP and NFP MHSs are indeed different. '!he 
profiles presented above suggest FP MHSs gave more attention to the 
bottom line than their NFP counterparts . '!here is also reason to 
believe FP MHS hospitals were operated in a more "business-like" 
manner. Decreased levels of cash in the context of increased overall 
liquidity may be due to more astute investment of previously 
nonproductive assets . Quicker payment of bills may have been intended 
to ilTiprove business relations . 
No evidence of increased efficiency was available to support the 
contention of property rights theory. '!his was largely a function of 
the indicators used and represents a limitation of the research. FP 
MHS hospitals were found to increase their profitability through 
higher prices not increased efficiency in the use of assets. It is 
inappropriate to conclude, however, that MHS hospitals were 
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inefficient . Financial activity ratios measuring efficiency in the 
use of assets are gross indicators with limited applicability to 
economics theories . Certainly, many factors other than efficiency can 
effect these ratios . In this case, improvements to plant and 
equipment probably increased the denominator in the financial activity 
ratios resulting in smaller measures. Additional efficiency 
indicators incorporating specific input measures (FI'Es and payroll 
expenses , for exarrple) would be useful in further investigating 
efficiency . 
Different:es between FP and NFP MRS-acquired hospitals may be 
explained in a mnnber of ways . First , The FP MHS sample contained 
hospitals purchased as early as 1978 . The earliest acquisitions in 
the NFP MHS sample were from 198 0 .  Perhaps the NFP MHS acquisitions 
did not have sufficient time to realize the improved profitability 
experienced in the FP sector. Another explanation may be found in the 
different missions of FP and NFP MHSs. FP organizations have an 
obligation to increase the wealth of their owners ( i . e .  , the 
stockholders) . NFP MHSs may be more community service oriented . 
Alternately , NFP MHS hospitals may not be managed as well or may face 
significantly different markets than their FP counterparts. 
Additional indicators measuring competition, casemix and payor mix 
would be helpful in examining the latter. 
MHS Effects 
In light of the demonstrated ownership differences , the 
performance of FP and NFP MHS hospitals in relation to NFP 
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independents was investigated separately. Both univariate and 
multivariate methods were errployed. The univariate analysis involved 
a matched corrparison of average financial perfonnance over time . A 
pooled cross-sectional multiple regression analysis provided a second 
test of MHS effects . Table 22 provides a sununary of variables found 
to be influenced by MHS membership in both univariate and multivariate 
tests. 
FP MHS Financial Perfonnance 
Between the years 1978 and 1982 , the FP MHSs acquired a sizable 
mnnber of NFP independent hospitals. These were primarily government 
hospitals and have been described as financially distressed at the 
time of purchase (McCue and Furst, 1986) . Based on theory, positive 
system effects were expected to follow in the form of higher liquidity 
measures , increased access to debt, increased financial activity, 
improved profitability, and replacement of deteriorating plant and 
equipment (Table 10) . 
The FP MHS-acquired hospitals turned out to be more liquid prior 
to purchase than expected . As a result, the only consistently 
significant liquidity finding ran counter to expectations . FP MHS­
acquired hospitals were found to have lower not higher cash holdings 
(ACID and DAYCASH) than NFP independents . In retrospect, this does 
not necessarily reflect a negative impact of MHS ownership. Instead, 
the FP MHSs may have invested previously nonproductive cash and 
initiated the use of sophisticated cash management techniques . 
Greater use of debt was expected and found. Debt (TDFB, IIT'DFB, 
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TABlE 22 : Variables Affected by MHS Membership * 
Variable 
LIQUIDITY 
CURRENT 
QUICK 
ACID 
DAYSAR 
AVPAY 
DAY CASH 
CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
CASHDEBr 
FBI'A 
TDFB 
LTDFB 
LTD FA 
AcriVITY 
CA'IURN 
FA'IURN 
TA'IURN 
PROFITABILITY 
MARKUP 
NONOPREV 
ROE 
ROA 
OH-1ARG 
oEIXJcr 
AVERAGE AGE OF PLANT 
AGE 
FP 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
NFP 
+ 
+ 
+ 
* - Indicates MHS membership is associated with lower values on this 
ratio 
+ Indicates MHS membership is associated with higher values on 
this ratio 
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L'IDFA) composed a larger proportion ard equity (FBI'A) a smaller 
proportion of the capital structure of FP MHS hospitals than of NFP 
independents . 
'!here was one consistently positive ard significant finding in the 
area of financial activity. FP MHS hospitals were found to earn a 
better return on current assets (CA'IURN) , or to be more efficient in 
the use of current assets, than the NFP independents .  A significantly 
lower return on fixed assets (FA'IURN) was found. Since FP MHSs 
acquired hospitals with initially high FA'IURN ratios ard later made 
capital improvements (AGE) , this finding is not surprising. Low fixed 
asset turnover ratios in relation to NFP independents may simply 
reflect sound business decisions to replace the deteriorating plant 
ard equipment of acquired hospitals . 
Higher prices , higher deductibles , ard lower nonoperating revenue, 
along with improved profitability, were expected. In fact, the FP 
MHS-acquired hospitals were found to mark up prices over expenses 
(MARKUP) to a greater extent than NFP independents. '!he result was 
improved profitability from operations (OFMARG) . Income from 
nonoperating sources (NONOPREV) was lower ard may have contributed to 
the lack of significant differences between FP MHS-acquired hospitals 
ard NFP independents in overall profitability (for example, ROE) . 
Reflecting upon the findings , it appears the FP MHSs took many of 
the steps necessary to improve the financial performance of acquired 
financially distressed hospitals. 'lhese systems purchased hospitals 
in need of improvements to their physical plants . Monies acquired 
through debt made possible by the MHSs were used to make capital 
119 
:inprovements. Furthermore, the FP MHSs may have had little recourse 
but to increase prices. For example, it is likely that the goverrnnent 
hospitals , which were later purchased by the MHSs , relied heavily upon 
subsidizes from the community to continue operations. Following 
acquisition it was probably necessary to replace the lost nonoperating 
income previously available through gifts and tax revenues • Higher 
post-acquisition prices in FP MHS hospitals corrpensated for their 
lower nonoperating revenues (NONOPREV) . 
NFP MHS Financial Performance 
NFP MHSs purchased hospitals which were not significantly 
different from those purchased by the FP MHSs . Similar outcomes with 
respect to increased liquidity, increased access to debt, increased 
financial activity, :inproved profitability, and replacement of 
deteriorating plant and equipment were hypothesized. 
Expectations were met in the areas of capital structure and age of 
the physical plant. NFP MHS hospitals were found to use greater 
proportions of debt (TDFB, I.:IDFB, and I.ll'DFA) and less equity (FBI'A) 
than NFP independents . '!he NFP MHS hospitals also had newer less 
depreciated assets . 'lhus like their FP counterparts, the NFP MHSs 
borrowed to make capital :inprovements in the aging facilities they 
purchased. 
Contrary to expectations, the NFP MHS hospitals were found to have 
lower liquidity (QUICK) than NFP independents . No significant 
differences were consistently found in the areas of profitability and 
financial activity. Profitability, as investigated here, involved 
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traditional account� rreasures . It is important to remember, howver, 
that NFPs may return value to their owners, "the conununity" , in other 
ways . 'Ihese may include, for exarrple, support of educational and 
research activities, charity care, on-the-job train� programs, and 
emergency room services (Long, 1976) . 
'!he failure to observe m::>re significant differences between the 
financial performance of NFP MHS and indeperrlent hospitals may be due 
to the small sample size. An alternate explanation could be that NFP 
MHS acquisitions all occurred between 1980 and 1982 . For a 
description of the m.nnber of FP and NFP MHS acquisitions by year see 
Appendix C (Table 10-c) . Perhaps m::>re time is needed to see the 
irrpact of NFP MHS 100IT1bership on the profitability and financial 
activity of acquired hospitals . '!he pr� explanations would 
suggest that NFP MHSs have an irrpact on acquisitions which was not 
observed in this study. Perhaps the reverse is true. Because the 
missions of NFP MHS and NFP indeperrlent hospitals are similar, one 
could speculate that NFP MHS hospitals had higher costs related to 
conununi ty service. 'Ihese higher costs prevented in"provements in 
profitability and financial activity. '!he findings of the present 
study do not allow us to detect the correct explanation. 
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
One of the primary weaknesses of the current research was the 
relatively weak linkages between theory and operational measures. 
'Iheory suggests FP organizations are m::>re efficient than NFP 
organizations . Further, there are various explanations for the 
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inefficiency of NFP organizational forms . Efficiency measures 
selected for examination here proved to be poor indicators . No 
provision was made to test the different hypotheses about the origin 
of inefficiency in NFP health care organizations . Future research 
should concentrate upon developing clearer connections between theory , 
hypotheses , and operational measures. 
Also with regard to efficiency, only gross financial indicators of 
this construct were available . 'Ihe incorporation of efficiency 
indicators reflecting management decisions on staffing and other 
individual inputs would be useful in understanding any efficiency 
strategies employed by the MHSs. 
Another weaknesses of this research was the relatively short 
periods between acquisition and follCM-up for NFP MHS hospitals. '!his 
was due to an inability to identify NFP MHS purchases prior to 1980. 
To correct this problem, it would be useful to follCM both groups of 
hospitals for a longer period . 'Ihe minimal time for realizing system 
benefits is presently unkn<:Mn .  
I t  would be useful too to employ confirmatory factor analysis to 
develop measurement models of financial perfonnance . In this fashion , 
the latent underlying dimensions of financial performance could be 
established . 
Finally, the MHSs have experienced varying degrees of success in 
i.rrproving the financial perfonnance of individual hospitals . It would 
be useful and interesting to identify the components of specific 
turnaround strategies . Are there different kinds of turnaround 
strategies? Does the successfulness of the strategy depend upon the 
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situation? 
Implications 
'!his study takes a retrospective look at the financial perfonnance 
of NFP hospitals acquired by the MHSs . Although the number of 
acquisitions have slowed in recent years , the firrlings reported here 
have implications for at least two different areas of cont.errporary 
policy fonnation. These are anti -trust policy and the future of small 
rural hospitals. 
There is increasing anti-trust activity in the hospital industry. 
As a result, it is useful for the Federal Trade Conunission and Justice 
Deparbnent to understand IOC>re about the financial strategies typically 
employed by MHSs in improving the perfonnance of acquisitions . A 
frequently asked question is whether hospital mergers are in the 
public interest. This study did not address the competitive impact of 
mergers ; however , it confinred a consistent finding from past 
research. MHSs tend to raise prices in acquired hospitals . Higher 
prices following acquisition suggest the need for continuing 
surveillance of merger activity. Although this study was unable to 
answer questions about efficiency gains, it suggests the need to 
closely IOC>nitor suspect mergers and inquire into potential savings 
from increased efficiency. 
The second area for policy applications follows from the 
observation that the majority of study hospitals were financially 
distressed small rural facilities . With the increasing prevalence of 
financial distress in the hospital industry and rising closure rate, 
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one of the prilncrry reasons to study MHS hospital perfonnance is to 
detennine the viability of system membership as a vehicle for hospital 
smvival. 'Those hospitals hardest hit by the economic pressures of 
today's health care environment are small rural facilities. Of the 79 
hospitals which closed in 1987, half served rural communities (Brice, 
1988). since these hospitals are frequently more dependent on 
Medicare, prospective payment hits them hardest. 'Ihe more than 300 
hospitals classified as sole community providers are a prilncrry public 
policy concern. 
'Ihe results of this study suggest that acquiring MHSs, 
particularly the FP MHSs, take steps to resolve the financial problems 
of acquisitions. However, these steps are not likely to be cost 
containing, at least not in the short run . 'Ihe twin strategies of 
financing newer hospital plants and increasing prices raises, rather 
than lowers, hospital costs. 'Ihese are not strategies which offer 
hope for financially troubled rural hospitals in today's environment. 
MHSs are currently little interested in rural acquisitions. Many 
acquired rural hospitals have been sold. 'Ihis is amply illustrated by 
the number of acquired hospitals identified by McCue and Furst (1986) 
but unavailable for follow-up here due to divestiture. 
To protect rural hospitals, especially sole community providers, 
more favorable reimbursement treatment will almost certainly be 
necessary. In order for a hospital to naintain the trust of the 
community so necessary in the provision of medical care, steps must be 
taken to assure a sound financial base. Favorable reimbursement 
policies could once again make these hospitals attractive 
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acquisitions . MH.S membership could besto.Y some of the benefits 
observed here . Judging from the slo.Y down in mergers ,  this scenario 
is unlikely in the absence of definitive public policy decisions . In 
light of the anti-trust issues discussed above, any encouragement of 
MH.S membership should be met with continuing public scrutiny. 
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Appendix A 
Empirical Studies on the Effect of MHS Affiliation 
on Hospital Financial Perfomance 
Author 
Wheeler 
et. al. 
(1982) 
Levitz & 
Brooke 
(1983 ) 
Kralewski 
et . al . 
(1984 ) 
Sample & 
Data 
10 NFP 
hospitals 
under 
contract 
with a 
single NFP 
MHS ; audited 
hospital 
financial 
reports 
All short­
term, acute 
care nongov­
errunent 
hospitals in 
the state of 
Iowa (20 
system & 74 
independ­
ent) ; 1981 
AHA Annual 
survey 
20  NFP 
hospitals 
under con­
tract with 
IO MHSs and 
a natched 
set of 20 
tradition­
ally nanaged 
hospitals ; 
AHA data 
tapes 
Methods 
longitudi­
nal ; Uni­
variate 
Cross-sec­
tional ; Uni­
variate 
I.Dngitudi­
nal ; Uni­
variate 
Findings 
Improved profitability and 
reduced rate of increase in 
expenses ;  increased prices 
and improved efficiency in 
the use of fixed assets 
(i .e.  fixed asset turnover) 
were also observed but these 
trends were in existence 
prior to initiation of the 
contract 
MHS hospitals used greater 
debt leverage, priced 
services higher, had higher 
deductibles & showed higher 
measures on some profit­
ability ratios than the 
independent hospitals 
avr hospitals priced services 
higher and showed greater 
profitability following 
contract nanagernent than did 
the non-eM hospitals during 
the same tirne period; CJVI 
hospitals showed a greater 
decline in the percent of 
gross patient revenues 
collected 
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Author 
Alexander 
and Lewis 
( 1984 ) 
Coyne 
( 1985) 
Rerm 
et. al . 
(1985) 
Appendix A (continued) 
Sample & 
Data 
407 managed 
acute care 
community 
hospitals 
and 401 
randomly 
selected in­
dependent 
hospitals ; 
1980 AHA 
Stn:Vey, 1981 
Validation 
Stn:Vey of 
MHSs, 1980 & 
1982 Area 
Resource 
Files 
Population 
of all AHA 
member hos­
pitals ; 1981 
AHA data 
A stratified 
random sam­
ple of 561 
hospitals 
including 
MHS , non­
system, IO, 
NFP, & 
government 
hospitals ; 
1980 Med­
icare Cost 
Reports, 
HCFA data, 
1980 AHA 
Annual Sur­
vey; Area 
Resources 
File 
Methcds 
Cross-sec­
tional ; 
Multivariate 
Cross-sec­
tional ; Uni­
variate 
Cross-sec­
tional ; 
Multivariate 
Findings 
Cl1 hospitals , particularly 
IO, used :roc>re debt than non-
01 hospitals; Cl1 hospitals, 
regardless of time under 
contract, tended to have 
lower liquidity; Old NFP 
managed hospitals reduced the 
collection period on 
accounts ; Old IO Cl1 hospitals 
were :roc>re efficient 
( i . e. higher fixed asset and 
total asset turnover ratios) ; 
new NFP managed hospitals had 
lower profitability ; old IO 
managed hospitals charged 
higher prices 
MHS hospitals , particularly 
the IO used greater debt 
leverage and were :roc>re 
profitable than the inde­
pendent hospitals 
IO MHS hospitals had higher 
prices and were :roc>re 
profitable than independent 
or system affiliated NFP 
hospitals ; IO hospitals , both 
system and independent, used 
:roc>re debt leverage ; Revenues 
to total assets were higher 
for both IO & NFP MHS 
hospitals relative to inde­
pendents 
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Author 
McCue & 
Furst 
( 1986) 
McCue & 
Lynch 
( 1987) 
Appendix A (continued) 
Sarrple & 
Data 
50 NFP 
hospitals 
acquired by 
IO chains 
and 50 
randomly 
selected 
nonacquired 
NFP hospi­
tals ; 1978 -
1982 data 
acquired 
through 
Medicare 
Cost Reports 
& the FAS 
data base 
Parent 
hospitals of 
56 small 
systems and 
a matched 
set of 56 
independent 
hospitals ; 
1984 balance 
sheet & 
income 
statement 
data from 
state 
agencies or 
Medicare 
fiscal 
intermediar­
ies 
Methods 
Cross-sec­
tional ; 
Multivariate 
Cross-sec­
tional ; Uni­
variate 
Findings 
Acquired hospitals differed 
from nonacquired hospitals by 
being snaller and having 
older more depreciated 
assets , lower profitability, 
and greater debt usage 
NFP church MHS hospitals had 
lower liquidity but a higher 
current asset turnover ratio 
than independent NFP church 
hospitals ; Secular NFP MHS 
hospitals used more debt but 
were less profitable than 
other NFP independent 
hospitals 
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Apperx:lix B 
Following' Kooprnans 1 ( 1981) example, 5 or 10 percent trims were 
employed in this research . The following' procedure was used to detect 
the need for a trlimned t test and construct the test for sing'le 
samples : 
(1 )  The sample distribution was examined to detect violations of 
nonnality, particularly, the presence of extreme outliers . The 
SAS PROC UNIVARIATE PI.DI' NORMAL procedure was used . SAS prints 
the sample interquartile range given as Q3 - Q1 , where Q3 is the 
observation for which 75 percent of the rema.ining' observations had 
lower values and Q1 is the value for which 25 percent of the 
rema.ining' observation had lower values. Extreme outliers were 
defined as values which were rrore than 3 times the interquartile 
range below Q1 or above Q3 . If extreme outliers were not detected 
and the distribution resembled a nonnal distribution as given by 
the SAS stem and leaf plot, nonnal probability plot and W (Nonnal) 
statistic, student 1 s t was used in tests of statistical 
significance. If extreme outliers were detected, steps (2)  
through (7)  were taken to construct trlimned t tests . 
(2 )  Sampling' distributions were trlimned in such a manner as to remove 
extreme outliers . In all cases, this involved either a 5 or 10 
percent trim. A 5 percent trim was accomplished by removing' 5 
percent of the observations from each side of the data set. 
Similarly, a 10 percent trim was obtained by removing' 10 percent 
of the observations from each side of the sample . 
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(3 ) '!he trimmed mean (X) was calculated after the most extreme points 
were removed from both sides of the data set. 
( 4 )  In order to construct the denominator of the trimmed t test , a 
measure of the standard deviation had to be c::orrputed. 
Intuitively, it seems appropriate to take the standard deviation 
of the trimmed sarrple. As demonstrated by Tukey and Mclaughlin 
( 1963 ) , a procedure which leads to a more accurate use of 
Student ' s  t distribution makes use of the standard deviation of 
the Winsorized sarrple. 
( 5) '!he Winsorized sarrple was obtained by replacing trimmed values in 
the data set with the value of the point next in line to be 
removed if one more point were removed. Replacement was made on 
both sides of the distribution. For ex.arrple, if three points were 
removed from both sides of a data set for a total of six 
deletions, six additional values were added to construct the 
Winsorized sample. If the most extreme values on the left side of 
the distribution were "a" , "b" , and "c" with "d" next in line, the 
Winsorized sarrple contained the value "d" in place of "a" , "b" , 
and "c" . '!hat is , "d" remained in the data set and also replaced 
the three deleted values . '!he result was that "d" was repeated 
four times. If "x" , "Y" , and "z" were the most extreme values at 
the right end of the distribution with "w" next in line for 
removal if one more point were removed, the Winsorized sarrple 
contained "w" repeated four times . In this way, more attention 
was given to the ends of the data set. '!he standard deviation of 
the trimmed sarrple ( i . e . , the value that was used in the trimmed t 
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test) is given by: 
sr = { [ (n - 1) (swf ) J/ (h - 1) } 1/2 , 
Where, SW = the Winsorized standard deviation, 
n = the original sample size, and 
h = the trirmned sample size 
(6)  '!he standard error of the trirmned mean was calculated by dividing 
the square root of the trirmned sample size into the trirmned 
standard deviation as constructed above. '!he standard error of 
the trirmned mean is given by: 
sEx 
= sri (h) 1/2 , 
Where, sr = the trirmned standard deviation, and 
h = the trirmned sample size 
(7 )  The formula for the trirmned t in the one sample case is given by: 
tJr = (X - fi-) /SEx 
Where, X =  the trirmned sample mean 
f1-= the p::>pulation mean 
SEx = the standard error of the trirmned mean 
Most of the trirmned t tests utilized here were one sample trirmned 
t ' s .  Samples were composed of differences between values for study 
hospitals and their matches . '!he trirmned mean was tested to determine 
if it differed from zero. 
In two cases, Tables 4-1 and 4-2 , two sample trirmned t tests were 
employed . '!he two sample test based on trirmned means was carried out 
in a fashion analogous to that described above . Extreme outliers were 
identified as already described . Data sets for comparison were 
trirmned by the same percentage . A pooled standard deviation (sp) was 
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used in the denominator. In the two sample case, the trinuned t is 
defined as :  
t = <XT1 - XT2 l /{ (sp) [ (1fh1) + (1fh2 ) J 11
2 ) , 
Where, sp = [ (h1 - 1) sr1
2 + (h2 - 1) &r22 ]/ (h1 + h2 - 2 ) 
SG:r1 = the trinuned mean of the first data set, 
q,2 = the trinuned mean of the second data set, 
h1 = the trinuned sample size of the first data set, 
h2 = the trinuned sample size of the second data set, 
sr1 = the trinuned standard deviation of the first data 
set 
sr2 = the trinuned standard deviation of the second 
data set 
Development of the trinuned t test is attributed originally to 
Tukey and Mclaughlin ( 1963) • Koopmans (1981) presents a practical 
application of the original statistical theory. Both sources may be 
consulted for further information. 
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Aooendix c 
TABlE 1-c: Corrq:>arison of Average Pre-acquisition Financial Indicator 
Ranks for Hospitals Acquired by FP and NFP MHSs (Wilcoxon 
Rank St.nn Tests) 
FP NFP 
mean mean z 
Variable n rank n rank score 
LIOUIDITY 
aJRRENT 29 2 1 . 97 13 2 0 . 46 • 72 
QUICK 29 2 1 . 66 13 21 . 15 - . 11 
ACID 29 23 . 48 13 17 . 08 -1. 55 
DAYSAR 29 20 . 55 13 23 . 62 . 73 
AVPAY 29 2 1 . 69 13 21 . 08 - . 14 
DAY CASH 29 22 . 69 13 18 . 85 - . 93 
CAPITAL STRUCIURE 
CASHDEBI' 29 2 1 . 76 13 2 0 . 92 - . 19 
FBI'A 29 21. 59 13 21 . 31 - . 05 
TDFB 29 2 1 . 97 13 2 0 . 46 - . 35 
LTDFB 29 20 . 45 13 23 . 85 . 81 
LTD FA 27 19 . 31 13 22 . 96 . 91 
ACTIVITY 
CA'IURN 29 2 0 . 93 13 22 . 77 . 44 
FA '!URN 27 21 . 11 13 19 . 23 - . 46 
TA'IURN 29 23 . 07 13 18 . 00 -1 . 22 
PROFITABILITY 
MARKUP 29 2 0 . 66 13 23 . 38 . 65 
NONOPREV 29 22 . 90 13 18 . 38 -1 . 09 
ROE 29 2 1 . 69 13 21 . 08 - . 14 
ROA 29 22 . 24 13 19 . 85 - . 57 
OfMARG 29 21 . 31 13 2 1 . 92 . 14 
DEIXJCT 29 2 0 . 10 13 24 . 62 1 . 09 
AVERAGE AGE OF PIANI' 
AGE 28 2 0 . 46 13 22 . 15 . 41 
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TABlE 2-c :  Wilcoxon Rank SUm Tests of Differences in Average 
Perfonnance for Hospitals Acquired by FP and NFP MHSs 
(During Membership minus Before Membership) 
FP NFP 
mean mean z 
Variable n rank n rank score 
LIQUIDITY 
a.JRREm' 29 24 . 3 1  13 15 . 23 -2 . 20** 
QUICK 29 24 . 24 13 15. 38 -2 . 15** 
ACID 29 18 . 31 13 28 . 62 2 . 50** 
DAYSAR 29 22 . 4 1  13 19 . 46 - . 71 
AVPAY 29 18 . 59 13 28 . 00 2 . 29** 
DAY CASH 29 18 . 55 13 28 . 08 2 . 31** 
CAPITAL S'IRUCIURE 
CASHDEBI' 29 24 . 10 13 15 . 69 -2 . 04** 
FBI'A 29 22 . 52 13 19 . 23 - . 79 
TDFB 29 22 . 24 13 19 . 85 - . 57 
LTDFB 29 22 . 48 13 19 . 31 - . 76 
LTD FA 27 20 . 33 13 20 . 85 . 12 
ACITVITY 
CA'IURN 29 2 0 . 62 13 23 . 46 . 68 
FA '!URN 27 18 . 11 13 25 . 46 1 . 85* 
TA'IURN 29 19 . 38 13 26 . 23 1 . 66* 
PROFITABILITY 
MARKUP 29 23 . 83 13 16 . 31 -1 . 82* 
NONOPREV 29 19 . 48 13 26 . 00 1 . 58 
ROE 29 23 . 97 13 16 . 00 -1 . 93* 
ROA 29 24 . 24 13 15 . 38 -2 . 15** 
OFMARG 29 24 . 97 13 13 . 77 -2 . 72*** 
DIDJcr 29 21 . 38 13 2 1 . 77 . 08 
AVERAGE AGE OF PI.ANI' 
AGE 28 19 . 36 13 23 . 17 . 93 
* Significant at the . 10 level 
** Significant at the . 05 level 
*** Significant at the . 01 level or better 
TABIE 3-c: Wilcoxon Signed Rank Tests of Differences in Performance 
Variable Averages Between FP MHS Acquired Hospitals and 
Independent Matches in the Years before Acquisition (FP 
MHS Value minus Independent Value) 
Variable n Signed Rank 
LIQUIDITY 
CURRENT 29 -68 . 5  
QUICK 29 -59 . 5  
ACID 29 -86 . 5* 
DAYSAR 29 31 . 5  
AVPAY 29 27 . 5  
DAY CASH 29 -79 . 5* 
CAPITAL STRUCIURE 
CASHDEBI' 29 6 . 5  
FBI'A 29 -38 . 5  
TDFB 29 40 . 5  
IJI'DFB 29 -48 . 5  
IJI'DFA 27 -58 . 0  
ACITVITY 
CA'IURN 29 58 . 5  
FA'IURN 27 125 . 0*** 
TA'IURN 29 142 . 5*** 
PROFITABILITY 
MARKUP 29 -26 . 5  
NONOPREV 29 -14 . 5  
ROE 29 -49 . 5  
ROA 29 -10 . 5  
OruARG 29 -56 . 5  
DEIXJcr 29 -8 . 5  
AVERAGE AGE OF PLANT 
AGE 28 15 . 0  
* Significant at the . 10 level 
* *  significant at the . 05 level 
*** Significant at the . 01 level or better 
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TABlE 4-c: Wilcoxon Signed Rank Tests of Differences in Perfonnance 
Variable Averages Between NFP MHS Acquired Hospitals and 
Independent Matches in the Years before Acquisition (NFP 
MHS Value minus Independent Value) 
Variable n Signed Rank 
LIQUIDITY 
aJRRENT 13 -16 . 5  
QUICK 13 -15 . 5  
ACID 13 -23 . 5  
DA.YSAR 13 . 5  
AVPAY 13 9 . 5  
DA.YCASH 13 -15 . 5  
CAPITAL STRUCIURE 
CASHDEBI' 13 . 5  
FBI' A 13 -9 . 5  
TDFB 13 10 . 5  
IJIDFB 13 13 . 5  
IJIDFA 13 11 . 5  
AcriVITY 
CA'IURN 13 9 . 5  
FA'IURN 13 12 . 5  
TA'IURN 13 5 . 5  
PROFITABILITY 
MARKUP 13 -17 . 5  
NONOPRE.V 13 -14 . 5  
ROE 13 -8 . 5  
ROA 13 -5 . 5  
OfMARG 13 8 . 5  
DEI:Ucr 13 -24 . 5* 
AVERAGE AGE OF PIAN!' 
AGE 13 -3 . 5  
* Significant at the . 10 level 
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TABlE 5-c: Wilcoxon Signed Rank Tests of Differences in Perfonnance 
Variables for FP MHS Hospitals Before and Drring 
Membership (Drring Membership minus Before Membership) 
Variable n Signed Rank 
LIQUIDITY 
aJRRENT 29 72 . 5 
QUICK 29 57 . 5 
ACID 29 -172 . 5*** 
DAYSAR 29 17 . 5  
AVPAY 29 -39 . 5  
DAY CASH 29 -198 . 5*** 
CAPITAL STRUCIURE 
CASHDEBI' 29 19 . 5 
FBI'A 29 -196. 5*** 
TDFB 29 169 . 5*** 
LTDFB 29 151 . 0*** 
LTD FA 27 120 . 5*** 
AcriVITY 
CA'IURN 29 87 . 5* 
FA'IURN 27 -85 . 0** 
TA'IURN 29 -25 . 5 
PROFITABILITY 
MARKUP 29 192 . 5*** 
NONOPREV 29 -191 . 5*** 
ROE 29 91 . 5** 
ROA 29 74 . 5 
OfMARG 29 163 . 5*** 
DEIXJcr 29 110 . 5** 
AVERAGE AGE OF PI.ANI' 
AGE 28 -182 . 0*** 
* significant at the . 10 level 
** Significant at the . 05 level 
*** Significant at the . 01 level or better 
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TABLE 6-c: Wilcoxon Signed Rank Tests of Differences in Performance 
Variables for NFP MHS Hospitals Before and During 
Membership (During Membership minus Before Membership) 
Variable 
LIQUIDITY 
CURRENT 
QUICK 
ACID 
DAYSAR 
AVPAY 
DAY CASH 
CAPITAL S'IRUCIURE 
CASHDEBI' 
FBI'A 
TDFB 
LTDFB 
LTD FA 
ACITVITY 
CA'IURN 
FA'IURN 
TA'IURN 
PROFITABILITY 
MARKUP 
NONOPREV 
ROE 
ROA 
OfMARG 
DEIXJcr 
AVERAGE AGE OF PlANT 
AGE 
* Significant at the . 10 level 
** significant at the • 05 level 
*** significant at the • 01 level 
n 
13 
13 
13 
13 
13 
13 
13 
13 
13 
13 
13 
13 
13 
13 
13 
13 
13 
13 
13 
13 
13 
Signed Rank 
-32 . 5** 
-32 . 5** 
8 . 0  
-10 . 5  
23 . 5  
7 . 0  
-31 . 5** 
-44 . 5*** 
34 . 5** 
33 . 5** 
25 . 5* 
22 . 5  
12 . 5  
17 . 5  
17 . 5  
-26 . 0** 
-16 . 5  
-21 . 5  
-9 . 5  
33 . 5** 
-27 . 0** 
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TABlE 7-c: Wilcoxon Signed Rank Tests of Olanges in Performance of FP 
MHS Hospitals Relative to Matched Independent Hospitals 
(FP MHS Value minus Independent Value) 
Variable n Signed Rank 
LIQUIDITY 
aJRRENT 29 103 . 5** 
QUICK 29 73 . 5  
ACID 29 -70. 5  
DAYSAR 29 -31 . 5  
AVPAY 29 -66 . 5  
DAY CASH 29 -118 . 5*** 
CAPITAL S'IRUCIURE 
CASHDEBI' 29 -23 . 5  
FBI'A 29 -194 . 5*** 
TDFB 29 172 . 5*** 
IIT'DFB 29 161 . 5*** 
IIT'DFA 27 119 . 0*** 
ACI'IVITY 
CA'IURN 29 88 . 5* 
FA'IURN 27 -128 . 0*** 
TA'IURN 29 -24 . 5  
PROFITABILITY 
MARKUP 29 78 . 5* 
NONOPREV 29 -138 . 5*** 
ROE 29 77 . 5* 
ROA 29 33 . 5  
OFMARG 29 111 . 5** 
DEIXJCT 29 -71. 5  
AVERAGE AGE OF PLANT 
AGE 28 -148 . 0*** 
* Significant at the . 10 level 
** Significant at the . 05 level 
*** significant at the . 01 level 
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TABlE 8-c: Wilcoxon Signed Rank Tests of Changes in Performance of 
NFP MHS Hospitals Relative to Matched Independent 
Hospitals (FP MHS Value minus Independent Value) 
Variable n Signed Rank 
LIQUIDITY 
ClJRRENT 13 -23 . 5  
QUICK 13 -30 . 5** 
ACID 13 10 . 5  
DAYSAR 13 -29 . 5** 
AVPAY 13 14 . 5  
DAY CASH 13 4 . 5  
CAPITAL STRUCIURE 
CASHDEBI' 13 -13 . 5  
FBI' A 13 -38 . 5*** 
'IDFB 13 27 . 5* 
IITDFB 13 32 . 5** 
IITDFA 13 28 . 5** 
ACTIVITY 
CA'IURN 13 45 . 59*** 
FA'IURN 13 7 . 5  
TA'IURN 13 15 . 5  
PROFITABILITY 
MARKUP 13 -2 . 5  
NONOPREV 13 -25 . 5* 
ROE 13 -15 . 5  
ROA 13 -14 . 5  
OfMARG 13 -3 . 5  
DEIXJCT 13 3 . 5  
AVERAGE AGE OF PLANT 
AGE 13 -33 . 0*** 
* Significant at the . 10 level 
** Significant at the . 05 level 
*** Significant at the . 01 level or better 
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TABlE 9-c: Multiple Regression Analysis of the Effects of System Membership on Financial Indicators 
CURRENT OOICK 
Irrleperrlent B t B t 
Variables (SE) (SE) 
OORDrn+ - . 06 - . 20 - . 24 - . 94 
( . 31) ( .  26) 
soorn+- - . 44 -1 . 61 - . 50 -2 . 16** 
( . 28) ( . 23 )  
METRO@ - . 14 - . 56 - . 23 -1 . 07 
( .  25) ( . 21) 
BEJ:B -. 002 - . 91 - . 0003 - . 19 
( . 002) ( . 002 ) 
NFFMHS# -1 . 22 -2 . 87*** - . 99 -2 . 79*** 
( . 43) ( . 36) 
FFMHS# . 50 1 . 66* . 06 . 22 
( .  30) ( . 25) 
Intercept 3 . 59 11. 05*** 3 . 10 11 . 37*** 
( .  32) ( . 27) 
F 2 . 61** 2 . 17** 
� . 05 . 04 
* significant at the . 10 level 
** significant at the . 05 level 
*** significant at the • Ol level or better 
Dependent Variables 
ACID 
B t 
(SE) 
- . 05 - . 45 
( . 11) 
- . 05 - . 45 
( . 10) 
- . 05 - . 54 
( . 09) 
. 00003 . 04 
( .  0007) 
- . 16 -1 . 03 
( . 16) 
- . 62 -5 . 54*** 
( . 11) 
. 74 6 . 14*** 
( . 12 )  
5 . 33*** 
. 09 
DlWSAR 
B t 
(SE) 
-36 . 88 -1 . 33 
(27 . 68 )  
-25 . 21 -1 . 01 
(24 . 85) 
-12 . 28 - . 55 
(22 . 51) 
- . 10 - . 58 
( . 16) 
106 . 99 2 . 79*** 
(38 . 36) 
-2 . 66 -0 . 10 
(27 . 33 )  
116 . 40 3 . 97*** 
(29 . 33 )  
1 . 88* 
. 04 
AVPAY 
B t 
(SE) 
-33 . 93 -1 . 46 
(23 . 17) 
-18 . 58 - . 88 
(21. 03 ) 
. 03 . 001 
(18 . 97)  
- . 14 -1 . 01 
( . 14) 
129 . 06 4 . 04*** 
(31 .  92 ) 
4 . 06 . 18 
(22 . 92) 
85. 38 3 . 45*** 
(24 . 75) 
3 . 45*** 
. 06 
+ Reference group includes TX, IA, MS ,  and AlA 
@ Reference group is rural 
# Reference group is NFP indeperrlent ....... � 
....... 
Table 9-c: Multiple Regression Analysis of the Effects of System Membership on Financial Indicators 
DiWCASH CASHDEBI' 
Irrlependent B t B t 
Variables (SE) (SE) 
OORDER+ . 56 . 12 . 19 1.  75* 
(4 . 72) ( . 11) 
soonr+ - . 80 - . 19 . 25 2 . 58*** 
( 4 .  28) ( . 10) 
MEIRO@ -2 . 81 - . 73 -. 03 - . 32 
( 3 . 87) ( .  09) 
BEI::S . 03 1 . 15 . 0008 1 . 28 
( .  03) ( .  0006) 
NFFMHS# -4 . 56 - . 71 - . 61 -4 . 12*** 
(6. 46) ( . 15) 
FFMHS# -26 . 16 -5 . 63*** . 13 1 . 23 
( 4 .  65) ( . 11) 
Intercept 25. 26 5 . 02*** . 11 . 95 
( 5 . 04) ( . 11) 
F 5 . 74*** 5 . 51*** 
R2 . 10 . 10 
* significant at the . 10 level 
** significant at the . 05 level 
*** significant at the . 01 level or better 
Dependent Variables 
FBI'A 
B t 
(SE) 
. 01 . 29 
( . 05) 
. 02 . 40 
( . 05) 
- . 14 -3 . 36*** 
( . 04 )  
. 0005 1 . 54 
( . 0003 ) 
- . 60 -8 . 31*** 
( .  07) 
- . 48 -9 . 42*** 
( . 05) 
. 58 10. 61*** 
( . 06) 
26. 13*** 
. 34 
TDFB 
B t 
(SE) 
- . 05 - . 02 
( 2 .  94) 
2 . 30 . 87 
( 2 .  65) 
-1. 22 - . 51 
(2 . 39) 
- . 0009 - . 05 
( .  02) 
5 . 41 1 . 32 
( 4 . 09 )  
18 . 81 6 . 47*** 
(2 . 91) 
1 . 05 . 34 
(3 . 12) 
7 . 35*** 
. 12 
LTDFB 
B t 
(SE) 
. 22 . 08 
( 2 . 74 )  
2 . 32 . 94 
(2 . 47)  
-1 . 37 - . 61 
(2 . 23)  
. 0003 . 02 
( .  02 ) 
4 . 26 1 . 12 
( 3 . 81) 
17 . 43 6. 42*** 
( 2 .  71) 
. 47 . 16 
(2 .  91) 
7 . 26*** 
. 12 
+ Reference group includes TX, LA, MS ,  arrl AlA 
@ Reference group is rural 
# Reference group is NFP independent .._. .+:> N 
Table 9--c: Multiple Regression Analysis of the Effects of System Membership on Financial Irrlicators 
LTD FA CA'IURN 
Independent B t B t 
Variables (SE) (SE) 
OORDER+ - . 22 -1 . 26 -3 . 81 -2 . 13** 
( . 18) ( 1 .  79) 
soorn+ -. 14 - . 85 -2 . 26 -1 . 4 1  
( . 16) ( 1 . 60) 
MEI'RO@ -. 05 - . 32 -2 . 01 -1 . 39 
( . 14 )  ( 1 . 45) 
BEDS . 0004 . 39 - . 02 -1 . 91* 
( .  001) ( . 01) 
NTIMHS# . 64 2 . 60*** 14 . 25 5 . 75*** 
( .  25) (2 . 48) 
FFMHS# . 78 4 . 45*** 1 . 00 . 57 
( . 17) (1 .  76) 
Intercept . 55 2 . 96*** 8 . 27 4 . 37*** 
( . 19) ( 1 . 89) 
F 4 . 35*** 7 . 48*** 
R2 . 08 . 13 
* significant at the . 10 level 
** significant at the . 05 level 
*** significant at the . Ol level or better 
Dependent Variables 
FA '!URN 
B t 
(SE) 
- . 56 -1 . 09 
( . 52)  
-1 . 18 -2 . 53*** 
( . 47)  
. 61 1 . 45 
( .  42) 
- . 01 -3 . 43*** 
( .  003 ) 
2 . 82 3 . 94*** 
( .  71) 
. 08 . 16 
( . 51) 
3 . 90 7 . 13*** 
( . 55) 
6 . 16*** 
. 11 
TA'IURN 
B t 
(SE) 
. 54 . 77 
( .  71) 
- . 57 - . 90 
( .  64) 
. 89 1 . 55 
( . 57) 
- . 008 -1 . 90* 
( . 004 ) 
1 . 51 1 . 54 
( . 98) 
1. 73 2 . 48*** 
( .  70) 
1 . 87 2 . 49*** 
( .  75) 
2 . 67** 
. 05 
MARKUP 
B t 
(SE) 
- . 36 - . 27 
( 1 .  34) 
1 . 03 . 86 
( 1 .  20) 
- . 91 - . 84 
( 1 . 09) 
-. 003 - . 41 
( .  008) 
. 35 . 19 
( 1 . 87)  
2 . 78 2 . 11** 
( 1 . 32)  
1 . 60 1 . 14 
( 1 . 41) 
1 . 16 
. 02 
+ Reference group includes TX, IA, MS ,  and AlA 
@ Reference group is rural 
# Reference group is NFP independent ...... -!'> w 
Table 9-c: Multiple Regression Analysis of the Effects of System Membership on Financial Indicators 
Independ- NONOPREV ROE 
ent Var- B t B t 
iables (SE) (SE) 
OORDER+ - . 02 -1 . 02 . 38 1 . 90* 
( .  02) ( . 20) 
sourn+ -. 009 - . 59 . 13 . 73 
( . 01) ( . 18) 
MEI'RO@ . 05 3 . 47*** . 31 1 . 93** 
( . 01) ( . 16) 
BEDS . 000 2 . 82*** . 002 1 . 48 
( . 000) ( .  001) 
NTIMHS# - . 04 -1 . 93** -1 . 12 -4 . 06*** 
( .  02) ( .  27) 
FFMHS# - . 04 -2 . 59*** - . 01 - . 07 
( .  02) ( . 20) 
Intercept . 005 . 28 - . 42 -1 . 99** 
( .  02) ( .  21) 
F 6 . 21*** 4 . 33*** 
R2 . 11 . 08 
* significant at the . 10 level 
** significant at the . 05 level 
*** significant at the . 01 level or better 
Deoendent Variables 
ROA OR1ARG 
B t B t 
(SE) (SE) 
. 09 1 . 66* . 04 1 . 52 
( . 05) ( .  02) 
. 12 2 . 49*** . 05 2 . 38** 
( . 05) ( .  02 ) 
-. 004 -. 10 - . 05 -2 . 55*** 
( .  04) ( .  02 ) 
. 0007 2 . 09** - . 000 - . 49 
( .  0003 ) ( . 0001) 
- . 39 -5 . 12*** - . 01 - . 39 
( . 08)  ( .  03) 
. 04 . 75 . 10 4 . 17*** 
( .  05) ( .  02 ) 
oErucr AGE 
B t B t 
(SE) (SE) 
- . 01 - . 55 -3 . 12 -1 . 51 
( .  02) (2 . 06) 
- . 02 -1 . 54 -2 . 74 -1. 47 
( .  02) ( 1 . 86) 
. 02 1 . 39 -1 . 97 -1 . 18 
( .  01) ( 1 . 67)  
. 0005 4 . 51*** - . 02 -1 . 80* 
( . 0001) ( . 01) 
. 03 1 . 13 4 . 01 1 . 36 
( .  02) (2 . 95) 
-. 003 - . 19 -6 . 56 -3 . 25*** 
( .  02 ) (2 . 02) 
-. 12 -1 . 98** - . 02 - . 83 . 13 7 . 28*** 14 . 12 6 . 37*** 
( . 06) ( .  02 ) ( . 02)  (2 . 22)  
7 . 22*** 5 . 74*** 5 . 24*** 3 . 61*** 
. 12 . 10 . 09 . 07 
+ Reference group includes TX, IA, MS ,  and AlA 
@ Reference group is rural 
# Reference group is NFP independent .._. -!'> -!'> 
Table 10-c: Year of Acquisition by MHS OWnership Type 
MHS 
OWnership 
For-Profit 
Not-For-Profit 
1978 
2 
Year of Acquisition 
1979 1980 1981 
2 8 16 
2 5 
145 
1982 Total 
1 29 
6 13 
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